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INTRODUCTION 
America is suffering from a definitional crisis regarding the term 
“marriage.” This crisis has crystallized in the context of the debate over same-
sex marriage.2 Because Americans cannot agree on what marriage is or should 
be, we cannot agree on whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. 
Moreover, Americans have historically—and in recent years, sometimes 
deliberately—conflated notions of civil marriage and religious marriage.3 This 
has resulted in the imposition of a religious definition of marriage on the larger 
society. As a consequence, the definitional crisis is not mere disagreement about 
the humanity of same-sex couples—rather, the crisis also carries constitutional 
implications because of the tangled histories of religious and civil marriage. 
Nevertheless, the status quo (opposite-sex marriage only) remains largely 
 
 2. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “same-sex marriage” and “same-sex civil marriage” 
interchangeably to connote all two-party civil relationships in which one or both of the parties, for 
whatever reason, do not conform to a “one biological man, one biological woman” paradigm. The 
terms do not include incestuous, bestial, plural, polygamous, polygynous, polyandrous, 
polyamorous, monoamorous, child-adult, child-child, or group marriage models. 
 3. See infra Part I.B (discussing the ecclesiastical roots of modern-day civil marriage in 
America). 
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undisturbed: In all but one of the fifty states,4 marriage is presently defined—
either explicitly or implicitly—as the legal union of one man and one woman.5 
Most of the present-day definitional tension arises because American 
governments have historically intertwined the civil and religious roots of 
marriage. According to the Pew Research Center, the two most common 
demographic indicators for opposition to same-sex civil marriage are age6 and 
religiosity.7 Indeed, young adults and “seculars” actually favor same-sex civil 
marriage by substantial margins.8 The most commonly-cited reason for 
opposing same-sex civil marriage is that it goes against one’s own religious 
 
 4. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is only state to bestow full marriage rights on same-
sex couples. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the 
Massachusetts Legislature’s failure to extend civil marriage to same-sex couples violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution’s equal protection guarantees; giving the Massachusetts Legislature 180 
days to enact same-sex civil marriage); see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 
(Mass. 2004) (responding to question from Massachusetts Senate regarding the permissibility of 
same-sex civil unions in lieu of same-sex civil marriage; holding that the same state constitutional 
infirmities lay with permitting only same-sex civil unions as with failing to permit same-sex civil 
marriage). 
As this Article is going to press, the Massachusetts Legislature has just voted to authorize a citizen 
petition proposing a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage. Cf. Doyle v. 
Sec. of the Commonwealth, SJC-09887, slip op. at *1 (Mass. Dec. 27, 2006) (in response to suit seeking 
order forcing the legislature to vote on the petition, holding that, while no judicial remedy existed to 
force a vote on the petition, “[t]hose members who now seek to avoid their lawful obligations . . . , 
ultimately will have to answer to the people who elected them”). The Legislature must authorize the 
petition in its 2007 legislative session before the measure can be placed on the statewide ballot in 
2008. Authorization requires a “yes” vote from twenty-five percent of the legislators in two 
consecutive legislative sessions; the 2006 session was the first. It is unclear whether the petition will 
pass in 2007, and if it appears before the voters in 2008, it is unclear whether the measure will be 
adopted. See Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage Vote Advances in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, 
at A12. 
In 2006, a Boston Globe survey showed that approximately fifty-six percent of Massachusetts 
residents support same-sex civil marriage. See Michael Powell & Robin Shulman, Mass. Gay Marriage 
Law Contested, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A3. 
 5. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 208 & n.11 (N.J. 2006) (cataloguing marriage laws in all 
fifty states). 
 6. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE ON SOCIAL 
ISSUES 8 (2006), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/social-issues-06.pdf. [hereinafter PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS] (reporting that, as of August 2006, persons age sixty-
five or older were thirty-five percent more likely to oppose same-sex civil marriage—termed “gay 
marriage” in the study—than were persons age eighteen to twenty-nine (seventy-three percent to 
thirty-eight percent)). 
 7. Id. (reporting that persons who attended religious activities “weekly or more” were forty 
percent more likely to oppose same-sex civil marriage than were persons who attended “seldom or 
never” (seventy-five percent to thirty-five percent)). 
 8. Id. (reporting that same-sex civil marriage enjoyed “relatively high levels of support” from 
persons under thirty and persons characterized as “secular” (fifty-three and sixty-three percent, 
respectively)). In the study, “seculars” includes those whose self-described religious preference was 
“[n]o religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic.” Id. at 26. However, across the entire population, the 
more frequently one attends religious functions, the likelier one is to oppose same-sex marriage: 
Seventy-five percent of persons attending “[w]eekly or more” opposed “gay marriage,” while fifty-
five percent of persons attending “[s]eldom or never” supported it. Id. at 8. 
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beliefs.9 These statistics are consistent with the Pew Research Center’s 
conclusion that opposition to homosexuality and gay rights is derived primarily 
from religious beliefs.10 
This is not to say that one could not both hold religious beliefs opposed to 
homosexuality and support same-sex marriage as a civil right. Indeed, the very 
fact that a small percentage of Evangelical Christians favor same-sex civil 
marriage shows this to be possible.11 One likely reason for this welcome 
statistical variance is that many religious believers do not consider it appropriate 
for their beliefs to drive generally-applicable public policy—said differently, 
these believers prefer that spiritual and worldly authority remain separate.12 It 
seems that, despite their philosophical differences,13 religious believers and 
“Secularists” (atheists, humanists, etc.14) have nevertheless found common 
ground.15 
These highly-textured statistics motivated me to investigate the extent to 
which religious beliefs are the driving force behind statutory and constitutional 
initiatives to prohibit judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex civil 
marriage. My findings were unsurprising: The overwhelming majority of 
 
 9. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY 14 
(2003), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-homosexuality.pdf. [hereinafter PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS] (reporting that, as of November 2003, sixty-two percent of 
respondents claimed that same-sex civil marriage—termed “gay marriage” in the study—went 
against their religious beliefs, and that, of those respondents opposed to same-sex civil marriage, 
forty-five percent offered explicitly religious grounds as a justification for holding that position (this 
last question was asked in an open-ended format)). 
 10. Id. at 1–5 (reporting that no major religious group has a majority expressing favorable views 
of gays and lesbians, while sixty percent of seculars hold positive views of homosexuals). See also 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that, along religious 
lines, same-sex civil marriage enjoys a majority of support only among seculars (sixty-three 
percent)). 
 11. See PEW FORUM, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that fourteen percent 
of White Evangelicals favored “gay marriage”). 
 12. As we have seen, however, the more religiously-committed one is, the less likely one is to 
believe that such separation is theologically acceptable. See PEW FORUM, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, 
supra note 6, at 8; PEW FORUM, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, supra note 9, at 1–6. 
 13. From simple definitions: “secularism” is defined as “[t]he doctrine that morality should be 
based solely on regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all 
considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future state.” XIV OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 849 (2d 
ed. 1989) (alteration added). Conversely, “religion” is defined as a 
[r]ecognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his 
destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental 
and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the 
individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard 
of spiritual and practical life. 
XIII OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 569 (2d ed. 1989) (alteration added). 
By definition, then, it seems that one cannot be both a “theist” and a “non-theist”: One belief 
system claims “there is not a god” while the other claims “there is a god.” Rationally speaking, God 
either exists or she doesn’t—she cannot both exist and not exist, for that would be the very definition 
of a logical contradiction. 
 14. See infra text accompanying note 144. 
 15. See infra notes 145–50 (describing the Secularist position on same-sex marriage; noting that 
most of these positions are derived both from personal morality and from an objection to using 
religious beliefs as a ground for social policy). 
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support for bans on same-sex civil marriage has come from religious believers, 
and the so-called “secular justifications” for these bans are mere pretexts for 
religious beliefs that homosexuality, homosexuals, and same-sex couples are evil 
or sinful. Opponents of same-sex civil marriage derive their preferred definition 
of marriage almost entirely from the Christian precept that one-man, one-
woman marriage was “ordained by God”16 and is therefore inherently superior 
to same-sex unions. The ongoing effort of the radical Christian right to impose 
its religious beliefs on Americans of all faiths and traditions has begun in 
piecemeal fashion—at the state level through state statutes and constitutional 
amendments, and at the federal level through the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act17 and the various proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution.18 
This Article discusses how, because of America’s history of blending 
religious and civil marriage, as well as the preservationist’s ongoing campaign 
to codify religious marriage in the law, our current definition of “civil” marriage 
is impermissibly derived from religious precepts, without a sufficient—or 
 
 16. E.g., 150 CONG. REC. H6587 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (“Marriage was ordained by 
God . . . .”); 152 CONG. REC. S5525 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
It is my belief that the State of ‘marriage’ can exist only between a man and a woman. The 
Bible tells us that marriage must be defined this way, and that the marriage vow between 
a husband and wife, meaning between a man and a woman, is sacred. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]hroughout the annals of human experience, the relationship of a man and woman 
joined in holy matrimony has been a keystone to the stability, strength, and health of 
human society. I believe in that sacred union to the core of my being. 
Id. (alteration added); 152 CONG. REC. H5295 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Carter) (“I 
believe [marriage] is part of God’s plan for the future of mankind. The sacredness of a marriage is 
based, to this Nation, and, quite frankly, every Nation on Earth, it is how the based governing we 
have in our lives starts.” (alteration added)); id. at H5297 (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (“[T]hose of us 
who support this constitutional amendment feel that this is all about marriage that result, or 
potentially can result, in the procreation of children. This is what our Constitution has implied for 
223 years and, indeed, what the word of God has implied for 2,000 years.” (alteration added)); id. at 
H5301 (statement of Rep. Pence) (“I believe that marriage matters, that it was ordained by God, 
instituted among men, that it is the glue of the American family and the safest harbor to raise 
children.”); id. at H5306 (statement of Rep. Beauprez). 
I think very often about the fact that we proudly profess that we are founded on Judeo-
Christian principles. 
. . . . 
. . . [M]arriage, since the beginning of time, as close as I can tell, ha been between a man 
and a woman. If it was, indeed, good enough for our Creator, and it was indeed our 
Creator’s plan, that we were created different for an absolute divine purpose, I think we 
best not be messing with His plan today. 
Id.; 150 CONG. REC. H7894 (2004) (statement of Rep. Bartlett). 
In the Christian community, and we are a Christian Nation . . . marriage is generally 
recognized as having started in the Garden of Eden. You may go back to Genesis to find 
that and you will note there that God created Adam and Eve. He did not create Adam and 
Steve. A union between other than a man and a woman may be something legally, but it 
cannot be a marriage, because marriage through 5,000 years of recorded history has 
always been a relationship between a man and a woman. 
Id. 
 17. See discussion infra Parts II.A, V.A.1. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II. 
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rational—secular justification. What is the remedy? Courts should take a hard 
look at the substantive justifications offered in support of same-sex marriage 
bans, bearing in mind that (1) these justifications are universally offered by 
religious believers but are infrequently offered by credentialed Secularists, and 
(2) they are the result of a studied use of pretextual, secular-sounding language 
to cloak a religiously-motivated bias against homosexuals and same-sex couples. 
In Part I, I describe the definitional problem, briefly explore the roots of civil and 
religious marriage in America, and survey the variety of religious and 
irreligious beliefs about the morality of homosexuality and same-sex unions. In 
Part II, I describe what same-sex marriage bans are, introduce the proposed 
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) as exemplary of all such bans, and 
determine that fundamentalist religious beliefs are the common trait held by the 
vast majority of witnesses who testified before Congress in favor of the FMA. In 
Part III, I introduce the concept of “preservationism”—a unifying theory to 
explain the invidious religious purpose underlying the “secular” justifications 
for same-sex civil marriage bans. In Part IV, I discern the background neutrality 
principles underlying modern-day Establishment Clause jurisprudence, briefly 
delineate the two primary interpretive methods that the Supreme Court 
currently applies to Establishment Clause claims, and determine that the Lemon-
endorsement test is the appropriate vehicle for analyzing the First Amendment 
implications of same-sex marriage bans. In Part V, I raise—and dismiss—the 
primary substantive objections to same-sex marriage that are continually raised 
by opponents of same-sex marriage (and key sponsors of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment), demonstrating that all of them fail to have a rationally secular 
relationship to banning same-sex civil marriage. I then apply the Lemon-
endorsement test to the sectarian definition of marriage that same-sex marriage 
bans enshrine into the law, showing that a reasonable observer would conclude 
that such bans endorse one form of religious marriage over another, which 
creates a sizeable class of political outsiders and violates neutrality principles. In 
Part VI, I conclude that, if the Establishment Clause really means what it says, 
same-sex marriage bans impose and endorse one set of religious precepts 
regarding marriage, resulting in an unconstitutional establishment of religion.19 
 
 19. Dissenting voices in two recent same-sex marriage cases raised this same Establishment 
Clause objection sua sponte. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1032–35, 1037 (Wash. 2006) 
(Bridge, J., concurring in dissent) (cataloguing the self-evident religious bias and motivations 
underlying Washington’s 1998 Defense of Marriage Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010(1), 
26.04.020(1)(c), (3) (West Supp. 2006); concluding that “[a] religious or moral objection to same-sex 
marriage is not . . . a legitimate state interest” (emphasis in original)); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 675, 747–48 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting opinion) (noting 
that the religious rationales employed in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971), and Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rested upon 
a “religious doctrine that cannot influence the civil law and, in any case, is not universally shared”; 
cataloguing the objections of several amici that “the ban on same-sex marriage has no secular 
legislative purpose, and the state’s reliance on the common understanding of marriage is a pretext 
for naked religious preference which impermissibly prefers certain religious beliefs over others” 
(internal quotations omitted)), review granted and opinion superseded, S147999 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006). 
Prof. Lynn Wardle recently catalogued the most commonly-used arguments in favor of same-sex 
civil marriage, noting that the Establishment Clause argument has come up several times in the 
literature, but not in the courts. Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why 
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I. DEFINING “MARRIAGE” 
A. A Brief History and Overview 
The idea that the state should—or even could—legally recognize same-sex 
relationships is relatively new. Baker v. Nelson, the first lawsuit seeking a 
marriage license for same-sex plaintiffs, was brought in Minnesota in 1971.20 
Although the Baker plaintiffs were unsuccessful, the case signaled to the nation 
that the modern gay-rights movement had marriage equality on its agenda. 
Many states began to assess the potential constitutional infirmities of their 
common-law definitions of marriage or antiquated marriage statutes. 
Consequently, some states affirmatively outlawed the legal recognition of same-
sex unions through judicial fiat,21 statute, or state constitutional amendment.22 
The number of states outlawing these unions has grown substantially since 2003 
when Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of 
 
and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439, 465 n.129 (2006) (alterations added) [hereinafter Wardle, Federal 
Constitutional Protection]. 
As these cases and articles show, I am not the first person to write in this area, but I am among the 
first to examine the question in detail in the literature since Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005), were 
decided. Without doubt, these cases significantly changed the constitutional landscape—particularly 
in terms of (1) the heightened requirement of government neutrality toward religion after McCreary 
County and (2) what constitutes a permissible morals-based rationale for same-sex marriage bans 
after Lawrence. If the Washington and California marriage cases are any indication, the courts and 
amici are picking up on this change. 
 20. 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
 21. E.g., id. at 186 (holding that the Minnesota marriage statute “does not authorize marriage 
between persons of the same sex and that such marriages are accordingly prohibited”); Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (holding that, although the then-applicable Kentucky 
marriage statutes did not specify the gender of the parties to a marriage, “the relationship proposed 
by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is 
not a marriage”). 
 22. A typical ban might read: “Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or 
performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender are not valid in North 
Carolina.” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West Supp. 2006). Other bans, instead of explicitly calling 
out same-sex couples for exclusion from marriage, might state the ban in more positive-sounding 
terms: “To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one 
woman.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998). A number of bans also prevent the state from 
enacting laws that emulate marriage or provide its legal benefits to non-opposite-sex couples: “Only 
a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state 
and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a 
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, 
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.” OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004). See also VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 15-A (adopted 2006). 
[O]nly a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. 
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal 
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, 
qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political 
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which 
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage. 
Id. (alteration added). See also discussion infra Part II. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
568 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
Public Health.23 The November 2006 election cycle alone saw voters weighing in 
on seven state-level constitutional amendments to prohibit same-sex marriage; 
six were ratified.24 To date, Arizona is the only state in which voters have 
repudiated an attempt to amend a state constitution to ban same-sex civil 
marriage.25 As of this writing, forty-five states have some form of a same-sex 
marriage ban on the books.26 Five of these states nevertheless provide some legal 
rights to same-sex couples.27 The remaining five states and the District of 
Columbia have not passed a statutory ban or a constitutional amendment.28 Of 
these, Massachusetts is the only state to affirmatively recognize same-sex 
marriage;29 courts in the other five jurisdictions have so far refused to force their 
respective legislatures to recognize civil marriage rights for same-sex couples.30 
No state allows marriages between more than two individuals.31 
 
 23. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 24. See CNN.com, America Votes 2006, Key Ballot Measures, http://www.cnn.com/ 
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (reporting on the balloting results from the 
November 2006 election cycle for same-sex civil marriage bans proposed in Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007). 
 25. See id. (reporting on the failure of Arizona Proposition 107 on November 7, 2006). 
 26. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws (Nov. 2006), http://hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Arizona&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Conten
tDisplay.cfm (cataloguing state laws regarding same-sex marriage) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); see also 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage (Oct. 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/cyf/samesex.htm. (last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
 27. See Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition in the U.S. (Apr. 2005), http://hrc. 
org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26860&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Con
tentDisplay.cfm (listing California, Connecticut, Hawai’i, Maine, and Vermont as states that provide 
some form of legal rights to same-sex couples) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); cf. Human Rights Campaign, 
Statewide Marriage Laws, supra note 26 (listing California, Connecticut, Hawai’i, Maine, and 
Vermont as having statutory bans on same-sex marriage). 
 28. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws, supra note 26 (listing 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia as 
the only jurisdictions without an affirmative ban on same-sex civil marriage). 
 29. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Opinions of the Justices 
to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
 30. E.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (refusing to find a due process or equal 
protection violation under the New York Constitution for the legislature’s failure to permit same-sex 
civil marriages; holding that permitting such marriages was within the power of the legislature and 
would not be unconstitutional under the state constitution); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) 
(refusing to find a due process violation under the New Jersey Constitution for the legislature’s 
failure to permit same-sex civil marriages; holding that failure to provide same-sex couples with the 
legal rights, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage violated the state constitution; holding further 
that, in fashioning a remedy for the equal-protection violation, the legislature was not compelled to 
call the resulting legal arrangement “marriage,” although it was within the legislature’s power to do 
so); Dean v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991) 
(challenging the 1981 version of the District of Columbia’s Marriage Act, which has been 
subsequently amended to provide limited domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples, while 
still reserving “marriage” for opposite-sex couples), available at 1992 WL 685364, aff’d on other 
grounds, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); see also Tom Hester, Jr., N.J. Gov. to Make Gay Unions Official, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2006 (announcing decision of New Jersey legislature to remedy the 
equal-protection violation in Lewis through same-sex civil unions), available at http://pewforum. 
org/news/display.php?NewsID=12246 (last visited Dec. 21, 2006). 
 31. See infra notes 40–41 (discussing polygamy); see also infra Part V.A.3.c; notes 397–400 
(discussing the teleological argument against same-sex marriage). 
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Thirty-five years after Baker v. Nelson,32 a majority of Americans still oppose 
allowing same-sex couples the right to marry.33 However, a majority also believe 
that it is important to give same-sex couples some legal protections.34 Moreover, 
the size of that majority is growing and has been for at least a decade.35 
Presumably, this is because more and more Americans are beginning to 
understand the hardship wrought upon gay and lesbian families who are 
denied the panoply of state and federal rights, benefits, protections, and 
responsibilities afforded by civil marriage.36 If this liberalizing trend continues, a 
majority of Americans may soon come to believe that civil marriage should be 
made available to same-sex couples. At that time, we could expect that several 
jurisdictions might amend their definitions of marriage to permit same-sex civil 
marriage. 
But what is the definition of marriage? Why should we amend it? Why 
should we not amend it? In undertaking this inquiry, we immediately encounter 
difficulty. Currently, marriage is defined on both semantic and substantive 
levels. First, the semantic: Those opposed to giving same-sex couples access to 
marriage claim that, because marriage has only ever been between “one man 
and one woman,” that this is all that marriage could ever be.37 Tactically, this 
 
 32. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971). 
 33. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that fifty-
six percent of respondents opposed same-sex civil marriage). 
 34. See id. at 1 (reporting that, as of August 2006, fifty-four percent of Americans support giving 
same-sex couples access to civil unions). 
 35. Cf. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGION AND POLITICS: CONTENTION AND CONSENSUS 1–2 
(2003), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf. (reporting that, between 
June 1996 and July 2003, the percentage of overall opposition to same-sex civil marriage dropped 
thirteen points, from sixty-five percent to fifty-three percent, while, over the same period, support 
for same-sex civil marriage rose eleven points, from twenty-seven percent to thirty-eight-percent). 
 36. A recent report released by the presently-named Government Accountability Office 
identified 1,138 discrete federal-level benefits that attach to legal marriage. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. See also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 
(Wash. 2006) (Madsen, J., plurality opinion) (cataloguing several ways in which same-sex couples 
and families headed by same-sex couples are disadvantaged because they cannot access the state-
level rights and obligations available to married couples; describing this disparity as a “clear 
hardship”). The state-level benefits that attach to marriage are so numerous and vary so widely that 
cataloguing them here would be impractical. 
 37. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“Marriage 
is embraced and intuitively understood to be what it is. Marriage is a union between a man and a 
woman.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5440 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“When it comes 
to same-gender couples there is a problem of definition. Two women or two men simply do not 
meet the criteria for marriage as it has been defined for thousands of years. Marriage is, as it always 
has been, a union between a man and a woman.”); id. at S5441 (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“[T]he 
basics of it say marriage is the union of a man and a woman, as it has been as an institution for 
thousands of years.” (alteration added)); id. at S5450 (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (“[T]he one-man, one-
woman family structure is a crucial foundational element of the American democratic society . . . .” 
(alteration added)); id. at S5456 (statement of Sen. Vitter) (“marriage is truly the most fundamental 
institution in human history”); id. at S5459 (statement of Sen. Thune) (same-sex couples are “trying 
to define marriage in a way that is contrary to what I believe is the tradition of this country, not only 
the tradition of this country, but since the beginning of time”); id. at S5474 (statement of Sen. 
Martinez) (“Our traditional and religious understanding of marriage is under attack by those who 
wish to redefine the meaning of marriage and family.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5533 (daily ed. June 7, 
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tautology is useful in deflecting criticism of an anti-same-sex marriage position, 
because it inevitably leads to a “yes it is, no it isn’t” banter that distracts from 
the substantive issue at hand. 
Logically, however, this self-defining model of marriage is visibly 
undermined by its question-begging and circular reasoning.38 By assuming the 
conclusion they wish to reach—that “marriage is marriage”—opponents of 
same-sex marriage have provided themselves with a pithy sound-bite—albeit 
one that fails to offer a substantive justification for itself.39 As a lexicographical 
matter, the proposition “marriage is marriage” is inherently circular; it is 
impossible to divine the meaning of “marriage” without looking to sources of 
information beyond the word itself. Typically, however, opponents offer no 
additional normative reasons to explain why this definition of marriage is the 
only possible one, or for that matter, why any particular definition of marriage 
should remain static. 
Moreover, the factual claim itself—that marriage has always been between 
only one man and one woman—is only half true: Polygamous marriage models 
have existed in many non-Western civilizations throughout history, and several 
currently exist today.40 Narrowing the “marriage is marriage” definition to 
encompass only Western civilizations—or only the United States—also fails: 
Before Utah joined the Union, the early Mormon Church openly practiced 
polygamy, which establishes that the proffered definition is premised on 
historical inaccuracies.41 Moreover, polygamous sects in Utah and the 
surrounding areas persist today.42 
 
2006) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Throughout human history and culture, the union between a man 
and a woman has been recognized as the cornerstone of our society.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5293 (daily 
ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Neugebauer) (“Thousands of years and many civilizations have 
defined a marriage as the union between one man and one woman.”); id. at H5295 (statement of Rep. 
Carter) (“The reality is marriage has always been a union between a man and a woman.”). 
 38. See Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 181, 190 
(2005–2006) (describing the definitional argument as “circular and conclusory”); see also Baehr v. 
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (dismissing the definitional argument as “tautological and 
circular”), superseded by constitutional amendment and subsequent statute, HAW. CONST. art I, § 23 
(adopted 1998) (reserving power to define marriage to the legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 
(West Supp. 2006) (defining marriage as between one man and one woman), cited in Carpenter, 
supra, at 190 n.31. 
 39. See Carpenter, supra note 38, at 191–92 (“Perhaps the man-woman definition is the best one; 
but to reach that conclusion we need substantive arguments supporting the definition . . . , not 
simply the definition itself.”). 
 40. See, e.g., PRISCILLA OFFENHAUER, FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., WOMEN IN ISLAMIC 
SOCIETIES: A SELECTED REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 40–41 (2005) (cataloguing the 
history and prevalence of state-sanctioned polygamy throughout the Islamic world, including 
practices that persisted into the Twentieth Century in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen). According to Offenhauer, legal polygamy 
persists into the Twenty-First Century in several of these nations, including Egypt, Iran, and Yemen. 
Id. 
 41. See generally, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (acknowledging the history 
and then-current practice of polygamy in the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons) in the Utah Territory and surrounding areas). 
 42. See Bill Hanna, Sect’s Texas Outpost Looking Permanent, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1, 
2007, at B1 (cataloguing history of the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints from 1890–2006, 
ending with the June 2006 arrest of Warren Jeffs, the sect’s leader). The Fundamentalist LDS Church, 
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These brief analyses show why limiting our inquiry to only the semantic 
level proves unhelpful in discerning a normative definition of “marriage.” 
Nevertheless, because the definitional argument is commonly encountered, it is 
addressed below in greater detail.43 
Same-sex marriage advocates44 must sidestep this semantic quagmire and 
instead examine the substantive issues that give rise to our definitional crisis. 
For our purposes, a primary method of defining substantive marriage will be to 
identify and distinguish marriage’s civil and religious aspects. This cannot be 
achieved without identifying exactly what marriage is designed to do—i.e., 
identifying the purposes it is intended to serve. We must keep in mind, 
however, that any purpose we identify must clear the constitutional hurdles 
designed to check unbridled majoritarian will.45 We may not develop or 
implement a model of marriage that inherently violates the Constitution.46 
Opponents of same-sex marriage claim that marriage is instrumental in 
achieving ends that only opposite-sex couples can meet.47 As such, we can 
characterize their preferred conceptions of marriage as very narrow. For 
example marriage is, according to opponents, designed to provide an “ideal 
environment” for raising children; by definition, this model must include only 
one father and one mother, whose “gender complementarity” will teach 
children proper sex roles within adult relationships.48 This “ideal environment” 
is often said to be the best method by which social values and knowledge can 
pass between generations; ergo, the government should encourage “responsible 
procreation,” or procreation within the confines of a pre-existing marriage.49 
Whether by chance or by design, same-sex couples fall outside this 
articulation of marriage—because same-sex couples are inherently mono-
gendered, they cannot procreate without assistance, and they cannot provide 
children with both a “mother” and “father” in the classic sense. As a result, 
opponents conclude that marriage should not be made available to same-sex 
couples. 
Each of the opponents’ arguments proceeds in a fashion similar to this one. 
By intentionally characterizing the purpose, nature, and function of marriage 
very narrowly, they are conveniently able to prevent same-sex couples from 
falling within the definition. Under this narrow sense of marriage, opponents 
 
an offshoot of the larger Mormon church, has practiced polygamy and child marriage throughout its 
entire history, up to and including the present day. See id. 
 43. See infra Part V.A.2.b. 
 44. In the interests of full disclosure, I admit that I fall into this category. 
 45. “If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
 46. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s ban on interracial 
marriage for violating both due process (by impermissibly burdening the fundamental right to 
marry) and equal protection (by drawing an impermissible racial classification) under the federal 
Constitution). 
 47. See infra Part V.A (raising and dismissing the key arguments used to justify bans on same-
sex civil marriage). 
 48. See infra Part V.A.2.e. 
 49. See infra Parts V.A.2.c, f. 
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thus conclude that marriage-qua-marriage cannot, by definition, be made 
available to same-sex couples, because “what they want does not exist.”50 
Conversely same-sex marriage advocates take a broader view, frequently 
conceiving of marriage as a choice-based institution that is designed to allow 
individuals to make autonomous decisions as to partner, family structure, and 
effective methods of values-transfer to children.51 Indeed, one of the primary 
rebuttals to the “ideal” environment characterization of marriage is the very 
existence of divorce—if marriage is truly only about providing a mother and 
father for as many children as possible, then governments should necessarily 
make it much harder for married couples (and particularly those with children) 
to obtain a divorce.52 Moreover, if marriage were only about encouraging 
“responsible procreation,” couples that are infertile, elderly, or who do not want 
children should not be permitted to marry at all.53 Yet, such prohibitions do not 
exist and seem intuitively absurd—but why? If Supreme Court precedent is any 
guide, marriage has been substantively reconceived as a private-ordering 
system that is not expressly tied to procreation and child-rearing;54 thus, it 
would appear that marriage-qua-marriage—at least as opponents have 
conceived of it—does not exist.55 If this is indeed the case, then, as a friend of 
 
 50. See Carpenter, supra note 38, at 186 (explaining the definitional argument). 
 51. Cf. generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003) (evaluating the fit of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), within the larger body of autonomous choices that are currently protected by the Court’s 
fundamental privacy-rights jurisprudence). 
 52. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see infra Part V.A.2.e. 
 53. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see infra Part V.A. 
 54. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prisoner’s right to marry could 
not be burdened by a requirement that the prisoner first receive permission from the prison warden 
before being permitted to marry another inmate or a citizen). Turner did not assume that prisoners 
have any right to conjugal visits or other sexual relations with their spouses. See id. at 95–96; accord 
Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 572, 
587 (1997) (“By acknowledging that the state could refuse to allow prisoners to have sex with their 
spouses while incarcerated, the [Turner] Court implicitly rejected any contention that procreation is 
an indispensable attribute of marriage.” (alteration added)) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996)); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 n.36 (2004) (noting that Turner held “without assuming that prisoners have 
any right to conjugal visits, that prisoners have a right to marry”); Note, Litigating the Defense of 
Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2691 (2004) (“Of 
particular importance [to the evolution of marriage] was the extension, in Turner v. Safley, of the 
right to marry to [sic] circumstances under which procreation and child rearing were literal 
impossibilities.” (alterations added and footnote omitted)); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
482 (1965) (holding a statutory ban on contraception to be an unconstitutional violation of a married 
couple’s due process right to privacy in procreative decisionmaking). 
 55. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2003) (in 
supporting broader marriage equality, suggesting that “family law is moving from a conception of 
marriage as an institution with a uniform meaning to a more variegated view that assesses marriage 
in terms of discrete groupings, or ‘bundles,’ of rights and responsibilities”). 
An argument also exists that marriage as opponents would have it has never existed: In many 
societies, marriage began as a means to transfer wealth and property within bloodlines and class 
structures. While this history does not challenge the teleology of marriage, it does challenge the 
opponents’ claimed reasons for having marriage at all. 
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mine once said, “What’s the big deal with letting two people own property 
together?” 
This definitional question has traditionally sounded in two constitutional 
doctrines: due process and equal protection.56 It is important to briefly examine 
these doctrines before addressing the substantive Establishment Clause 
question, because the level of scrutiny and analytical methods employed in 
these areas will prove to be highly relevant.57 
First, the definitional question we face implicates “fundamental rights” 
under substantive due process. Opponents of same-sex marriage seek to define 
the right to marry very narrowly, while supporters seek a broader definition. (In 
other due-process cases, the outcome turned on whether the narrow or broad 
definition of the right prevailed,58 just as it does here.) If a court construes the 
claimed right to marry narrowly, then same-sex marriage advocates have a 
difficult road to hoe: “[T]he right to marry someone of the same sex”59 is not 
fundamental, because same-sex civil marriage is not “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition;”60 as a result, the government’s interest in 
 
 56. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960 (Mass. 2003) (“The plaintiffs 
challenge the marriage statute on both equal protection and due process grounds.”); Lewis v. Harris, 
908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs presented both due process and equal protection 
claims); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (same); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 57. See infra Part V. 
 58. E.g., compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding Georgia’s sodomy 
statute to be constitutional, because the fundamental due process “right to privacy” did not include 
a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”), with id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“This case is about the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men, 
namely, the right to be let alone.” (quotations and citation omitted)), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”). Compare also 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (holding that the 
fundamental “right to parent” does not include awarding procedural due process rights to a natural 
father seeking paternity rights, when (1) the natural father is not the mother’s husband, (2) the 
presumption of marital paternity has gone unrebutted, and (3) the mother’s husband wishes to 
“embrace the child” within a “unitary family”), with id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the 
fundamental due process conception of “‘liberty’ must include the freedom not to conform” to pre-
existing conceptions of “family” and “parenthood”). 
In his Michael H. plurality opinion, Justice Scalia attempted to fix the method of inquiry for 
fundamental due process claims as “refer[ring] to the most specific level at which a relevant 
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Id. at 128 n.6. 
While four Justices signed on to the plurality opinion, Scalia’s conception of fundamental due 
process claims received only two votes: his and Justice Rehnquist’s. See id. at 132 (O’Connor, 
Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part). 
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion. . . . On occasion the Court has 
characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that 
might not be the most specific level available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by 
the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 59. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9. 
 60. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (holding that there is no fundamental 
liberty interest in committing suicide or in assisting someone to commit suicide, because committing 
suicide is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”) (citation omitted). 
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providing only opposite-sex couples with civil marriage receives rational-basis 
review. Analytically, same-sex marriage advocates are thus required to establish 
two propositions: (1) preventing same-sex couples from marrying is not 
rationally related to the state’s interests in sustaining opposite-sex marriage and 
(2) allowing opposite-sex couples to marry is also not rationally related to the 
state’s interests. Stated differently, same-sex marriage advocates are essentially 
required to establish that the state’s purported interests in maintaining opposite-
sex marriage are not legitimate.61 This is very difficult for two reasons: (1) there 
are many reasons that governments have opposite-sex marriage, and courts will 
probably find at least some of them to be legitimate; and (2) it is more likely than 
not that courts will determine opposite-sex marriage rationally advances these 
interests. Of all courts-of-last-resort to review due-process claims for same-sex 
marriage, only Goodridge has held that the state’s asserted interests did not 
survive rational-basis review under a due process claim;62 this is partly because 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the right in question to be 
“the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject to appropriate 
government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare.”63 
No court yet has found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage per se. 
Second, our definitional question also raises equal-protection concerns. 
Laws that limit marriage to heterosexuals single out sexual minorities64 for 
disparate treatment based on a single trait. If courts begin to find that sexual 
minorities—particularly homosexuals—comprise a suspect class, they would 
begin to undertake a heightened scrutiny of the classifications drawn by 
heterosexuals-only marriage laws. Technically speaking, having a heterosexual 
sexual orientation is not a prerequisite to marriage: As many opponents delight 
in noting, homosexuals remain free to get married—they just have to marry 
someone of the opposite sex.65 Nevertheless, under heightened-scrutiny review, 
a court would examine the classification to determine what group is most likely 
to be disparately impacted by the law. Clearly, same-sex civil marriage bans 
have no legal effect on heterosexuals, who continue to enjoy the right to engage 
in a course of action consistent with the nature of heterosexuality: entering into a 
relationship with someone of the opposite sex and subsequently marrying that 
individual. But these bans have a substantial legal effect on homosexuals, who 
are prevented from engaging in a course of action consistent with the nature of 
 
 61. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to 
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not 
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group). 
 62. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
 63. Id. at 958. 
 64. This term is used to represent all manner of non-heterosexual individuals. 
 65. See, e.g., Orson Scott Card, Civilization Watch: Homosexual “Marriage” and Civilization, THE 
RHINOCEROS TIMES (Greensboro, N.C.) (online ed.), Feb. 15, 2004 (“[I]t is a flat lie to say that 
homosexuals are deprived of any civil right pertaining to marriage. To get those civil rights, all 
homosexuals have to do is find someone of the opposite sex willing to join them in marriage. 
(alteration added)), available at http://www.ornery.org/essays/warwatch/2004-02-15-1.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2007). But see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 (holding that “the right to marry means little 
if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice”). 
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homosexuality: entering into a relationship with someone of the same sex and 
then marrying that person. As a result, homosexuals as a class are prevented 
from engaging in a desired course of action based on a single trait, and the 
marriage bans that draw these classifications would face an uphill battle within 
a heightened-scrutiny regime. 
Unfortunately, the equal-protection heightened-scrutiny claim has not 
caught on in either federal or state courts.66 As such, rational-basis review is 
currently all that is available for same-sex marriage advocates. Therefore, 
advocates must undertake an analysis similar to the one outlined above for due 
process. Essentially, they must establish that a heterosexuals-only definition of 
marriage irrationally discriminates against homosexuals as homosexuals. Said 
differently, advocates must establish that the state has no legitimate interest in 
excluding homosexuals from marriage when it makes marriage available to 
heterosexuals. 
Because marriage is, in due-process terms, an individually-based right and 
not a couple-based right, it makes sense to characterize the equal-protection 
claim here along the lines of sexual orientation—a classification based on sexual 
orientation impacts individuals and not couples. However, the equal-protection 
violation could also be characterized as challenging the disparate treatment of 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples. Regardless of how the argument is cast, the 
methodology of the rational-basis analysis remains the same.67 
All told, advocates have had more success making equal-protection claims 
than due-process claims: All courts that have ruled in favor of same-sex couples 
have invoked equal protection; these cases have universally resulted in civil 
unions. Only Goodridge resulted in “marriage,” most likely because the 
Massachusetts Court also invoked due process; to date, it is the only court to 
have done so. Had Goodridge found only an equal-protection violation, the case 
might well have resulted in civil unions, just like the others.68 
 
 66. But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211–21 (N.J. 2006) (noting that, in light of the general 
equal-protection guarantees of the New Jersey Constitution and the state’s history of positive 
treatment of homosexuals, the interest of same-sex couples in receiving the benefits of marriage 
outweighed the state’s interest in denying same-sex couples these benefits). The Lewis Court did not 
make an express finding that homosexuals are constitutionally entitled to heightened scrutiny for 
equal-protection claims. See id. at 211–24. 
 67. But see generally Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 
34 RUTGERS L.J. 107 (2002) (arguing that same-sex marriage bans constitute straightforward sex-
discrimination violations and are therefore entitled to intermediate scrutiny under the federal 
Constitution); but see also infra note 404 and accompanying text. 
 68. Compare Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969 (in response to both due-process and equal-protection 
violations, construing “civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others”), with Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221–24 (ordering on equal-protection grounds that 
same-sex couples be given the rights and benefits of civil marriage, but not requiring that the 
resulting legal arrangement be termed “marriage”) and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (same). 
See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60–67 (Haw. 1993) (characterizing the equal-protection violation 
as based in sex discrimination, which triggered heightened scrutiny under the Hawai’i Constitution; 
remanding claim for further review under the heightened-scrutiny standard), superseded by 
constitutional amendment and subsequent statute, HAW. CONST. art I, § 23 (adopted 1998) (reserving 
power to define marriage to the legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West Supp. 2006) (defining 
marriage as between one man and one woman). The Baehr Court is the only court-of-last-resort to 
date that has found a ban on same-sex marriage to expressly trigger any constitutionally-mandated 
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As these brief discussions show, the definitional question can be resolved 
in favor of same-sex civil marriage within the scope of either doctrine: Under 
substantive due process, we must adopt a broad definition of the “right to 
marry,” regardless of whether a fundamental right is implicated; under equal 
protection, we must identify homosexuals as a suspect class deserving of 
heightened scrutiny. In rarer instances—i.e., Goodridge69 or Lewis70—we might 
determine that the state’s interest is so lacking that neither of these actions is 
prerequisite to holding in favor of same-sex civil marriage or civil unions. 
The arguments for same-sex civil marriage are numerous, nuanced, and 
complex. Because I am not advancing a due-process or equal-protection 
argument in favor of same-sex marriage, rehearsing them here is not necessary.71 
For our purposes, it is important to keep in mind the courts’ consistent 
application of rational-basis review and the accompanying analytical method. 
B. The Establishment Clause and Our Religious Heritage 
In our pluralistic society, religious beliefs and sectarian texts like the Bible 
are considered by many to be unacceptable grounds for developing generally-
applicable social and political policy.72 The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment reflect the Framers’ understanding that, when society conflates 
worldly and spiritual authorities, it undermines both. Religions cannot flourish 
when subjected to governmental meddling, and republican governments cannot 
survive when they are hijacked by religious dogma. The English settlement of 
New England began as a direct result of religious persecution against the 
Puritan belief system; the Settlers’ own experiments with religious governance 
showed that striving toward an ideologically-homogenous state led to 
dangerously unstable and tyrannical results—i.e., the Salem witch trials. Against 
this instructive history, the Framers drew the Religion Clauses to establish two 
primary goals: (1) keeping the government out of the pulpit (the Free Exercise 
Clause), and (2) keeping the pulpit out of the government (the Establishment 
Clause). 
The American legal system has historically assumed that there is no 
inherent Establishment Clause problem with the form of marriage it inherited 
 
heightened scrutiny, and Baehr is the only case so far to hold for same-sex marriage on a sex-
discrimination theory. 
 69. 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 70. 908 A.2d at 221–24. 
 71. As we will see, the argument is not “give us same-sex marriage.” Instead, it is “you haven’t 
given a good enough reason not to give us same-sex marriage.” These statements are cognitively 
different: one demands a positive assignment of rights, which would shift the scales from being 
weighted against same-sex marriage to being weighted for it; the other merely rids the scales of 
religious arguments—this may or may not weight the scales in favor of same-sex marriage, but it 
certainly makes room for more discussion based on genuinely secular arguments. 
 72. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, http://www.au.org; People for 
the American Way, http://www.pfaw.org; American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org; 
see also infra Table 2 and accompanying text. But see “Our Fight Is Your Fight,” EQUALITY, Fall 2006, at 
9, 11 (interview with Dolores Huerta, co-founder of the United Farmworkers of America) (reporting 
that a California legislator explained his vote against California’s 2006 marriage-equality bill with 
the statement, “I vote my religion.”). 
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from the English common law.73 Indeed, advocates of same-sex marriage have 
brought an Establishment Clause claim in only one case, Dean v. District of 
Columbia [Dean I].74 It is ironic, then, that in dismissing the Dean I plaintiffs’ 
challenge as “patently frivolous,” the trial judge cited to the Bible and to specific 
Judeo-Christian beliefs regarding the immorality of sodomy and the sinfulness 
of possessing a homosexual status.75 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs abandoned 
their Establishment Clause claim on appeal.76 
The Dean I trial court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court’s cases Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,77 McGowan v. Maryland,78 and Bowers v. Hardwick.79 The Court has 
subsequently altered both Lemon and McGowan since Dean I, and their 
applicability to First Amendment challenges has been largely supplanted by 
newer articulations of the constitutional values underpinning the Establishment 
Clause.80 Moreover, Bowers was overruled explicitly in Lawrence v. Texas;81 as a 
result, it is an outstanding question whether bare religious disapproval of 
homosexual conduct still constitutes a legitimate justification for reserving civil 
 
 73. For a brief overview of the development of English ecclesiastical laws and their subsequent 
adoption into American legal canons, see Rev. Ellen M. Barrett, Legal Homophobia and the Christian 
Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1978). See also Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage: The 
Cultural Wars and the Lessons of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427 (2004) (tracing the tangled history of 
religious and civil marriage in early America; delineating extant sources of pre-American religious 
marriage laws, including the Code of Hammurabi, the Torah, the New Testament, Roman consent 
laws, Anglican and Catholic traditions in Europe, and the English common law). 
 74. Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991) (challenging the 1981 
version of the District of Columbia’s Marriage Act, which has been subsequently amended to 
provide limited domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples, while still reserving “marriage” 
for opposite-sex couples), available at 1992 WL 685364, aff’d on other grounds, 653 A.2d 307 [Dean II] 
(D.C. 1995). 
 75. Dean I, slip op. at *4 n.18. 
 76. See generally Dean II, 653 A.2d at 307. 
 77. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (announcing the three-part “Lemon test”; holding that two programs 
providing state aid to non-public sectarian schools constituted excessive government entanglement 
with religion). See also infra Part IV (discussing the Lemon test and its evolution). 
 78. 366 U.S. 420, 442, 444–49 (1961) (holding that, despite their explicitly religious origin, state-
wide Sunday Closing Laws did not violate the federal Constitution, because they had a reasonable 
secular purpose that existed independent of any incidental religious one; noting that “the 
‘Establishment’ Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect 
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions”). It would seem, 
then, that McGowan presents a specific challenge to the thesis presented here—if there is a 
sufficiently secular reason for basing our modern-day definition of marriage upon a religious one, 
why then would opposite-sex marriage laws fail constitutional scrutiny? This characterization of 
McGowan slightly misconstrues the question before us. As I will discuss below, the question is not 
whether there is a “reasonable” secular purpose behind having opposite-sex marriage; this is 
undoubtedly true. Instead, the question is whether there is a “reasonable” secular purpose behind 
banning same-sex civil marriage. As I will establish, there are no such purposes. Therefore, even 
under McGowan’s rule, same-sex civil marriage bans cannot pass constitutional muster. See infra Part 
V.A (raising and dismissing the key arguments used to support same-sex marriage bans). 
 79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 80. See infra Part IV (discussing McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and Van Orden 
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005)). 
 81. 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It 
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
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marriage to opposite-sex couples only.82 No cases since Dean I have raised the 
Establishment Clause question addressed in this Article. Only recently have 
government officials83 and commentators84 begun to recognize the importance of 
 
 82. After Lawrence, many commentators have questioned what morals-based legislation—if 
any—could survive its reasoning. See generally, e.g., Tribe, supra note 54; Sunstein, supra note 51. 
 83. 152 CONG. REC. S5465 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dayton). 
What we ought to do is leave marriage up to God. In the religious marriage services of my 
faith, the minister says that marriage is an institution created by God. Thus, we should 
leave the definition of marriage to those ordained by God, the leaders of the respective 
organized religions, and we should redefine the legal term for marriage to civil union or 
some other words and make that legal contract, with its rights, protections, and 
responsibilities, available equally to any two adult citizens as the equal protection clauses 
of our Constitution require. 
That would be an American, a Christian, and a just resolution to this situation, one that 
elevates and enlightens us, one that continues the progress in our country toward 
acceptance and understanding, one that honors our common humanity. 
Id.; id. at S5469 (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
[I]t should be the right of every religion, under the freedom of religion, to decide the 
sacramental laws of marriage as defined by that religion. But when it comes to the 
contractual right, the civil right, that is determined by the State. That is why when you go 
to get married, you do two things—find a minister, a rabbi, a priest, whatever, but then 
you have to go to the courthouse of your State and get a license. Why? Because you are 
entering a contractual relationship. That is what this amendment would take away. Again, 
I would defend to the death the right of a religion to determine its own sacramental laws 
of what it determines a marriage to be, but also defend the right of a State to set up its own 
contractual laws within and under the umbrella of equal rights for all and 
nondiscrimination under the Constitution of the United States. 
Id. (alteration added). See also 152 CONG. REC. H5294 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Cleaver) (“[T]he domain of the church is the place where definitions should be made with regard to 
marriage. Every denomination has struggled with this issue.” (alteration added)); id. at H5309 
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“The vocal proponents of the MPA [FMA] show their strong and 
willful hatred of the gay and lesbian community. This egregious amendment would enshrine 
discrimination against a specific group of citizens and intolerance of specific religious beliefs into 
our Nation’s most sacred document.” (alteration added)); 150 CONG. REC. H7922 (2004) (written 
statement of Rep. Jones) (“[W]e . . . must resist the temptation to have the State engage in a religious 
battle. Separation of church and state is the basic principle of this Nation and it exempts us from this 
unnecessary action. Separation of church and state gives ministers, rabbis, imams, priests, [and] 
reverends . . . the freedom to practice their faith and choose to marry, or more importantly not to 
marry, any two people before them.” (alterations added)); id. at H7924 (statement of Rep. Wexler) 
(“Not only does this amendment completely disregard [our] basic liberties but it actually erodes the 
religious freedom upon which our great nation was founded.” (alteration added)); id. at H7931 
(statement of Rep. Meehan) (“[I]f we leave the Constitution intact, every church, every community, 
and every State will be free to define marriage as they choose.” (alteration added)); id. at H7932 
(statement of Rep. Honda) (“The legal right to marry—be it man-to-woman or same-sex—is and 
must remain separate from the religious one.”). 
 84. See, e.g., BARRY W. LYNN, PIETY & POLITICS: THE RIGHT-WING ASSAULT ON RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 203 (2006). 
The Federal Marriage Amendment . . . would say to Unitarian ministers, ministers like 
myself in the United Church of Christ, and Reform rabbis, ‘Even though you have 
ecclesiastical authority to perform same-gender marriage rituals, we the state will not 
recognize those.’ That preference for state ‘blessing’ of only certain marriage rituals seems 
clearly to violate the idea of equal treatment of all faith traditions in America. 
Id. See also Editorial, Massachusetts diocese might no longer marry: Episcopal priests would stop acting as 
agents of the state, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), October 11, 2006, at 16A (describing the 
Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts’s proposal to stop performing legal marriages as “a healthy 
separation” between “ministers and priests” and “agents of the state”). 
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separating church from state in the course of resolving the definitional crisis 
regarding marriage. 
American society and governments have historically—and in the past few 
years, deliberately—conflated civil marriage with religious marriage. In colonial 
times, English ecclesiastical marriage served as the model for what is frequently 
termed “traditional marriage.”85 Despite its religious moniker, ecclesiastical 
marriage was derived in part from the feudal system of property, by which 
parents arranged marriages between the children of similarly-stationed families 
in order to protect family interests in land. The church’s role in marriage was 
twofold: (1) to provide a divine blessing for the marriage, and (2) to stand in loco 
gubernationis for the Crown, similar to how a modern-day state or federal agency 
governs under the auspices of its respective executive branch. As a result, the 
church served both religious and legal needs because the English monarchy had 
no administrative system akin to the modern American system.86 
With the rise of the American administrative state, the church found its role 
in the legal—or “civil”—part of marriage increasingly limited: Parties seeking 
only a “civil” marriage can circumvent the religious aspects of marriage entirely, 
as each state vests certain government officials with the power to solemnize a 
marriage. Religious leaders have retained the power to solemnize a marriage on 
behalf of the government—and legal presumptions favoring validity may arise 
as a result of a religious marriage ceremony—but the parties generally must file 
for a marriage license from the state before a marriage becomes fully valid.87 
Modern conceptions of what constitutes a “civil marriage” are relatively 
universal: “Civil marriage” occurs when the government recognizes the legal 
existence of a relationship between certain kinds and numbers of individuals, 
and as a result of that relationship, vests in those individuals a bundle of legally-
enforceable rights, benefits, and responsibilities. Both opponents and advocates 
of same-sex marriage proffer definitions of marriage that fall within this generic 
teleological conception of marriage: What opponents of same-sex marriage call 
“traditional marriage” is the “one-man, one-woman” model of civil marriage 
that prevails in all jurisdictions save Massachusetts; as mentioned above, same-
sex marriage advocates characterize civil marriage as a two-party, choice-based 
institution, regardless of the gender of the parties. Both of these definitions 
classify relationships along lines of quality (i.e., gender of the parties) and 
 
 85. Opponents of same-sex marriage have adopted the phrase “traditional marriage” as a 
clarion call to their fundamentalist constituencies. Lawmakers and fundamentalist political activists 
alike frequently use code words—e.g., “traditional marriage,” “ideal environment,” “gender-
complementarity,” “values-transmission”—to signal their support for insinuating one set of 
fundamentalist Christian values into the law. See discussion infra Part III.A (identifying code words 
as a key part of the modernization of anti-gay discourse). 
 86. See also generally Barrett, supra note 73. 
 87. But see State v. Denton, 983 P.2d 693 (Wash. App. 1999) (validating a marriage when, despite 
their failure to formally file for a marriage license, the couple had gone through a religious ceremony 
and had held one another out as husband and wife for a period of several years). See also IRA MARK 
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 73–79 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the formal 
requirements for licensing and solemnizing a marriage; identifying potential procedural defects in 
meeting these formal requirements; discussing various judicial methods of addressing procedural 
defects). 
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quantity (i.e., number of parties),88 but they give a different weight to each of the 
factors. Advocates place almost no weight on the quality of the parties, while 
opponents give each factor equal importance. 
Religious notions of “marriage” vary widely and depend both upon the 
creed of the religious institution and upon the particular adherents. 
Teleologically, modern permutations of “religious marriage” range from two-
party marriage (including same-sex marriage) to man-woman marriage (so—
called “traditional marriage”) to polygamy. Table 1 summarizes the positions of 
major American and world religions regarding the nature of marriage. 
This list of religious beliefs is far from exhaustive, and it is not intended to 
characterize non-Judeo-Christian faith communities one-dimensionally. It is 
indeed likely that theological and philosophical divisions exist within Buddhist, 
Islamic, and Hindu traditions that parallel the theological divisions among Jews 
and Christians over the issues of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. For our 
purposes, however, this table is sufficient to show that, both in America and 
worldwide, there is no religious consensus on the meaning of “marriage.” 
Opponents of same-sex marriage have pointed out that, regardless of this 
diversity of belief, the vast majority of religious observers in America belong to 
groups that either oppose or are theologically suspicious of homosexuality and 
same-sex marriage.89 Undoubtedly, the opponents’ suggestion is that such an 
incredible majority of believers cannot be wrong about the meaning of marriage. 
While it is true that a huge majority of believers belong to faith traditions that 
profess belief in exclusively opposite-sex marriage, it is an oversimplification to 
assume that every believer within each one of those faith traditions also believes 
that same-sex religious marriage is theologically unsound. Such a suggestion 
belies the complexity of most faith systems and willfully mischaracterizes the 
ongoing theological shift occurring within several large, mainstream churches. 
Consider: the list of religious groups in the “Traditional Marriage” column 
is the largest of any column. However, a nearly-equal number of religious 
groups are listed in the “Traditional Marriage”-Plus column, and if we add in 
the number of religious groups in the Two-Party Marriage column, the total 
exceeds the number of groups listed in the first. Of the groups listed under 
“Traditional Marriage”-Plus, a significant number have simultaneously affirmed 
opposite-sex marriage and begun to grapple with the theological implications of 
same-sex marriage. This reveals that religious beliefs regarding same-sex mar- 
 
 88. There may be a third dimension to the teleological matrix: character (i.e., intimate 
relationship between the parties). However, an intimate relationship is no longer required for a 
marriage to legally exist, and parties to a marriage are not required to love one another before they 
get married. See supra notes 54–55 (discussing the general consensus that the legal aspects of 
marriage no longer turn on the parties’ ability to procreate or their willingness to be intimate). As a 
result, the character of marriage seems significantly less relevant to the teleological debate than the 
quality and quantity of marriage. But see infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the civilizing qualities 
inherent in marital relationships). 
 89. See, e.g., MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, WORLD RELIGIONS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1 (2002) (“In 
the United States, of 163,916,650 adherents of the five major religions [Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism], 160,049,690 are in religious bodies that affirm the classical definition of 
marriage (97.6 percent), while 3,030,930 are in religious bodies which support same-sex ‘marriage’ 
(2.4 percent).” (alteration added)), available at http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/publications/wrr.pdf. 
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TABLE 1. RELIGIOUS VIEWS ON MARRIAGE. 
“Traditional Marriage”: 
Opposite-Sex Marriage 
“Traditional Marriage”-
Plus: 
Opposite-Sex Marriage; 
Some Congregations Bless 
Same-Sex Unions; 
No Unified Theological 
Viewpoint 
Two-Party Marriage: 
Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Polygamy/Polyamory 
Christian Traditions 
American Baptist 
Association
90
 
Anabaptists (Amish, 
Mennonites)
91
 
Assemblies of God 
(Pentecostal)
92
 
Children of God (The 
Family)
93
 
Christian Reformed 
(Calvinist)
94
 
Church of Christ
95
 
Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons)
96
 
Coptic Orthodox
97
 
Evangelical Christian Church 
(Christian Disciples)
98
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses (The 
Watchtower)
99
 
Presbyterian Church in 
America (PCA)
100
 
Reformed Church in 
America
101
 
Roman Catholic Church
102
 
Russian Orthodox Church
103
 
Seventh-Day Adventist
104
 
Southern Baptist 
Convention
105
 
Unification Church 
(“Moonies”)
106
 
United Pentecostal Church 
International
107
 
The Way, International
108
 
Worldwide Church of God
109
 
Judaic Traditions 
Orthodox (and Ultra-
Orthodox)
110
 
Other Traditions 
Baha’i
111
 
Hinduism
112
 
Zoroastrianism
113
 
Christian Traditions 
American Baptist Churches 
in the USA (Northern 
Baptist Convention, 
American Baptist 
Convention)
114
 
Christian Church (Disciples 
of Christ)
115
 
Church of Christ, Scientist 
(Christian Science)
116
 
Community of Christ 
(Reorganized Latter-
Day Saints)
117
 
Cooperative Baptist 
Fellowship
118
 
Episcopal Church, USA
119
 
Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of America
120
 
Presbyterian Church 
(USA)
121
 
Quakers (Society of 
Friends)
122
 
United Methodist Church
123
 
Unity Church
124
 
Judaic Traditions 
Conservative
125
 
Other Traditions 
Buddhism
126
 
Native American 
Traditions
127
 
Neopaganism (Asatru, 
Druid, Wicca, 
Witchcraft)
128
 
Scientology
129
 
Theosophy
130
 
Christian Traditions 
Alliance of Baptists 
(Southern Baptist 
Alliance)
131
 
Evangelicals Concerned
132
 
Metropolitan Community 
Church
133
 
National Gay Pentecostal 
Alliance
134
 
United Church of Canada
135
 
United Church of Christ
136
 
Judaic Traditions 
Reconstructionist
137
 
Reform
138
 
Other Traditions 
Unitarian-Universalist 
Association
139
 
Christian Traditions 
Fundamentalist Latter-Day 
Saints: opposite-sex 
marriage and 
polygamy—man may 
have two or more 
wives
140
 
Other Traditions 
Islam: opposite-sex 
marriage and 
polygamy—man may 
have two or more 
wives
141
 
 
 90. Religious Tolerance.org, American Baptist Association and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_aba.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 91. Religious Tolerance.org, The Mennonite Churches and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_men.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Religious Tolerance.org, The Amish: 
Practices of Various Groups, http://www.religioustolerance.org/amish4.htm (describing marriage 
practices of several Amish communities in America) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 92. Religious Tolerance.org, The Assemblies of God and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_aog.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
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 93. Religious Tolerance.org, The Family a.k.a. The Children of God: Its beliefs about homo-
sexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/homthefam.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 94. Religious Tolerance.org, Christian Reformed Church and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_crc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 95. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Christ, and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_coc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 96. Religious Tolerance.org, The LDS Church & Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_lds.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 97. Religious Tolerance.org, The Coptic Orthodox Church and homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_copt.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 98. Religious Tolerance.org, The Evangelical Christian Church and Homosexuality, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_eccdc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 99. Religious Tolerance.org, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_jeh.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 100. Religious Tolerance.org, The Presbyterian Church in American (PCA) and Homosexuality: 
Statements on homosexuality: 2000 to now, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pcia3.htm (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 101. Religious Tolerance.org, Reformed Church in America and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_rca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 102. Religious Tolerance.org, Roman Catholic Church and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_rom4.htm#ssm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007). 
 103. Religious Tolerance.org, Russian Orthodox Church and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_russi.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 104. Religious Tolerance.org, The Seventh-Day Adventist Church and Homosexuality, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_sda.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 105. Religious Tolerance.org, Southern Baptist Convention and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_sbc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 106. Religious Tolerance.org, The Unification Church and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_uni.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 107. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and the Pentecostal movement, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_upci.htm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007). Several offshoots of the Pentecostal 
movement—e.g., the National Gay Pentecostal Alliance—would fall in the “Two-Party Marriage” 
category as fully affirming the right of same-sex couples to be religiously married. Id. 
 108. Religious Tolerance.org, The Way, International and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_way.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 109. Religious Tolerance.org, The Worldwide Church of God and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_wcg.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 110. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Orthodox Judaism, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_jortho.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 111. Religious Tolerance.org, The Baha’i Faith and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_bah.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 112. MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, supra note 89, at 3 (“Within the history of Hinduism, one finds a 
variety of views on homosexual feelings and behaviors, ranging from indifference to disapproval to 
strong opposition.” (citing Arvind Sharma, Homosexuality and Hinduism, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND 
WORLD RELIGIONS 68 (Arlene Swidler ed., 1993) (observing that as “a religion Hinduism is perhaps 
more tolerant of homosexuality than it is as a culture”))). 
 113. Religious Tolerance.org, The Zoroastrian Faith and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_zor.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Zoroastrians have taken no public 
stance on same-sex marriage, and they are divided regarding the morality of homosexuality. Id. 
 114. Religious Tolerance.org, American Baptist Churches in the USA, and Homosexuality, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_abc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 115. Religious Tolerance.org, The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) and Homosexuality, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_disc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
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 116. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Christ, Scientist (Christian Scientist) & Homo-
sexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chsc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 117. Religious Tolerance.org, The Community of Christ and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_reo.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 118. Religious Tolerance.org, The Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, and Homosexuality, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_cbf.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 119. Religious Tolerance.org, The Episcopal Church, USA and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_epis.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 120. Religious Tolerance.org, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and Homosexuality, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_ecla4.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 121. Religious Tolerance.org, The Presbyterian Church (USA) and Same-Sex Unions, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pru5.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Religious Tolerance.org, The 
Presbyterian Church (USA) and Homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pru.htm 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 122. Religious Tolerance.org, The Society of Friends (Quakers) and Homosexuality, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_quak.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 123. Religious Tolerance.org, The United Methodist Church and Homosexuality: An Overview, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_umc4.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 124. Religious Tolerance.org, Unity Church and Homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/hom_unit.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 125. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Conservative Judaism, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_jcons.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). See also Laurie Goodstein, 
Conservative Jews Allow Gay Rabbis and Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A26 (reporting on the 
December 6, 2006 vote that permitted “individual synagogues to decide whether to accept or reject 
gay rabbis and commitment ceremonies”). 
 126. Religious Tolerance.org, The Buddhist Religion and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_budd.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Buddhists have taken no public 
stance regarding same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id. 
However, the Dalai Lama has described homosexual sex as against Buddhist teachings because it is a 
misuse of the sex organs. Id. 
 127. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Religion: Policies of Non-Judeo-Christian 
Religions, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chur3.htm#nativ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
Many Native American traditions have celebrated homosexuals as healers and shamans, referring to 
them as berdache or “two-spirited.” Id. To date, no Native American tribes permit same-sex 
marriage, but several tribes—including the Cherokee and Navajo—have taken up the issue in recent 
years. See Lois Romano, Battle Over Gay Marriage Plays Out in Indian Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 
2005, at A2 (noting that one Cherokee lesbian couple was permitted to marry before the Cherokee 
Nation banned same-sex civil marriage). 
 128. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Religion: Policies of Non-Judeo-Christian 
Religions, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chur3.htm#neopa (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). It is 
likelier than not that, given the general openness of Neopaganism to homosexuality, most 
Neopaganists would publicly support same-sex marriage within their faith traditions. However, 
given the decentralized nature of the coven system, there is no one public stance on same-sex 
marriage that is attributable to Neopaganism. See id. 
 129. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Scientology® & homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_scie.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Scientologists have taken no public 
stance regarding same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id. 
 130. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Theosophy, http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/hom_theo.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Theosophists have taken no public stance regarding 
same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id. 
 131. Religious Tolerance.org, The Alliance of Baptists and homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/homalbapt.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 132. Evangelicals Concerned, About Evangelicals Concerned, http://www.ecwr.org/aboutus/ 
aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Evangelicals Concerned is “a nationwide ministry which 
encourages and affirms lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered Christians in their faith.” Id. See also 
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-riage are neither static nor universally-held within a single faith system—in 
fact, a heated debate is currently taking place within major religious groups 
around the nation.142 
Finally, it is critical to understand that, just because a particular religious 
group rejects same-sex religious marriage, it does not necessarily follow that the 
 
Neela Banerjee, Gay and Evangelical, Seeking Paths of Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A1 
(reporting on Evangelicals Concerned and other gay-affirming Evangelical Christian groups). 
 133. Religious Tolerance.org, The Metropolitan Community Church and Homosexuality, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_met.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 134. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and the Pentecostal movement, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_upci.htm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007). 
 135. Religious Tolerance.org, United Church of Canada and Homosexuality, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_ucc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 136. Religious Tolerance.org, United Church of Christ and Homosexuality: General Synod 25 in 
2005: Endorsement of same-sex marriage, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_ucca4.htm (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 137. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Other Groups, http://www.religious 
tolerance.org/hom_jother.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 138. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Reform Judaism, 
http://www.religious tolerance.org/hom_jref.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 139. Religious Tolerance.org, The Unitarian-Universalist Association and Homosexuality, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_uua.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 140. See Bill Hanna, Sect’s Texas Outpost Looking Permanent, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1, 
2007, at B1 (cataloguing polygamous history of the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints from 
1890–2006). 
 141. See OFFENHAUER, supra note 40, at 40–41 (cataloguing Islamic nations in which polygamy is 
legal). See also Religious Tolerance.org, Islam and Homosexuality: All Viewpoints, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_isla.htm (noting that Islamic traditions oppose homosexuality and 
same-sex relationships and that homosexual behavior is punishable by death in several Islamic 
nations) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 142. The seriousness of this theological dispute is not debatable. For example, the seventy-seven 
million-member world-wide Anglican Communion, known in the United States as the Episcopalian 
Church, has begun to schism over the ordination of openly homosexual bishops. See, e.g., 
Episcopalians approve gay bishop: Opposition vows to seek intervention from Anglican leaders, CNN.COM, 
Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/05/bishop/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Alex Kirby, 
Analysis: Anglican schism nears reality, BBC NEWS UK, Feb. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/ 
4296373.stm. 
In an attempt to stave off schism, key Anglican leaders have begun a dialogue about how to keep 
the church from fracturing over the issues of homosexuality, gay-ordination, and same-sex marriage. 
E.g., Peter Lee & Jack Spong, A Catechesis on Homosexuality (2006), http://www.dioceseofnewark. 
org/jsspong/catech.html (identifying the roots of the theological debate over homosexuality and 
encouraging Anglicans to remain committed to continued unification) (last visited Aug. 9, 2006). 
Bishops Lee and Spong are from the Dioceses of Christ the King (Southern Africa) and Newark 
(USA), respectively. Id. 
Despite these best efforts, American Episcopalians are finding that the issue of schism is far from 
resolved. On December 17, 2006, eight Episcopal parishes in Virginia voted to break with the 
American Episcopal Church over the ordination of gays and women. Wars of Religion, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 23, 2006, at 65. 
Finally, intra-sect divisions over social issues are not limited to same-sex marriage. For example, in 
the abortion context, most of the religious groups in the “Traditional Marriage” column oppose 
abortion, but polls show that the majority of Americans support preserving a woman’s right to 
choose as a fundamental constitutional right. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ABORTION AND RIGHTS OF 
TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES 1 (2005), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/ 
253.pdf. 
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group also rejects same-sex civil marriage. As mentioned above, some religious 
groups regard the legal right to marry as a civil or human right, regardless of 
their own beliefs about the morality or immorality of homosexuality.143 Likewise, 
individuals within faith traditions are not of one mind—and as voters, they may 
vote against same-sex marriage bans as a matter of civic conscience, while 
simultaneously believing that homosexuality is sinful or theologically 
problematic. 
And what of non-theists? Secularists are found throughout America. By its 
nature, secularism rejects religion and mysticism, instead drawing upon 
philosophy and science as sources of personal morality. As a whole, Secularists 
favor same-sex civil marriage.144 For comparison purposes, the beliefs of 
Secularists are laid out in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. SECULAR VIEWS ON MARRIAGE. 
“Traditional Marriage”: 
Opposite-Sex Marriage 
“Traditional Marriage”-
Plus: 
Opposite-Sex Marriage; 
Some Members Support 
Same-Sex Unions; 
No Unified Viewpoint 
Two-Party Marriage: 
Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Polygamy/Polyamory 
  Atheist Traditions 
American Atheists
145
 
Humanist Traditions 
American Humanist 
Association (Humanist 
Society)
146
 
Council for Secular 
Humanism
147
 
Institute for Humanist 
Studies
148
 
Secular Traditions 
Secular Coalition for 
America
149
 
Secular Judaism
150
 
 
 
 143. E.g., Religious Tolerance.org, Reformed Church in America and Homosexuality, http:// 
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_rca.htm (noting that, while “[h]omosexuality is not God’s 
intended expression of sexuality,” the church also believes that “[h]omosexual persons should be 
accorded their full measure of human and civil rights” (alterations added)) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); 
see also Religious Tolerance.org, The United Methodist Church and Homosexuality: An Overview, 
http://www. religioustolerance.org/hom_umc4.htm (reporting that liberals within the UMC 
“generally look upon gay/lesbian ordination and same-sex marriage as civil rights issues—
fundamental human rights . . . that should be available to persons of all sexual orientations”) (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 144. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 145. American Atheists, Inc., Vote on Federal Marriage Amendment Slated for Tuesday, June 6, 
http://www.atheists.org/action/alert-03-jun-2006.html (urging atheists to “oppose religion-based 
discrimination” in the form of a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage) 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2006); see also American Atheists, Inc., Bush Push for Federal Marriage 
“Protection” Amendment—Senate May Vote Tues [sic] on S.J.1, “The Battle of Our Times,” http:// 
www.atheists.org/flash.line/gaym1.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). 
 146. Press Release, American Humanist Association, Considerations Regarding Proposals to 
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, http://www.americanhumanist. 
org/press/VaticanMarriage.html (noting that the AHA has advocated for legal recognition of same-
sex marriage for decades; stating that “[t]he AHA will continue to advocate for equal justice under 
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These tables are not an exercise in mere exhaustiveness—establishing the 
diversity of religious and Secularist opinion in America is central to the point. 
America’s ongoing failure to distinguish religious from civil marriage has led to 
two constitutionally-impermissible results: (1) the government is allowing a 
majority of religious believers to impose a theological definition of “marriage” 
upon a significantly-sized minority of non-believers and different-believers, 
without offering a rationally secular justification for the mandated definition; 
and (2) by allowing this to occur, the government is endorsing the majority’s 
definition of religious marriage, and as a result, has created a sizeable class of 
political outsiders who are being told that their religious beliefs are, at best, less-
worthy than the majority’s or, at worst, simply wrong. The Establishment Clause 
expressly forbids such explicit sectarianism.151 
II. A PRIMER ON THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND ITS KIN 
A. What Are Same-Sex Marriage Bans and What Do They Do? 
Before we undertake our constitutional analysis, it is important to 
understand what same-sex marriage bans are and what they are intended to 
accomplish. Typically, same-sex marriage bans arise as either constitutional 
amendments or statutory revisions to pre-existing Marriage Acts, and they come 
in two general flavors: those that ban legal recognition of same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions—also known as Defense of Marriage Acts152—
 
the law, and won’t rest until there are equal marriage laws in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia” (alteration added)) (last visited Dec. 19, 2006). See also Charlene Gomes, The Need for Full 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 63 HUMANIST 15 (Sept.–Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.thehumanist.org/ humanist/articles/GomesSO03.pdf. 
 147. Massimo Pigliucci, Rationally Speaking: Bush, the Pope, and Gay Rights (2003), http:// 
www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=columns&page=03-10-pope-vs-gays (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2007). 
 148. Institute for Humanist Studies, Testimony in Support of Legally Recognizing Same-Sex 
Marriage in New York State, http://humaniststudies.org/media/same_sex_marriage.html (tran-
script of testimony of Matt Cherry, Executive Director of the IHS) (last visited Dec. 19, 2006). 
 149. Secular Coalition for America, Constitutional amendments on marriage, http://secular.org/ 
issues/marriage/?view=summary (opposing bans on same-sex civil marriage because they enact 
“theological definitions for civil contracts”) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 150. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Other Groups, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/hom_jother.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 151. But see George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 593 (1999) 
(“Basing the legal definition of marriage on religion would not breach the Constitution’s 
Establishment Clause because it does not endorse or compel obedience to any faith.”). Dent elides 
the fact that basing the civil definition of “marriage” upon a religious one requires the government 
to choose among several available definitions of marriage. While such a definition would certainly 
not compel religious observance, the very act of choosing one religious definition over another clearly 
endorses the religion that supplied the preferred definition. Moreover, the government must have a 
rational secular basis for adopting the chosen definition—as discussed below, none of the proffered 
justifications for same-sex marriage bans is rationally secular. See discussion infra Part V (raising and 
dismissing the “secular” arguments against same-sex marriage; applying the Lemon-endorsement 
test to same-sex marriage bans). 
 152. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020(1)(c), (3) (West Supp. 2006). 
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and those that permit only opposite-sex marriage to the exclusion of all others.153 
Many states that have adopted same-sex marriage bans have adopted both 
types.154 
Whether stated positively (e.g., “To be valid or recognized in this State 
[Alaska], a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”155) or 
negatively (e.g., “Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or 
performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender 
are not valid in North Carolina.”156), the legal effect is the same: Same-sex civil 
marriage bans prohibit the legal recognition of any civil or religious marriage 
between persons of the same sex. 
Some bans go even further, prohibiting the creation of marriage-like legal 
arrangements or the conferral of marriage-like benefits (commonly referred to as 
“the legal incidents” of marriage).157 These broad-based “legal-incidents” bans 
are even more sweeping than simple same-sex marriage bans: Whether by 
accident or by design, they bar same-sex couples from obtaining even marginal 
legal protections for their relationships. 
Proponents of “legal-incidents” bans claim that they are only intended to 
prevent legislatures and municipal governments from allowing same-sex 
couples to enter civil unions and domestic partnerships.158 Despite this assertion, 
 
(1) Marriages in the following cases are prohibited: . . . (c) When the parties are persons 
other than a male and a female. 
. . . . 
(3) A marriage between two persons that is recognized as valid in another jurisdiction is 
valid in this state only if the marriage is not prohibited or made unlawful under 
subsection . . . (1)(c) . . . of this section. 
Id. 
 153. E.g., id. § 26.04.010(1) (West Supp. 2006) (“Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a 
female . . . .”). 
 154. See supra notes 26–28 (cataloguing state-level bans on same-sex marriage). 
 155. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998) (alteration added). 
 156. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West Supp. 2006). 
 157. E.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one 
woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any 
state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any 
member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status 
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be 
valid or recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any 
marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one 
woman. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 158. See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Voters to Decide on Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2006, at VA23 
(reporting that the purported goal of the Virginia constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage and civil unions was to “protect against judges who might rule that the current statut[ory 
ban] is unconstitutional” (alteration added)). Virginia’s constitutional amendment reads: 
[O]nly a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. 
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal 
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, 
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it is an outstanding question whether these bans potentially reach private 
relationship contracts, wills, and powers of attorney.159 For example, Michigan’s 
state attorney general recently determined that Michigan’s constitutional 
amendment bars state and local governments from offering employment 
benefits to same-sex couples as domestic partners.160 Similarly, Ohio’s 
amendment has been read to bar unmarried heterosexual domestic-violence 
victims from bringing certain suits against their batterers in Domestic Violence 
Court, because standing to bring these claims is limited to persons in a legal 
familial relationship, which is only created through blood or marriage.161 
At the federal level, there is already a statutory ban on same-sex marriages: 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Enacted in 1996, DOMA was 
codified in two separate titles of the United States Code. First, DOMA enacted a 
garden-variety ban on same-sex marriage by establishing a “one-man, one-
woman” definition of marriage for the purposes of federal law.162 Until DOMA, 
there had never been a federal definition of marriage; moreover, the Supreme 
Court has long recognized that the regulation of family law—including 
determining what constitutes “marriage”—lies beyond the reach of federal 
 
qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political 
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which 
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage. 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (adopted 2006) (alteration added). 
 159. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 158, at VA23 (reporting that opponents of the Virginia 
constitutional amendment thought it could potentially hamper “the ability of unwed heterosexual 
couples to engage in contracts covering such things as property ownership and allowing partners to 
determine health care”; noting that opponents thought it might also “threaten protective orders and 
additional safeguards for unmarried victims of domestic violence by barring legal recognition of 
unmarried family or household members”). 
 160. See 7171 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 9 (Mich. 2005) (determining that the City of Kalamazoo’s “policy 
of offering benefits to same-sex domestic partners violates the [Michigan constitutional] 
amendment’s prohibition against recognizing any ‘similar union’ other than the union of one man 
and woman in marriage” (alteration added)), available at 2005 WL 639112; see also MICH. CONST. art. I, 
§ 25 (adopted 2004) (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future 
generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only 
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”). 
Such determinations are devastating for the same-sex couples and their families. For example, as 
of January 2007, 13 state governments, 139 city and county governments, 299 colleges and 
universities, 264 Fortune-500 companies, and 9,378 other private-sector companies offered domestic-
partner health benefits. For a continually-updated count provided by the Human Rights Campaign, 
see http://www.hrc.org/worknet (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 161. See Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642, 2005 WL 4651081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 28, 
2005) (holding that Ohio’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage had the 
unintended effect of invaliding Ohio’s Domestic Violence Act, insofar as it conferred standing to 
bring claims in Domestic Relations Court upon unmarried heterosexual individuals). Ohio’s 
constitutional amendment reads: 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized 
by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004). 
 162. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)). 
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authority, instead falling squarely within the states’ regulatory powers.163 
DOMA’s second part purported to fashion an exception to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause164 by allowing states to refuse to recognize any same-sex marriage 
performed in another jurisdiction.165 The constitutionality of DOMA has been the 
subject of much speculation and analysis.166 
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) is designed to preempt 
any constitutional challenges to DOMA.167 The FMA is a “legal-incidents” ban 
that first appeared in 2002, when Rep. Ronnie Shows, D-Miss., introduced it to 
the Second Session of the 107th Congress as H.J. Res. 93.168 In 2003, the 108th 
Congress saw H.J. Res. 56169 and S.J. Res. 26170 introduced in the First Session, by 
 
 163. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding that “domestic relations [is] an area that has 
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States 
upon the subject of divorce . . . .”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has 
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens 
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”) (alteration added)). 
Therefore, the only limitation on the states’ right to regulate in this area is the federal Constitution 
itself. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation 
statute unconstitutionally violated equal protection and due process); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 388–91 (1978) (holding that Wisconsin’s statute requiring child-support payors to seek judicial 
permission before remarrying unconstitutionally burdened the payors’ fundamental right to marry); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prisoner’s right to marry could not be burdened 
by a requirement that the prisoner first receive permission from the prison warden before being 
permitted to marry another inmate or a citizen). 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 165. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). 
 166. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997) (arguing that the full faith and credit aspects of DOMA do 
not pass constitutional muster); Emily J. Sack, The Retreat from DOMA: The Public Policy of Same-Sex 
Marriage and a Theory of Congressional Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 507 (2005) (exploring the constitutionality of DOMA as a federal definition of marriage and as a 
full faith and credit question). The constitutionality of DOMA has been addressed at length in the 
literature, so it will not be addressed here. 
 167. 151 CONG. REC. S364 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2005) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[T]he Marriage 
Protection Amendment . . . define[s] marriage as a union between a man and a woman. . . . What we 
are trying to do is protect the voice of the American people. The right place for this to be determined 
is in the legislative bodies of this country, in the Congress of the United States and each and every 
legislature in every state, and not in the Federal courts.” (emphasis and alterations added)); see also 
infra Part V.A.6. 
 168. 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (May 15, 2002). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups. 
Id. H.J. Res. 93 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 15, 2002, which in turn 
referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on July 18, 2002. No subsequent action 
was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HJ00093:. 
 169. 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 21, 2003). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups. 
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Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo. and Sen. Wayne Allard, R.-Colo., respectively. 
Neither of these amendments got off the ground in a meaningful way. 
Since 2003, Rep. Musgrave and Sen. Allard have introduced five versions of 
the FMA, four of which have come up for a vote in their respective chambers. 
First among the subsequent versions was S.J. Res. 30,171 introduced in the 108th 
Congress’s Second Session. S.J. Res. 30 was replaced later on in the Session with 
S.J. Res. 40 (“Allard Amendment I”)172 and its companion bill in the House, H.J. 
Res. 106 (“Musgrave Amendment I”),173 which were the first two versions of the 
FMA to come to the floor of either chamber. Neither S.J. Res. 40 nor H.J. Res. 106 
passed its respective chamber with the requisite two-thirds majority. In the 
Second Session of the 109th Congress, renewed efforts to revive the FMA 
 
Id. H.J. Res. 56 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 21, 2003, which in turn 
referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on June 25, 2003. The Subcommittee held 
hearings on May 13, 2004. No subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HJ00056:. 
 170. 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Nov. 25, 2003). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, nor State or Federal law, shall 
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups. 
Id. S.J. Res. 26 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on November 25, 2003. No 
subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00026:. 
 171. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 22, 2004). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require 
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman. 
Id. S.J. Res. 30 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 22, 2004. See 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00030:. 
 172. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 7, 2004). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require 
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman. 
Id. The Allard Amendment I was brought to the Senate floor on July 8, 2004, and after a motion to 
proceed to consideration of measure was made on July 9, 2004, it was the subject of intense debate 
for several days—several motions to invoke cloture and end debate were made during this time. 
Under Senate rules, a motion to invoke cloture must pass by a three-fifths majority. On July 14, 2004, 
the Senate voted 48 to 50 not to invoke cloture and thus did not consider the measure. While the 
cloture vote did not technically address the substance of the Allard Amendment I, it was largely 
understood to represent the Senate’s receptiveness to the measure. On July 15, 2004, the motion to 
proceed to consideration of measure was withdrawn, and no subsequent action was taken on the 
Allard Amendment I. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00040:. 
 173. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 2004). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require 
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman. 
Id. The Musgrave Amendment I was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on 
September 23, 2004. On September 30, 2004, after some debate, the measure failed 227 to 186. No 
subsequent action was taken on the Musgrave Amendment I. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ 
bdquery/z?d108:HJ00106:. 
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spawned S.J. Res. 1 (“Allard Amendment II”)174 and H.J. Res. 88 (“Musgrave 
Amendment II”).175 Both S.J. Res. 1 and H.J. Res. 88 came up for a vote in their 
respective chambers and failed for a second time.176 
 
 174. 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 24, 2005), renewed without amendment, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (May 
18, 2006). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require 
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman. 
Id. The Allard Amendment II was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on January 24, 
2005, which in turn referred it to the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and 
Property Rights, where hearings were held on November 9, 2005. On May 26, 2006, the Allard 
Amendment II was brought to the Senate floor with a motion to proceed to consideration of 
measure. Like the Allard Amendment I, the Allard Amendment II sparked intense debate for several 
days, and several motions to invoke cloture were made. On June 7, 2006, the Senate voted 49 to 48 
not to invoke cloture and thus did not consider the measure. As with the Allard Amendment I, no 
vote was taken on the Allard Amendment II itself; however, it was generally understood that the 
cloture vote was at root a vote on the substantive merits of the measure. No subsequent action was 
taken on the Allard Amendment II. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00001:. 
 175. 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 6, 2006). 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require 
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman. 
Id. The Musgrave Amendment II was referred to the House Committee on June 6, 2006. It was 
brought to the House floor on July 18, 2006, where it failed 236 to 187. No subsequent action was 
taken on the Musgrave Amendment II. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109: 
HJ00088:. 
 176. Several other versions of the FMA were proposed in the 109th Congress, none of which 
gained any meaningful momentum. Rep. Daniel Lungren, R-Cal., introduced H.J. Res. 39, 109th 
Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 17, 2005). 
§ 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man and one 
woman. 
§ 2. No court of the United States or of any State shall have jurisdiction to determine 
whether this Constitution or the constitution of any State requires that the legal incidents 
of marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between one man and 
one woman. 
§ 3. No State shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State concerning a union between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage, or as having the legal incidents of marriage, under the laws of such 
other State. 
Id. H.J. Res. 39 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 17, 2005, which in 
turn referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on April 4, 2005. No subsequent 
action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HJ00039:. 
Sen. Sam Brownback, R-Kan., introduced S.J. Res. 13, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 2005). 
§ 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 
§ 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
Id. S.J. Res. 13 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 14, 2005. No 
subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00013:. On 
May 18, 2005, Sen. Brownback withdrew S.J. Res. 13. See 151 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. May 18, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Brownback). 
Rep. Louie Gomert, R-Tex., introduced H.J. Res. 91, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 11, 2006). 
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The versions of the FMA that concern us here are the four that came up for 
a vote on the floor of Congress. The Musgrave and Allard Amendments were 
virtually identical each time they were considered; Rep. Musgrave and Sen. 
Allard were joint co-sponsors of one another’s proposed amendments. As a 
matter of interpretation, then, the legislative histories of these four versions of 
the FMA should and will be considered as a whole. To that end, when I refer to 
the FMA, I am referring collectively to these four proposals. 
B. Who Supports the FMA? 
Many individuals have testified in hearings before Congress in favor of the 
FMA. With only two possible exceptions177 and one notable one,178 every single 
one of these witnesses was a fundamentalist Christian, Mormon, or Catholic, 
each vested with strong religious credentials earned from years of working on 
behalf of fundamentalist religious causes. As discussed above in Table 1, all of 
the religious traditions to which these witnesses belong vehemently oppose 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage—and for explicitly religious reasons. 
Table 3 lists all of the witnesses who testified in favor of the FMA in 
congressional hearings. 
Interestingly, despite these witnesses’ obviously religious viewpoints, each 
one employed a carefully-crafted non-religious vocabulary to advance the 
secular-sounding arguments dismissed below.179 Couched in safe, secular-ish 
terms, each witness’s arguments were cleverly—albeit transparently, to the keen 
observer—designed to mask the FMA’s invidious purpose of imposing religious 
marriage onto an unsuspecting nation. 
It is impossible to rationally conclude that these witnesses had a genuinely 
secular purpose in mind or actually believed the secular implications of their 
 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man and one 
woman. 
Id. H.J. Res. 91 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on July 11, 2006. No sub-
sequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HJ00091:. 
 177. Gregory Coleman, Former Texas Solicitor General, and Jon Bruning, Nebraska Attorney 
General, both gave statements in their representative official capacities. See What Is Needed to Defend 
the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civ. Rights and Property Rights,108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 28, 2003) 
[hereinafter Senate, What Is Needed] (statement of Gregory Coleman); Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: 
What are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of 
Traditional Marriage Laws?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civ. Rights and Property Rights, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Senate, 
Judicial Activism] (statement of Jon Bruning). While no information is available on Coleman’s 
religious affiliation, Bruning calls himself a Christian and attends a Christian-Congregationalist 
church, see Biography, http://www.jonbruning.com/index.php?PAGE_ID=3 (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007). 
 178. Stanley Kurtz is a conservative commentator and legal theorist who does not ground his 
arguments in religion. Stanley Kurtz, Point of No Return, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 3, 2001 (“I 
personally do not see homosexuality as sinful . . . .”), available at http://www.hudson.org/index. 
cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=935. He instead argues in favor of the FMA on consequen-
tialist grounds, claiming that same-sex marriage would result in ancillary harms to other legitimate 
governmental interests. See infra Part V.A.3.a. 
 179. See infra Part V.A. 
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testimony. How do we know this? Because of the strong religious pedigree of 
each of the witnesses. The idea that these individual witnesses—decidedly-
religious, almost to a person—somehow prefer secular-ish conceptions of 
“traditional marriage”—a minority position among Secularists180—to their 
deeply-held religious beliefs again defies common sense.181 
 
TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA. 
Name/Affiliation Religious Tradition Hearing(s) Attended 
Judge Robert Bork, U.S. Cir. Ct. App. for 
the 4th Cir.
182
 
Catholic (Natural Law) Federal Marriage Amendment (The 
Musgrave Amendment)
183
 
Gerard V. Bradley, Prof. of Law, Univ. of 
Notre Dame Law Sch. 
Catholic (Natural Law) Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal 
and State Defense of Marriage 
Initiatives Vulnerable to Judicial 
Activism?
184
 
Jon Bruning, Neb. Att’y Gen. Christian-Congregational Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
185
 
Gregory Coleman, Former Tex. Solicitor 
Gen. 
Unknown What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
186
 
Teresa S. Collett, Prof. of Law, St. Thomas 
Univ. Sch. of Law 
Catholic (Natural Law) A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
187
 
 
 180. See supra notes 6–10 (discussing the significant majority of secularists who support same-sex 
civil marriage). 
 181. See H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House 
Committee on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”) (describing same-sex civil 
marriage bans as the result of a “moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”). But see supra notes 11, 143 (noting that many 
religious believers choose to privatize their religious views, instead relying on secularism to supply 
justifications for social policy). 
 182. Some may challenge my characterization of Judge Bork as a religious believer. It is true that, 
for the better part of his career, Bork was not a highly-religious person, despite authoring such 
religiously-overtoned works as SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND 
AMERICAN DECLINE (1996) (cataloguing perceived excesses in American society, including loosening 
strictures on sexual mores). Bork converted to Catholicism in 2003. Tim Drake, Judge Bork Converts to 
the Catholic Faith, NAT’L CATH. REG. (online ed.), July 20–26, 2003. He subsequently authored A 
COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005), in which he 
heavily criticizes the Supreme Court’s recent religion cases, claiming that they have inappropriately 
accelerated the secularization of America. From his writings, it seems reasonable to characterize 
Bork as a religion-driven preservationist. 
 183. Hearing on H.J. Res. 56 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Const., 108th 
Cong. 2d Sess., at 16–18 (May 13, 2004) [hereinafter House, Musgrave Amendment I] (statement of 
Judge Bork). 
 184. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property 
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Senate, Less Faith] (statement of Prof. Bradley). 
 185. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Att’y Gen. Bruning). 
 186. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Gregory Coleman). 
 187. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 23, 2004) 
[hereinafter Senate, Proposed Amendment] (statement of Prof. Collett). 
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TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA. 
Name/Affiliation Religious Tradition Hearing(s) Attended 
John Cornyn, U.S. Sen., R-Tex. Church of Christ (Pentecostal) A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
188
 
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
189
 
What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
190
 
Pastor Daniel de Leon, Sr., Gen. Presbyter, 
Alianza de Ministerios Evangélicos 
Nacionales (AMEN) 
Assemblies of God (Pentecostal) Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
191
 
Dwight Duncan, Assoc. Prof. of Const. Law, 
S. New Eng. Sch. of Law 
Catholic (Natural Law) Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage: 
Implications for Public Policy
192
 
John C. Eastman, Prof. of Law, Chapman 
Univ. Sch. of Law 
Christian (Natural Law, affiliation 
unknown) 
The National Consensus to Protect 
Marriage: Why a Constitutional 
Amendment Is Needed
193
 
Michael Farris, President, Patrick Henry 
Coll. 
Fundamentalist Non-Denominational 
Evangelical 
What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
194
 
Scott Fitzgibbon, Prof. of Law, Boston Coll. Catholic (Natural Law) An Examination of the Constitutional 
Amendment on Marriage
195
 
Maggie Gallagher, President, Inst. for 
Marriage & Pub. Pol’y 
Catholic (Natural Law) Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
196
 
What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
197
 
Rev. Dr. Ray Hammond II, Pastor, Bethel 
African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
Church 
Methodist-Holiness (Pentecostal) What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
198
 
 
 188. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
 189. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
 190. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
 191. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Pastor de Leon). 
 192. Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Const., 108th Cong. 2d Sess., 
at 5–14 (Apr. 22, 2004) [hereinafter House, Legal Threats] (statement of Prof. Duncan). 
 193. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property 
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 18, 2005) (statement of Prof. Eastman). This hearing was cancelled, 
and Prof. Eastman’s testimony was never made publicly available. 
 194. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Michael Farris). 
 195. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R and Property 
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Senate, Examination] (statement of Prof. 
Fitzgibbon). 
 196. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Maggie Gallagher). 
 197. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Maggie Gallagher). 
 198. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Rev. Dr. Hammond). 
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TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA. 
Name/Affiliation Religious Tradition Hearing(s) Attended 
Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen., R-Utah Mormon (LDS) Preserving Traditional Marriage: A 
View from the States
199
 
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
200
 
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
201
 
What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996?
202
 
Stanley Kurtz, Hoover Inst. Natural Law/Consequentialism (no 
affiliation) 
Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage: 
Implications for Public Policy
203
 
Marilyn Musgrave, U.S. Rep., R-Colo. Assemblies of God (Pentecostal) Federal Marriage Amendment (The 
Musgrave Amendment)
204
 
Preserving Traditional Marriage: A 
View from the States
205
 
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
206
 
Lincoln C. Oliphant, Res. Fellow, Marriage 
Law Project 
Catholic (Natural Law) Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage: 
Implications for Public Policy
207
 
Rev. Richard Richardson, Asst. Pastor, St. 
Paul African Methodist Episcopal 
(AME) Church 
Methodist-Holiness (Pentecostal) A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
208
 
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional 
Marriage Laws?
209
 
Mitt Romney, Gov. of Mass. Mormon (LDS) Preserving Traditional Marriage: A 
View from the States
210
 
Jay Sekulow, Am. Ctr. for Law. & Justice Fundamentalist Non-Denominational 
Evangelical 
Federal Marriage Amendment (The 
Musgrave Amendment)
211
 
Katherine S. Spaht, Prof. of Law, La. State 
Univ. 
Christian (affiliation unknown); primary 
drafter of covenant marriage 
legislation in Louisiana212 
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
213
 
 
 199. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property 
R., 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Senate, View from the States] (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
 200. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 201. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 202. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 203. House, Legal Threats, supra note 192, at 14–34 (statement of Stanley Kurtz). 
 204. House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 5–15 (statement of Rep. Musgrave). 
 205. Senate, View from the States, supra note 199 (statement of Rep. Musgrave). 
 206. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Rep. Musgrave). 
 207. House, Legal Threats, supra note 192, at 38–47 (statement of Lincoln Oliphant). 
 208. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Rev. Richardson). 
 209. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Rev. Richardson). 
 210. Senate, View from the States, supra note 199 (statement of Gov. Romney). 
 211. House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 22–34 (statement of Jay Sekulow). 
 212. See Katherine S. Spaht, Covenant Marriage, http://faculty.law.lsu.edu/katherinespaht/ 
convenantinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 213. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Prof. Spaht). 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
596 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA. 
Name/Affiliation Religious Tradition Hearing(s) Attended 
Lynn Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young 
Univ. 
Mormon (LDS) Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal 
and State Defense of Marriage 
Initiatives Vulnerable to Judicial 
Activism?
214
 
Richard Wilkins, Prof. of Law, Brigham 
Young Univ. 
Mormon (LDS) An Examination of the Constitutional 
Amendment on Marriage
215
 
Christopher Wolfe, Prof. of Pol. Sci., 
Marquette Univ. 
Catholic (Natural Law) An Examination of the Constitutional 
Amendment on Marriage
216
 
 
Why then, if the supporters of the FMA are as staunchly religious as their 
credentials would lead us to believe, would they resort to arguing from a 
Secularist viewpoint? Only one Secularist, Stanley Kurtz, was put forward to 
lend credibility to the claim that the FMA is based on secular principles—and 
his consequentialist legal theories are so irrational and have been so heavily 
criticized (by writers on both ends of the political spectrum) that they are not 
creditable.217 Instead, delineating the FMA’s secular purposes was left largely to 
the say-so of numerous highly-religious witnesses. 
This is not to say that the mere presence of a creditable Secularist would 
cure the underlying constitutional infirmities of the FMA. Even if one were put 
forward, if there is no rational secular relationship between the purposes given 
for the FMA and the action that the law takes (banning same-sex civil 
marriage),218 then no amount of secularist pontification would be able to justify 
it: The purpose of the law would still be religious, even if not on its face. Thus, it 
would be void under an endorsement analysis.219 
Still, why does this matter? Taking a page from the Establishment Clause’s 
sister doctrine is instructive. When courts hear Free Exercise claims, they 
frequently inquire as to the sincerity with which the claimed adherents hold 
their beliefs.220 And so it should be in the search for a secular purpose: Divining a 
secular purpose for a government action demands an inquiry into the sincerity 
with which its proponents believe the action to be genuinely secular. Merely 
claiming a secular purpose does not mean that one exists. If that were the rule, 
then the Establishment Clause would be undermined from within: Without a 
more searching inquiry, no court could ever discern an invidious religious 
purpose, as the central question is whether the claimed secular purpose is 
merely pretextual for a religious one. 
This has nothing to do with evaluating the content of one’s beliefs and 
everything to do with whether actually believes that the claimed secular 
purpose is actually secular. If courts are competent to undertake inquiries into 
purpose at all, then they must necessarily be competent to determine whether 
the proponents of a law are subtextually motivated by religious beliefs. 
 
 214. Senate, Less Faith, supra note 184 (statement of Prof. Wardle). 
 215. Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (statement of Prof. Wilkins). 
 216. Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (statement of Prof. Wolfe). 
 217. See infra Part V.A.3.a. 
 218. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.A. 
 219. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.B. 
 220. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
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Finally, one might question my use of the FMA as exemplary of all same-
sex marriage bans or as even relevant at all. Indeed, it may seem silly to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. However, because similar 
constitutional concerns exist for DOMA and for individual state bans on same-
sex civil marriage (whether statutory or constitutional), the Establishment 
Clause discussion remains highly relevant. At the time of this writing, no new 
versions of the FMA have been introduced into the First Session of the 110th 
Congress. Nevertheless, if the opponents of same-sex marriage are true to their 
word,221 efforts to amend the federal Constitution are far from over. Future 
Congresses will almost certainly face incarnations of the FMA that are 
essentially replicas of those that—so far—have been voted down. These yet-
unwritten versions of the FMA will undoubtedly implicate the same 
Establishment Clause concerns that are addressed here. 
Barring a significant change in opponents’ rhetoric, the so-called “secular” 
arguments used to justify prior bans will be recycled anew for the consideration 
of future legislators. Therefore, it is important to debunk these pretexual 
arguments now, to better equip same-sex marriage advocates for future debate 
and litigation. 
III. WHERE ARE WE GOING, AND WHY ARE WE IN THIS HANDBASKET?: 
A SHIFT IN FUNDAMENTAL(IST) RHETORIC 
“Overt bias, when prohibited, has oft-times been supplanted by more cunning 
devices designed to impart the appearance of neutrality, but to operate 
with the same invidious effect as before.” 
–Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.222 
Until recently, same-sex civil marriage advocates were entirely 
disempowered in their attempts to obtain any legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships.223 While successes have come in fits and starts, with several key 
state court decisions being handed down recently and others on the way,224 the 
 
 221. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5518 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“We 
are making progress in America on defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and we 
will not stop until it is defined and protected at the union of a man and a woman.”). 
 222. 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 223. Compare generally Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 
810 (1971) (holding that a same-sex couple could not qualify for a marriage license, in part because, 
as two men, they fell outside of the historical definition of religious marriage), with Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that, under the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples could not 
be denied the civil benefits and obligations of marriage, regardless of what the resulting legal 
arrangement was called), and Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that, under the Massachusetts Constitution, same-sex couples could not be denied access to 
civil marriage and its attendant legal benefits), and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding 
that New Jersey’s refusal to extend the rights and privileges of marriage to same-sex couples 
violated equal protection but not due process under the New Jersey Constitution). 
 224. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that New York’s refusal to 
extend the rights and privileges of marriage to same-sex couples violated neither due process nor 
equal protection under the New York Constitution); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 
2006) (holding the Washington’s state DOMA violated neither due process nor equal protection 
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legal recognition of same-sex relationships is in a state of constant flux and 
upheaval. Religion is playing a key role on both sides of the debate.225 
Historically, the Supreme Court has described marriage using explicitly 
religious language, portraying it as a “holy estate”226 or “sacred precinct”227 that 
could only be entered into by one man and one woman. Indeed, in early same-
sex civil marriage cases, courts invoked similar language in determining that 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships was improper.228 As discussed above, 
one trial court cited both the Bible and specific Judeo-Christian beliefs in 
disposing of a claim seeking same-sex civil marriage rights.229 
Currently, the proponents of same-sex civil marriage are not raising claims 
of any religious liberty interests.230 Opponents of same-sex marriage are 
tiptoeing around the subject of religion, mostly claiming that allowing same-sex 
civil marriage would limit the availability of religious exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws that protect homosexuals—said more plainly, opponents 
claim that allowing same-sex civil marriage will hamper Christians’ ability to (1) 
publicly speak out against homosexuality and (2) act on those beliefs in a 
functionally-discriminatory way; therefore, their right to free exercise of religion 
trumps the government’s interest in preventing invidious discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. While the religious-freedom claim is addressed more fully 
below,231 it is important to note that, for the bulk of opponents, Free Exercise is 
 
under the Washington Constitution). See also In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006), review granted and opinion superseded, S147999 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006). The California Supreme 
Court has yet to hear the marriage cases. 
 225. See Matthew Hay Brown, Senate to revisit same-sex marriage: Hope for a ban unites many faiths, 
BALT. SUN, June 5, 2006, at 1A (reporting on the high levels of religious fervor encountered on both 
sides of the same-sex civil marriage question). For a functionalist argument in favor of expanding 
religion’s role in supporting claims for same-sex civil marriage, see generally Larry Catá Backer, 
Religion as the Language of Discourse of Same Sex Marriage, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 221 (2002). 
 226. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885). 
 227. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964). 
 228. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (“The institution of marriage as a union of man 
and woman . . . is as old as the book of Genesis.”); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) 
(“Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose. For a 
time the records of marriage were kept by the church.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. 
App. 1974) (quoting the “book of Genesis” language from Baker v. Nelson), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 
1008 (Wash. 1974); see also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (regarding 
same-sex marriage within the context of federal immigration law, holding that “there has been for 
centuries a combination of scriptural and canonical teaching under which a ‘marriage’ between 
persons of the same sex was unthinkable and, by definition, impossible”; regarding both federal and 
Colorado law, holding that “[g]iven the scriptural, canonical, and civil law authorities[, and] the 
prevailing mores and moral concepts of this age, one could not entertain a good faith belief that [the 
plaintiff] could be married to a person of the same sex” (alterations added)), aff’d on other grounds, 
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 229. See Dean I, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991), available at 1992 
WL 685364, aff’d on other grounds, 653 A.2d 307 [Dean II] (D.C. 1995). 
 230. For a strategy outlining how same-sex civil marriage advocates could be raising these claims 
to their advantage, see generally Catá Backer, supra note 225. 
 231. See infra Part V.A.4. 
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the only context in which they currently appear comfortable advancing 
affirmatively religious arguments.232 
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Preservationism 
Over time, as American society as a whole has grown more tolerant—albeit 
not totally accepting—of homosexuality,233 opponents of same-sex civil marriage 
have learned to couch their arguments in positive-sounding, seemingly un-
bigoted terms, and to decry any “hatred” or intent to “discriminate” against 
anyone’s “lifestyle choices.”234 
As a result, once overtly-religious rhetoric has been largely supplanted 
with what Prof. Edward Rubin terms “post hoc, secular-sounding argu-
ment[s].”235 As Prof. William Eskridge has pointed out, this shift in language and 
tone does not show that the substance of the religious arguments has abated—
instead, it indicates that anti-gay rhetoric and discourse has “sedimented,” a 
process by which the old religious arguments have evolved to become more 
sophisticated and secular-sounding.236 
Describing the foundation of anti-gay rhetoric as “religious natural law 
theory,” Eskridge notes that religion forms the bedrock for these newer, 
secularized arguments used to “promote” opposite-sex civil marriage.237 This 
“sedimentation” has layered three distinct levels of anti-gay rhetoric upon one 
another, like a wedding cake: (1) the bedrock layer is “God’s law,” a religiously-
derived form of natural-law theory that emphasizes the moral depravity of 
homosexuality, bolstering these claims with “objective” scientific data 
 
 232. But see 152 CONG. REC. S5450 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (quoting the 
book of Genesis and the Gospel of Matthew as justifications for the Allard Amendment II; describing 
these biblical texts as “the Law”). 
 233. See supra notes 6–10 (tracing liberalization of opinions regarding same-sex marriage and 
civil unions). 
 234. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8089 (2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I make it clear nobody 
wants to discriminate against gays. Simply put, we want to preserve traditional marriage. Gays have 
a right to live the way they want. But they should not have the right to change the definition of 
traditional marriage.”); see also infra Part V.A (raising and dismissing key justifications for same-sex 
civil marriage bans). 
 235. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 43 (2005). 
 236. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse 
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) [hereinafter Eskridge, No 
Promo Homo]. 
 237. Id. at 1338, 1347, 1364. To be sure, there are both religious and secular natural-law theories. 
Secular natural-law theory has been rent asunder in attempts to find within it theoretical and 
philosophical justifications for banning same-sex marriage. However, the theory can be convincingly 
read to both support and oppose same-sex marriage. See generally Mark Strasser, Natural Law and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (1998) (establishing that the legal theories of secular natural 
law cannot be construed as either supporting or opposing same-sex marriage with any definiteness, 
and that any attempts to do so result in outcome-determinative analytical methods). 
Every argument raised against same-sex marriage on secular natural-law grounds has an equally-
compelling counterargument, which leaves the theory in equipoise. Because of this irreconcilable 
ambiguity within secular natural-law theory, it is not a useful method of analysis when attempting 
to justify bans on same-sex marriage. 
Moreover, the natural-law theory in play with the FMA is entirely religious. See infra note 245. As 
such, it is the only form of natural-law analysis with which we must concern ourselves. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
600 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
purporting to show that homosexuality and same-sex relationships are bad for 
society;238 (2) the constitutional tier protects “normal”239 (heterosexual) people’s 
right to be free from exposure to homosexuals, because such exposure could 
make heterosexuals uncomfortable or corrupt their children;240 and (3) the “no 
promo homo” frosting seeks to prevent any suggestion that the government 
“promotes” homosexuality as an “acceptable lifestyle choice”—particularly to 
children.241 
Eskridge concludes that the discourse has layered itself in this way in order 
to appeal to the broadest cross-section of anti-gay constituencies: (1) the 
religious fundamentalists who believe that Leviticus 18:22242 and 20:13,243 and 
Romans 1:26–27244 should govern modern legal treatment of homosexual 
behavior and orientation; (2) the moral bigots who believe the various scientific 
claims—derived from religious natural-law theory245—that homosexuals and 
 
 238. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1338, 1351–52, 1363. 
 239. The word “normal” is used with due care regarding its implications. There is a general 
scientific consensus that homosexuality is a benign variation of human sexuality and is therefore 
“normal.” See infra notes 359–62. As such, the idea that heterosexuality is “normal” and 
homosexuality is “abnormal” is not conceded here. 
 240. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1362–63. 
The rights of people frightened of homosexuality to speak out against it, of parents to 
control the education of their children, of children to be free from the trauma of a lesbian 
or gay household, of spouses to enjoy the sanctity of their institution, and of churches, 
landlords, employers, soldiers, and organizations like the Boy Scouts not to involve 
themselves with openly gay persons are just as often heard in antigay churches and 
political rallies as in the courtroom. 
Id. 
 241. Id. at 1330–31, 1362–64. 
 242. “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination.” Leviticus 18:22 (New 
Oxford ann., New Revised Standard Version). 
 243. “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; 
they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.” Leviticus 20:13 (New Oxford ann., New Rev. 
Standard Version). 
 244. “For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their women exchanged natural 
intercourse for unnatural, and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse with 
women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and 
received in their own persons the due penalty for their error.” Romans 1:26–27 (New Oxford ann., 
New Rev. Standard Version). 
 245. One doesn’t have to look very hard to discover that the majority of “religious natural law” 
scholarship against same-sex marriage is written by religious authors and published by religious 
institutions. For example, the University of Notre Dame Law School (a conservative Catholic 
university) sponsors a law journal that was founded in 1947 as the “Natural Law Institute” (the 
oldest legal journal devoted to the study of natural law) and is now known as the “American Journal 
of Jurisprudence.” http://law.nd.edu/ajj/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). One of the faculty 
editors of the journal, Prof. Gerard V. Bradley, was a primary drafter of the FMA. See 151 CONG. REC. 
S5454 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (identifying Prof. Bradley as a drafter of 
the FMA). 
Moreover, several religious law schools appear to be fixated on same-sex marriage and 
homosexuality. In 1995, the Notre Dame Journal of Ethics and Public Policy hosted a symposium 
titled “Sexual Orientation,” and in 1996, a symposium titled “Law and the Family.” In 1997, the 
American Journal of Jurisprudence hosted a forum titled “Sexual Morality and the Possibility of 
‘Same-Sex Marriage.’” In 1998, the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law hosted a 
symposium titled “Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years.” In 2002, 
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same-sex relationships are bad for society; and (3) the “normal people” who 
assert their collective “constitutional right”—typically claiming free exercise of 
religion246—to avoid exposure to homosexuals.247 At the heart of this layered 
discourse lie two common elements: (1) religious belief and (2) the opinion that 
such beliefs should guide the government’s treatment of homosexuals in the 
public sector. 
Prof. Reva Siegel takes a slightly different approach to conceiving the 
modernization of disempowering anti-minority rhetoric. Characterizing the 
phenomenon as “preservation through transformation,”248 she notes that 
“struggles over group inequality can transform the rules and reasons by which 
social stratification is enforced and justified.”249 Transformation occurs 
antiphonally: first, members of a disfavored minority—e.g., same-sex couples, or 
homosexuals generally—begin to successfully discredit the historical rhetoric 
used to justify their continued disempowerment. In response, the majority 
simply modernizes its justificatory rhetoric—often through the use of code 
 
the Regent University Law Review hosted a symposium titled “Homosexuality: Truth Be Told.” In 
2004, three symposia were sponsored by conservative religious schools: the Notre Dame Journal of 
Law, Ethics & Public Policy hosted a symposium titled “Marriage and the Law”; the University of St. 
Thomas (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Law Review hosted a symposium titled “Federal Marriage 
Amendment: Yes or No?”; and the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law hosted a 
symposium titled “Same-Sex Marriage.” In 2005, Regent University Law Review hosted a 
symposium titled “Moral Realism and the Renaissance of Traditional Marriage.” Also in 2005, the St. 
Thomas University (Miami) Law Review hosted a symposium on “Lofton and the Future of Gay and 
Lesbian Adoption.” In 2006, Ave Maria University Law Review hosted a symposium titled 
“Perspectives on Natural Marriage.” 
This is not an exhaustive list of the work that these religious schools have published; nor is it to 
say that secular schools are not also publishing in this area. The point is that there is a predilection 
on the part of conservative religious schools to solicit, develop, and publish anti-same-sex marriage 
scholarship that is based heavily on religious natural-law principles—a predilection that appears to 
be unique to these institutions. 
 246. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20 
(reporting that, when the Catholic Charities of Boston failed to receive a religious exemption from 
Massachusetts’s anti-discrimination laws protecting sexual orientation, it was faced with the choice 
of having to place children with homosexual and same-sex couple adoptive parents; instead of 
complying with the law, Catholic Charities chose to forfeit its license and stopped providing 
adoption placement services altogether) [hereinafter Gallagher, Banned in Boston]. Gallagher 
characterized this situation as a “tragedy.” Id. See discussion infra Part V.A.4 (addressing the 
religious-freedom argument against same-sex civil marriage). 
 247. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1409. 
Apparently, those advocating on behalf of the “normal people” have forgotten the lesson of Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which held that a citizen wearing a jacket emblazoned with the 
phrase “Fuck the Draft” could not be censored in public fora, because any observers who were 
offended by the phrase had the option to avert their gaze. Id. at 21 (noting that persons who find 
certain information or speech to be offensive “could effectively avoid further bombardment of their 
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”). In a broader sense, Cohen recognized that pluralistic 
societies with open marketplaces of speech and expression cannot tolerate the censorship of some 
viewpoints for the sake of preserving the comfort of observers. 
 248. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts 
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 111 (2000). 
 249. Id. at 111. 
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words,250 making only superficial adjustments to its excuses for discrimination. 
This serves to perpetuate the power imbalance without addressing head-on the 
substantive question of why the minority deserves to be disempowered—
instead, it brilliantly smoothes over the conflict, leaving the majority 
comfortable with its newfangled explanation for why it should remain superior. 
When the minority realizes that, despite the facial shift in rhetoric, nothing 
of substance has changed, the cycle begins anew. This call and response 
continues ad infinitum until one of the following occurs: (1) the majority’s 
arguments to support continued disempowerment eventually become so 
attenuated that they are no longer creditable; (2) the majority tires of the 
masquerade and ceases to engage in modernization; or (3) the majority actually 
liberalizes and decides that there are no longer adequate substantive 
justifications for continued disempowerment. Only then does equalizing change 
become possible. 
B. Preservationism: An Application 
A prime example of “preservation through transformation” and 
“sedimentation” is the veritable evolution of “creation science” into “intelligent 
design.” In Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, a school board passed a 
resolution requiring teachers to read a statement offering “intelligent design” as 
an alternative “scientific” theory to evolutionary biology.251 Several parents from 
the area challenged the resolution as an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion.252 At the head of its analysis, the court traced the refinement of 
Fundamentalist rhetoric about evolutionary biology from the Scopes Monkey 
Trial253 to the present day: During the Twentieth Century, as more and more 
public-school teachers and public-school systems eschewed blatantly-religious 
instruction in favor of teaching evolutionary biology in public-school 
classrooms, it became harder for the Fundamentalists to justify their desire for 
the teaching of facially-religious beliefs in public schools. In response, the 
Fundamentalists changed their rhetoric, but only incrementally, and only as 
much as was necessary to pass muster under ever-more-stringent constitutional 
standards. Most importantly, the underlying religious purpose never changed.254 
In Scopes, it was considered constitutionally permissible to bring a criminal 
prosecution for teaching evolutionary biology in lieu of biblical creationism.255 
Forty years later, in Epperson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court struck down 
statutory prohibitions against teaching evolutionary biology in public schools.256 
In response, Fundamentalists began to advocate for laws requiring “balanced 
treatment” of biblical creationism and evolutionary biology—teachers wishing 
to teach evolutionary biology were forced to devote equal time to biblical 
 
 250. See generally id. (discussing the use of “semantic code” in “color-blindness” discourse to 
signal—and perpetuate—white privilege). 
 251. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708–09 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 252. Id. at 709–11. 
 253. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). 
 254. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711–12. 
 255. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363. 
 256. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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creationism. This too, was struck down by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Daniel v. Waters.257 In response, Fundamentalists began to reason that scientific-
sounding language would help their religious purpose to survive constitutional 
scrutiny: hence “creation science.” When, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme 
Court struck down a requirement that “creation science” be taught alongside 
evolutionary biology,258 “intelligent design” was born. 
In striking down the Dover School Board’s resolution as an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion, the Kitzmiller court recognized the 
evolution of the Fundamentalists’ discourse for what it was: preservation 
through transformation. The Fundamentalists had simply layered new, 
scientific-sounding language over their previously-religious rhetoric, but the 
underlying message and purpose remained unchanged. 
*     *     *     * 
As the evolution case reveals, Siegel’s “preservation through 
transformation” formulation synthesizes with Eskridge’s “sedimentation” 
theory rather nicely: When the disfavored minority empowers itself, the 
language used to perpetuate the minority’s disempowerment transforms—or 
sediments—itself into a more politically-palatable rhetoric, while maintaining a 
broad-based appeal to a majority whose bigotry remains palpable. 
Both “preservation through transformation” and “sedimentation” have 
occurred throughout the debate over same-sex civil marriage. As it has become 
less fashionable to use expressly religious rhetoric to justify holding an anti-gay 
position, it has become more important for religiously-motivated opponents of 
same-sex marriage259 to couch their arguments in secular-sounding terms. 
Currently, opponents rely mostly on social-science evidence and broader 
appeals to “morality”; express citations of religious doctrines are rare. Still, it is 
necessary for these religious believers to communicate with one another, so they 
have developed code words that signal a belief in the unstated—but ever-
present—religious objective, which is to impose a specific religious definition of 
marriage on the entire nation. 
Catchphrases such as “traditional marriage,” “ideal environment,” “gender 
complementarity,” and “values-transmission” abound. They are derived from 
the larger “family-values”-talk that permeates many religious spheres. 
However, because phrases like these straddle the line between sounding 
comfortably secular and signaling a religious objective, it is not always obvious 
when modernized anti-gay discourse is afoot. With experience, however, same-
sex civil marriage advocates will learn to decode this rhetoric and expose the 
underlying religious objectives to all who would see them. The same-sex 
marriage debate is drenched with this “family-values” newspeak. I will refer to 
the tactical use of such modernized discourse as “preservationism.” 
 
 257. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 258. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 259. According to the Pew Research Center, there really isn’t another kind. See supra notes 6–10 
(reporting that advanced age and religiosity—which frequently go hand-in-hand—are the two best 
predictors of opposition to same-sex civil marriage). 
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IV. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: “HOPELESS DISARRAY”260 
“[W]e do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.” 
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in McCreary County v. ACLU261 
Before same-sex civil marriage bans can be properly analyzed under the 
Establishment Clause, it is important to ascertain the current constitutional 
landscape that applies to such bans. Identifying background principles that are 
universally agreed-upon has proven to be a Sisyphean task for the Supreme 
Court. For example, consider Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing,262 the first 
modern-day case to discern a durable theory of the Establishment Clause. 
Everson presented a deceptively simple question: Is it an impermissible 
establishment of religion for a state to subsidize transportation for students 
attending certain private religious schools, but not all private schools, whether 
secular or religious? The Court voted 9–0 in favor of the now-famous “wall of 
separation between church and state” principle handed down by Justice Black.263 
All Justices concurred in Black’s articulation of what might be described as basic 
neutrality rules: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever form they adopt to teach 
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and 
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion 
by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and State.264 
Even so, the Court divided 5–4 over whether the transportation program 
constituted an establishment of religion—the majority concluded that it did not, 
while the dissent concluded that it did. Why? Because the dissenting Justices 
had actually sought a more stringent set of neutrality rules than the ones adopted 
by the majority: 
The Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment 
of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had 
prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all 
such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state 
in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of 
 
 260. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 261. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 262. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 263. Id. at 16. See also id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (opining that “complete separation 
between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion”). 
 264. Id. at 15–16 (Black, J., majority opinion). 
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the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively 
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.265 
Regardless of which of these conceptions one prefers, it seems that the Court 
took a unified, aggressive stance in favor of the government remaining neutral 
in its treatment of religious affairs, both among religions and between religion 
and irreligion. 
Fast-forward to 2005. Heard, decided, and announced together, the twin 
cases of McCreary County v. ACLU266 and Van Orden v. Perry267 are the bellwether 
of present-day Establishment Clause jurisprudence. But simply put, the opinions 
are a mess. Like Everson, McCreary County and Van Orden also presented a 
deceptively simple question: In what context, if ever, is a government-sponsored 
display of the Ten Commandments on government-owned property 
constitutional? Said more broadly, where do we draw the line between displays 
that acknowledge America’s religious heritage and those that actually 
“establish” religion? 
The Court answered the question two ways: The McCreary County displays 
were struck down while the Van Orden display was allowed.268 The McCreary 
County displays were in two Kentucky county courthouses,269 and the Van Orden 
display was on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.270 Although the specific 
context and background of each display varied, and the outcome of each case 
differed, the Justices generally wrote as if they were addressing a single case, 
rendering a total of ten opinions across the two cases: three in McCreary County 
and seven in Van Orden.271 
Of all that might be said about these cases, they begged for the Court to 
articulate a unifying principle and stick to it. In rendering their ten opinions, the 
Justices struggled to delineate an analytical method that was not susceptible of 
substantive criticism from the other side. Still, with Justice Breyer272 and Justice 
 
 265. Id. at 31–32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 266. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 267. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 268. In each case, the Court split 5–4, with the “swing” vote being Justice Breyer, who joined the 
McCreary County majority opinion and concurred in judgment only in Van Orden. 
 269. 125 S. Ct. at 2727. 
 270. 125 S. Ct. at 2858. 
 271. When the Court announced its ten opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist joked, “I didn’t know 
we had that many people on our Court.” Evan Thomas et al., Transition: Hail to the Chief, NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 12, 2005, at 60, 60. 
 272. Justice Breyer employed a “divisiveness” test that asked whether striking down the 
challenged government action would “tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment 
Clause seeks to avoid.” Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Reasoning 
from the principle that government and religion are separate but not “mutually hostil[e],” Breyer 
concluded that (1) the display conveyed a sufficiently secular message of morality as to not 
constitute an outright imposition of religion and (2) given the display’s context among numerous 
other monuments and historical markers, the degree to which the display is divisive because it 
potentially offends passersby is outweighed by the degree to which the removal of the display 
would be divisive. The length of time for which the display had stood unchallenged was a relevant, 
but not dispositive, factor—this display had stood for forty years. All told, the point is to 
circumnavigate outcomes that could “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the 
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” See id. at 2869–71 (alteration added). 
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Thomas273 providing two notable exceptions, the Justices fell neatly across two 
interpretive schools: the Lemon-endorsement test and the historical-
acknowledgement test. (The liberal wing of the Court applied the former, and 
the conservative wing of the Court applied the latter.) The tests are comprised of 
starkly contrasting analytical methods, which the Justices have drawn from their 
various schools of constitutional interpretation. 
Save for Justice Breyer’s defection in Van Orden, a five-Justice majority 
emerged in McCreary County in favor of applying the Lemon-endorsement test. 
As discussed below, the Lemon-endorsement test was derived from the 
longstanding neutrality principles articulated in Everson. However, given the 
recent turnover of Justices, and most notably the replacement of Justice 
O’Connor with the decidedly more conservative Justice Alito, it is unclear 
whether the liberal wing of the Court will have the last word on resolving this 
doctrinal fracture. As such, it is important to at least identify the competing 
principles that caused the Court to fracture so badly in these cases. Thus, a 
portion of the following discussion will address the historical-acknowledgment 
test, despite the fact that for now, the Lemon-endorsement test is the controlling 
framework applicable to Establishment Clause claims. 
A. The Lemon-Endorsement Test: Context-Specificity and the Requirement of 
Government Neutrality Toward and Among Religions 
Over the last thirty years, various majorities of the Court have employed 
two tests in analyzing Establishment Clause questions: the “Lemon test” and the 
“endorsement test.” Both of these tests are the direct offspring of the Court’s 
longstanding recognition that the Establishment Clause calls for government 
neutrality both among religions and between religion and irreligion.274 Over 
time, the two tests have merged into a single endorsement analysis steeped in 
neutrality ideals. 
1. The Lemon Test 
The famous “Lemon test,” announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,275 held that 
government actions are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause (1) if 
they have no valid secular purpose, (2) if they have the effect of establishing 
religion, or (3) if they result in unnecessary government “entanglement” with 
 
For an explanation of how all applications of the Establishment Clause are inherently divisive, 
thus rendering any analysis that focuses primarily on divisiveness to be essentially meaningless, see 
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1 (2005). 
 273. Justice Thomas employed an “actual coercion” test in determining that the display in Van 
Orden did not compel any religious observance or profession of belief through threat of coercion, 
punishment, or force of law. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865. 
Even if Thomas’s “coercion” test was the controlling one, it is possible that the banning of same-
sex marriage constitutes impermissible legal coercion, because it has the purpose of “prevent[ing] 
individuals from engaging in a desired course of action.” See Rubin, supra note 235, at 40 (alteration 
added). 
 274. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
 275. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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religion.276 Soon after the test was announced, the Court quickly qualified it, 
noting that the three factors are “no more than helpful signposts.”277 Over time, 
several members of the Court have criticized Lemon as unhelpful in analyzing 
certain Establishment Clause questions, and at times, the Court has simply not 
applied it.278 
2. The Endorsement Test 
As Lemon proved dissatisfying to more and more Justices, the 
“endorsement test”—in reality, a gloss on Lemon—became a more palatable 
alternative to some. Justice O’Connor originally postulated the test in her 
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,279 in part because the Lynch majority used the 
word “endorsement.”280 O’Connor subsequently codified the test in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,281 with five Justices signing on to 
its basic principles.282 
Essentially, the endorsement test asks whether a government action 
appears, to the reasonably informed observer, (1) to have the purpose or effect 
of (2) specifically endorsing or rejecting (3) a religion or a religious belief.283 
Under this articulation, the first prong of Lemon—valid secular purpose—is 
refashioned into a threshold question, and the third prong of Lemon—
entanglement—is essentially discarded. The test also mandates that the 
government’s action cannot render “adherence to a religion relevant in any way 
to a person’s standing in the political community.”284 In County of Allegheny, 
O’Connor laid out the key values underlying the test: 
If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than showing either 
favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their personal religious 
choices, government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens 
without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full 
members of the political community. 
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or 
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the 
numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or 
convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
 278. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860–61 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (declining to apply 
Lemon and cataloguing recent cases in which the Court has alternately applied and not applied 
Lemon); McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cataloguing instances in which 
individual Justices have expressly disapproved of Lemon as an analytical device). 
 279. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 280. Id. at 683 (Souter, J., majority opinion). 
 281. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 282. See id. at 623–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 620 (Blackmun, J., plurality); id. at 
642–43 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 283. Id. at 625 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 284. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of 
our pluralistic political community.285 
Another way to lay out the test is to ask the following four questions: (1) As 
a threshold matter, is there a valid secular purpose for the government’s action? 
If no, then the action establishes religion and is unconstitutional.286 If yes, then 
we apply the following endorsement analysis. (2) To the reasonable observer, 
does the government’s action have the purpose of endorsing a religion or 
religious belief? If yes, then the action endorses religion and is unconstitutional. 
If no, then (3) to the reasonable observer, does the government’s action show 
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey disapproval to others, such that it has 
the effect of endorsing religion? If yes, then the action endorses religion and is 
unconstitutional. If no, then (4) to the reasonable observer, does the 
government’s action either create a class of outsiders or render a person’s 
religious beliefs relevant to her standing in the political community? If yes, then 
the action endorses religion and is unconstitutional. If no, then the action is 
constitutional. 
This series of questions synthesizes the basic elements underlying 
O’Connor’s original endorsement test. The test was not immediately popular, 
and the conservative Justices never really signed on to it.287 Additionally, the 
Court initially struggled to determine what specific knowledge is imputed to the 
“reasonably informed observer.”288 However, all Justices supporting the 
endorsement test agree that government actions “may not prefer one religion 
over another or promote religion over nonbelief,”289 which seems to be a 
reasonable position, considering the Court’s longstanding precedent.290 
 
 285. Id. at 627–28 (internal cross-references omitted) (emphases added). 
 286. Although O’Connor’s endorsement analysis does not undertake an express “secular 
purpose” analysis, Souter’s majority opinion in McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2732–33, 
2735–36 (2005), affirmed that the key threshold step is whether the government has articulated a 
sufficiently secular interest in undertaking the challenged action. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
include it here as the first question a reviewing court would ask. 
 287. Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (Scalia, J., plurality 
opinion) (adopting a form of the endorsement test and attempting to create a public-forum exception 
to it; this articulation failed to garner a majority of votes). Scalia’s articulation of the test would have 
undermined it from within—his proposed public-forum exception would have permitted 
governments to erect religious displays of any type in any public forum; provided each display 
occurred in a public forum, the exception would supply no meaningful outer limit regarding what 
constitutes an impermissible religious display in that forum. This giant loophole was probably 
among the reasons that Scalia failed to gain a majority in favor of his proposed exception. 
 288. Compare id. 778–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable observer as 
someone “deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the 
religious display appears,” understanding the “‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice,” and not 
“limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display,” id. at 780 (quoting 
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring))), with id. at 800 n.5, 800–02 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (describing the reasonable observer as part of “the universe of reasonable persons[,] 
ask[ing] whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a government 
endorsement” (alterations added)). 
 289. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)); accord id. at 2733 (Souter, J., majority opinion) (“The touch-
stone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (quoting Epperson v. 
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In McCreary County and Van Orden, the Justices began to synthesize the 
Lemon and endorsement tests within the broader framework of neutrality rules. 
In his McCreary County majority opinion, Justice Souter emphasized the values 
underpinning his dissent in Van Orden: (1) the impact of the display’s religious 
content on the reasonable observer;291 (2) the presence or lack of a larger coherent 
plan, of which the religious display constitutes but a part;292 and (3) the 
significance or importance of the display’s location, particularly when it is 
situated on civic or government property.293 Souter also affirmatively embraced 
the neutrality principle in his own Van Orden dissent.294 
In McCreary County, Justice Souter placed additional weight on: (1) the 
coherence of the plan, (2) its original development and justifications, and (3) its 
subsequent evolution.295 Thus, a critical infirmity of the McCreary County 
displays was that they were originally erected with an expressly religious 
purpose that was covered up in subsequent iterations of the displays but never 
repudiated.296 As a result, Souter found the post-hoc secular justifications offered 
for the displays to be merely pretextual, reasoning that, if the government has 
nothing to hide, it should not need to change its justifications for an action after 
the action is challenged. When the government re-explains its purpose, it invites 
inquiry into its original purpose, motivation, or objective.297 
Justice Souter noted that “the secular purpose required has to be genuine, 
not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”298 The McCreary 
County majority took no position on whether this is a rational-basis standard or 
some form of heightened scrutiny. Certainly, the Court’s language makes it 
seem reasonable to conclude that this test constitutes heightened scrutiny—e.g., 
“genuine,” “sham,” “merely secondary.” However, the Court was unclear about 
whether the secular purpose must be express and easily-identified, or whether 
any conceivable secular purpose will suffice. It might assume too much to 
 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2875 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The first and most fundamental of [First Amendment] principles, one that a majority of 
this Court today affirms, is that the Establishment Clause demands religious neutrality—
government may not exercise a preference for one religious faith over another.” (citation omitted 
and alteration added)). 
 290. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.”). 
 291. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2893 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 292. Id. at 2895–96. 
 293. Id. at 2897. 
 294. Id. at 2892 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 18). 
 295. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005). This emphasis probably arose 
from the factual circumstances at hand: Each display had undergone three incarnations, but the 
express purposes of the displays, manifested in official county documents, was to post the Ten 
Commandments in the courthouses. At the time of the litigation, both displays had been integrated 
into larger displays designed to showcase historical sources of American law. Id. at 2727–32. 
 296. Note how much this sounds like “preservation through transformation.” See supra Part III.A. 
 297. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2739. 
 298. Id. at 2735. See also supra note 286 (discussing the role of the secular-purpose inquiry within 
the larger context of the endorsement-test framework). 
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conclude that heightened scrutiny applies. Therefore, a rational-basis approach 
will be used for the substantive analysis below.299 
Finally, Justice Souter provided the Court with a satisfying description of 
the “reasonable observer,” obtaining a five-Justice majority in support of the 
articulated definition. Accordingly, the reasonable observer: (1) is “presumed to 
be familiar with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn 
what history has to show;”300 (2) is “familiar with implementation of government 
action;”301 (3) inquires as to “‘the historical context of the statute . . . and the 
specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage;’”302 and (4) is “‘deemed 
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the 
religious display appears.’”303 
Concurring fully with Justice Souter’s analysis in McCreary County, Justice 
O’Connor wrote separately to identify the greatest danger when governments 
endorse religion—namely, that the endorsement will unduly influence, deter, or 
restrict the free exercise of all religious adherents, even those who otherwise 
agree with the substance of the government’s religious expression.304 
In his dissent in Van Orden, Justice Stevens’s endorsement analysis focused 
primarily on the neutrality principle;305 he invoked it in criticizing the fact that 
the actual text inscribed on the display placed “the State at the center of a 
serious sectarian dispute,” because it made a definitive choice of language 
among the many available versions of the Decalogue.306 Finally, Stevens 
aggressively touted neutrality ideals when rejecting Justice Scalia’s “original 
meaning” position,307 opining that Scalia’s position “is plainly not worthy of a 
society whose enviable hallmark over the course of two centuries has been the 
continuing expansion of religious pluralism and tolerance.”308 
 
 299. See infra Part V.A. 
 300. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2737 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 
(2000)). 
 301. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted)). 
 302. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)) (alteration added). 
 303. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 304. See generally id. at 2746–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is true that many Americans find 
the Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before 
enforcing the First Amendment.”). 
 305. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2874 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2876 
(“[T]he Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a 
Christian faith.”). 
 306. Id. at 2880 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”)). 
Also, Stevens noted that, due to its placement on the State Capitol grounds, reasonable observers 
might potentially perceive the Decalogue as representing the official belief of all Texans, which 
raises compelled speech issues under Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). See Van Orden, 125 S. 
Ct. at 2881. 
 307. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 308. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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While Justice Stevens’s particular objection to the text of the Van Orden 
display garnered only the votes of himself and Justice Ginsburg, it leads to two 
instructive questions: (1) Does the government’s action reveal that the state has 
taken one side in an ongoing sectarian dispute? (2) Does the government’s action 
expressly or implicitly attempt to resolve the ongoing sectarian dispute? The 
answers to these questions seem relevant to addressing the broader issue of 
whether, even when the government did not have the express purpose of 
endorsing religion, the government’s action has the effect of endorsing religion 
or of segmenting society into insiders and outsiders: If the government has 
taken a side in a sectarian dispute or attempted to resolve it, then necessarily, 
the government has chosen to lend its imprimatur to one set of religious beliefs 
over another. This effectively endorses the preferred belief system, which 
violates neutrality ideals by preferring one religion to another. 
B. The Historical-Acknowledgement Test: A Free Pass to Christian Majorities 
Like the liberals, the conservatives on the Court have combined two 
distinct modes of analysis in synthesizing what can only be characterized as an 
extremely deferential test. Grossly stated, the historical-acknowledgment test 
asks only whether the government action honors or acknowledges longstanding 
religious beliefs that have been held since the dawn of the Union. The only limit 
on this principle appears to be political will, which, in practice, supplies no 
meaningful constraint on these “acknowledgments.” As a result, the test 
provides religious majorities—who, in America, happen to be Christian—with a 
free pass to concoct any “acknowledgement” they please, based primarily on the 
fact that they comprise the greatest number of believers in American society and 
always have.309 
Recognizing the infirmity inherent in this conception of the Clause, the 
conservatives valiantly attempted to fashion a limiting principle, but the result 
was much more lenient and religion-favoring than either the Lemon-
endorsement test or any of the Court’s previous rules. The historical-
acknowledgment test limits the government’s authority in the following way: 
The Establishment Clause is only offended when the government’s action (1) has 
a religious purpose that extends beyond the scope of its secular purposes310 or (2) 
requires or coerces nonbelievers into either professing adherence to a religious 
doctrine or participating in a religious ceremony.311 
1. “Unbroken History”: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Test 
Describing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as 
“Januslike,”312 Chief Justice Rehnquist cast the question before the Court as the 
need to navigate two lines of cases, one acknowledging the “strong role played 
 
 309. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 310. This is the outer limit that Justice Rehnquist describes in his articulation of the test. See 
discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 311. Justice Scalia considers the outer limit to be compelled religious observation or 
participation. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. Justice Thomas describes the outer limit as “actual 
coercion.” See supra note 273. 
 312. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). 
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by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s history,”313 and one 
recognizing that “governmental intervention in religious matters can itself 
endanger religious freedom.”314 Rehnquist stated that the best reconciliation 
between these competing values is one that “neither abdicate[s] our 
responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince[s] a 
hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing 
our religious heritage.”315 
In a footnote, Rehnquist repudiated neutrality ideals, asserting that “we 
have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars 
any and all governmental preference for religion over irreligion. . . . Even the 
dissenters do not claim that [we must] forbid all governmental 
acknowledgements, preference, or accommodations of religion.”316 Technically, 
Rehnquist is correct, but only because he used absolutist language. Rehnquist’s 
criticism of the neutrality principle is an attack on a straw man, because there is 
no genuine doctrinal dispute on this point: The Lemon-endorsement test neither 
bars any and all governmental preference for religion nor forbids all 
governmental acknowledgements of religion. No one questions that the 
government can acknowledge religion (i.e., by erecting holiday displays),317 that 
it can prefer religion (i.e., by giving tax-exempt status to all religious 
organizations, regardless of their belief systems),318 and that it can accommodate 
religion (i.e., by recognizing Christmas as a federal holiday).319 As such, 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. (alteration added). 
 316. Id. at 2860 n.3 (alteration added). The first part of this statement overstates the scope of the 
neutrality principle, while the second part constructs and attacks an argument that was never made 
by either the McCreary County majority or the Van Orden dissenters. See also discussion supra Part 
IV.A. 
 317. E.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 318. E.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing types of organizations eligible for tax-exempt status under 
federal law; includes churches and religious social-service groups). 
We must be careful not to overstate the nature or permissibility of this “preference.” The tax-
exemption of churches is commonly considered to serve a two-fold purpose: (1) encourage tax-
deductible donations to social-service and religious organizations; and (2) relieve churches of tax 
liabilities that would burden their delivery of social and religious services. The “preference” in 
question would not seem to constitute a preference for religion over irreligion, because Secularist 
societies are eligible for tax-exemption just like churches are. See id. Moreover, the general 
availability of tax-exemption to religious organizations does not favor one religion over another. Id. 
Finally, the secular purpose has commonly been understood as encouraging participation in 
religious and social-service organizations because of their civilizing effects on society. Again, this 
principle is inherently inclusive of all systems of both belief and non-belief. 
Therefore, the word “preference” is being used in a subtly different way here than in everyday 
English: Notions of favoritism (i.e., the government “prefers” for people to be religious, or it 
“prefers” religion over irreligion) have been discarded in favor of recognizing the net-positive social 
benefits of encouraging support for these organizations (i.e., the government “prefers” for these 
organizations to enjoy public support and for them to be successful in their missions). This is not to 
say that future claims may not arise about the permissibility of giving tax-exemption to religious 
organizations generally. Instead, I merely note that the courts have thus far recognized several 
secular reasons for permitting such exemptions. 
 319. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000) (listing federal holidays, including Christmas Day, December 25). 
Christmas Day is the only federal holiday derived from the beliefs of a particular religion, viz., 
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acknowledgments, preferences, and accommodations appear to be entirely 
permissible, provided they pass the basic neutrality test. Therefore, Rehnquist’s 
characterization of the Court’s neutrality precedent is simply incorrect, and his 
rhetorical sleight-of-hand fails: He is repudiating a position that no member of 
the Court appears to hold. The neutrality rule is not an absolute bar—instead, it 
is an inquiry as to whether the government’s action has the purpose or effect of 
endorsing religion. This is a far cry from an outright ban on acknowledgment, 
preference, or accommodation. 
Nevertheless, to support his characterization of the Clause, Rehnquist 
proceeded to recount the “‘unbroken history of official acknowledgement by all 
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at 
least 1789.’”320 He also noted the role of functional acknowledgments or 
“ceremonial deism” encountered in several places in American government.321 In 
applying this “unbroken history” test, Rehnquist characterized the displays as a 
“passive use” of the Decalogue,322 noting that the government’s interest in 
acknowledging the Commandments was coextensive—and therefore 
coterminous—with their religious significance.323 
Because of the potential that net-positive secular effects flow from the 
admonishments found in the Decalogue, Rehnquist ultimately concluded that 
the secular purpose behind posting it on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol 
grounds was at least as great as the religious purpose, and that the display was 
therefore constitutional. 
2. The Framers and Original Meaning: Justice Scalia’s Test 
Essentially, Justice Scalia sought to identify precisely what the Framers and 
Ratifiers intended the Establishment Clause to mean, paying specific attention 
both to their expressions of monotheistic beliefs at the time of the founding324 
and to the role of ceremonial deism throughout America’s history.325 Scalia 
angled to refute the neutrality principle by establishing that “the history and 
traditions” of the nation “reflect our society’s constant understanding of” the 
 
Christianity. No other religious holidays are codified in federal law as days on which the federal 
government is closed. 
 320. Id. at 2861 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (upholding a crèche and 
Christmas display installed on government property)). 
 321. See id. at 2861–62 (citing cases upholding government acknowledgement of religion and 
“official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance” (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675)). 
The Court expressly permitted “ceremonial deism” in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n.46 
(Blackmun, J., plurality, in dicta) (noting that invocations and prayer have a “solemnizing” effect on 
public events and proceedings). 
Currently, acceptable forms of “ceremonial deism” definitely include the national pledge (“one 
nation under God”) and motto (“in God we trust”), see id., formalistic or traditional prayers, see 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (permitting non-denominational legislative prayer), and 
probably include historic installations of religious figures and symbolism on federal government 
buildings in Washington, D.C., see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2862–63; id. at 2894 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
It is unclear exactly where the outer limit lies, as it may be different for each Justice. 
 322. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748–50 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 325. See id. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
614 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
Establishment Clause not as generally requiring neutrality among religions, and 
certainly not as requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion.326 Paralleling 
Rehnquist’s view, Scalia’s conclusion seems to conflict with Everson and the 
Court’s long-standing neutrality jurisprudence.327 
Nevertheless, Scalia sought to cast doubt upon the line of cases that 
announced and reaffirmed the neutrality principle, criticizing Lemon as “brain-
spun,” incapable of consistent application, and a “mistaken interpretation of the 
Constitution.”328 He subsequently offered up the proposition that an 
acknowledgement of religion is permissible when it either is constituted of 
“‘beliefs widely held among the people of this country,’”329 or is “recognized 
across . . . a broad and diverse range” of religious groups.330 He then argued that, 
when balancing “the interest of [a religious] minority in not feeling ‘excluded’” 
with “the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being 
able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our 
national endeavors,” courts should recognize that “[o]ur national tradition has 
resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.”331 
Conceding that the foregoing analysis had failed to win over a sufficient 
number of Justices, Scalia argued that, if Lemon’s secular-purpose prong is to be 
preserved at all,332 the focus should remain on “the search for a genuine, secular 
motivation” and not turn into a “hunt for a predominantly religious purpose.”333 
It is not clear whether Scalia conceives of this test as a form of rational basis or 
heightened scrutiny, but it is probably safe to assume that, given his willingness 
to let majorities erect almost any acknowledgement they please, Scalia conceives 
of it as a form of rational basis—and a highly-deferential one, at that. 
Furthermore, he proposed that any contextual inquiry should be 
presumptively satisfied if the religious portion of the display does not have 
“greater prominence” than the other portions,334 and the reasonable observer 
could discern from the context that the entire display has a “purely secular 
purpose.”335 Scalia would not consider evidence of a prior improper purpose as 
“taint[ing]” a legitimate present purpose.336 
In conclusion, Scalia announced that he would affirm a display’s 
constitutionality when (1) “[n]o one [is] compelled to observe or participate in 
any religious ceremony or activity,”337 (2) the government does not “contribut[e] 
 
 326. Id. at 2750. 
 327. See supra Part IV.A. 
 328. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750–52 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 329. Id. at 2753 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). Ostensibly, Scalia means 
only monotheistic beliefs in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. Id. at 2753, 2756. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 2756 (alterations added, quotation marks and emphasis in original). 
 332. See id. at 2758 (“I have urged that Lemon’s purpose prong be abandoned . . . .”). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 2759. 
 336. Id. at 2763 (alteration added). 
 337. Id. at 2762 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)) (alterations added). 
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significant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of one religious faith,”338 and 
(3) “[p]assersby who disagree with the message conveyed by th[e] displays are 
free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when 
they disagree with any other form of government speech.”339 
The conservative wing of the Court has struggled mightily to insinuate its 
deferential, religion-preferring historical analysis as the primary method of 
conceiving of the Establishment Clause. While the Lemon-endorsement test 
generally prevailed in McCreary County and Van Orden, the recent turnover on 
the Court probably means that neither side has been given the last word on the 
matter. Nevertheless, as the law stands today, the Lemon-endorsement test is the 
lens through which we must critically evaluate same-sex marriage bans. 
V. DO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS PASS MUSTER?: 
APPLYING THE LEMON-ENDORSEMENT TEST 
The analysis of same-sex civil marriage bans occurs in two major steps. 
First, a secular purpose must be identified. Without one, the bans cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. As we will see, even under a rational-basis 
conception of the secular purpose requirement, some of the so-called secular 
purposes given for same-sex civil marriage bans are decidedly religious, while 
others lie on such unstable logical foundations that, while the proffered 
justifications may be secular purposes in and of themselves, none of them is 
rationally related to banning same-sex civil marriage. 
Even conceding for the sake of argument that some yet-unidentified secular 
purpose is out there, the analysis is incomplete. The second step is to apply the 
endorsement test’s three remaining questions: To the reasonable observer, does 
the government action have (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of endorsing 
religion, and (3) does the action render a person’s religious beliefs relevant to 
her standing in the political community? As we will see, even assuming a 
secular purpose, the preservationists’ preferred definition of marriage cannot 
pass the endorsement analysis. 
A. The Search for a Secular Purpose: Evaluating the Arguments Against Same-
Sex Civil Marriage 
“[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be 
a secular legislative purpose.” 
–Justice Tom C. Clark, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp340 
We must first determine whether the proponents of banning same-sex civil 
marriage have articulated a non-pretextual, genuinely secular interest for doing 
so. Without one, such bans are unconstitutional establishments of religion, 
rendering the inquiry complete. This inquiry is far-ranging and relatively 
 
 338. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)) (alteration added). 
 339. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)) (alterations added). 
 340. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
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extensive, because it requires us to undertake a critical evaluation of the logical 
and secular foundations of the justifications offered for bans on same-sex civil 
marriage. Our search is for a purpose that is “genuine, not a sham, and not 
merely secondary to a religious objective.” 341 As such, we are permitted to pierce 
the veil of pretextual obfuscations designed to mask an invidious religious 
purpose—genuine-ness cannot be determined otherwise.342 
The following analysis relies primarily on the arguments advanced in favor 
of the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which are found in its legislative 
history and hearing transcripts. I have supplemented a handful of these 
arguments with statements written by several individuals who testified in favor 
of the FMA, as they are helpful in unpacking their claims. I assume for the ease 
of argumentation that the arguments raised and dismissed here are the same 
ones used to justify statutory and constitutional bans that have been enacted at 
the state level, and that therefore, those bans would suffer the same 
constitutional infirmities that exist within the FMA. 
1. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Social Science, and a Bit of  
 History 
In 1996, DOMA was passed with great religious fanfare, and supporters of 
the law did not hesitate to trumpet its explicitly religious underpinnings.343 The 
proponents of DOMA used religious beliefs about the immorality of 
homosexuality as a justification for blatant gay-bashing. In light of DOMA’s 
undeniably religious background, some commentators have argued that DOMA 
is an unconstitutional establishment of religion.344 Fast-forward to the present 
day. While explicitly religious arguments against homosexuality were used to 
support DOMA,345 there is a near-complete absence of such anti-gay religious 
rhetoric used to justify the FMA.346 The preservationists only mention religion in 
two contexts: (1) religious freedom347 and (2) the definition of marriage.348 
 
 341. McCreary County, 125 U.S. at 2735. See also id. at 2727–28. 
 342. As a literal matter, if a proposition is pretextual, it is not genuine. The adjectives 
“pretextual” and “genuine” are mutually exclusive, as they are contradictory—a proposition cannot 
be both false and true at the same time. 
 343. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,100–02, S10,109–11 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (during the 
DOMA floor debates, citing the Bible to condemn homosexuality and homosexual behavior). See also 
James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. 
J. GENDER & L. 335, 349–53 (1997) (cataloguing the range of explicitly religious anti-gay rhetoric used 
during the DOMA debates, including congresspersons’ direct citations to the Bible). 
 344. E.g., Donovan, supra note 343. 
 345. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary 
Subcomm. on the Const., 104th Cong. 1, 247 (1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (declaring the 
homosexual “lifestyle” to be an “inherently destructive” one from which homosexuals need to be 
“rescued”). Rep. Canady’s statements mimic the fundamentalist Christian groups who try to 
convince homosexuals that they can “convert” from homosexual to heterosexual through prayer and 
religious belief. See infra notes 363–65, 407–12 and accompanying text. 
 346. E.g., House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 1–53 (containing almost no 
religiously-based anti-gay justifications for the FMA). 
 347. See discussion infra Part V.A.4; see also supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 16; infra note 568; see also discussion infra Part V.A.2.b; supra Part I.A. 
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While the FMA has the consequential effect of legitimizing discrimination 
against same-sex couples, it does not have the express purpose of doing so.349 
The lack of a facially-discriminatory purpose lends an air of credibility to the 
arguments favoring the FMA, despite their subtextual religiosity. This is a 
remarkable modernization of discourse: The lessons of history have truly 
“channeled” the preservationists’ once-religious anti-gay arguments into more 
tolerable, secular-sounding ones.350 What happened? The preservationists have 
not abandoned their religious principles. Instead, they have turned to using 
pseudo-secular justifications and obfuscating free-exercise claims as cover for 
insinuating their religious beliefs into the law. 
Secularization of religious preservationism is not costless. For example, a 
truly “fundamental” tenet of fundamentalist religious beliefs is proselytization 
and conversion.351 As such, it is consistent with preservationist values to 
conclude that imposition of their religious beliefs on American society is a 
paramount goal.352 Preservationists ardently decry the secularization of 
 
 349. See discussion infra Parts V.B.2–3. 
 350. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1332. Even more remarkable about this 
tactical change is that fifty-eight of the congresspersons who co-sponsored DOMA in 1996 have co-
sponsored various versions of the FMA between 2002 and 2006. 
 351. E.g., Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), On Evangelism (June 2005), available at 
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=1150 (“Since salvation is a free gift of God 
and lost people matter to God, He has commissioned believers to share the gospel . . . ; we urge 
individual Southern Baptists to recognize their responsibility to reach lost people with the gospel of 
Christ . . . .”); see also Coral Ridge Ministries (CRM), About Coral Ridge Ministries, http://www. 
coralridge. org/about_crm.htm (“CRM’s three-fold mission is to evangelize, nurture Christian 
growth through biblical instruction, and act in obedience to the Cultural Mandate by applying the 
truth of Scripture to all of life, including civic affairs.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE), Our Values, http://www.nae.net/index/cfm?FUSEACTION= 
nae.values (“The Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies, an NAE affiliate, serves thousands of 
missionaries around the world by providing an integral liaison with the State Department of the 
United States of America and other governments around the world.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The 
SBC, CRM, and NAE respectively claim sixteen million, three million, and thirty million members. 
 352. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition (TVC), Empowering People of Faith Through Know-
ledge, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/about.php (“Traditional Values Coalition is the largest 
non-denominational, grassroots church lobby in America. Founded in 1980, by Rev. Louis P. 
Sheldon, Chairman, TVC has sought to empower people of faith through knowledge. TVC speaks on 
behalf of over 43,000 churches . . . .”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
In the interest of full disclosure, TVC opposes the FMA, but only because it does not go far 
enough. See Andrea Lafferty, Constitution should ban gay marriage, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (online ed.), 
June 24, 2006, http://www.columbusdispatch.com/editorials-story.php?story=dispatch/2006/06/ 
24/20060624-A12-00.html (criticizing the FMA because it leaves open the possibility that a 
legislature might enact same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). It is 
beyond dispute that TVC opposes same-sex civil marriage, and that, given the choice between the 
FMA or no ban at all, TVC would support the FMA. Lafferty is the Executive Director of TVC. 
Traditional Values Coalition, About TVC, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/about.php (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007). See also WallBuilders, About Us, http://www.wallbuilders.com/aboutus/index.htm 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
WallBuilders’ goal is to exert a direct and positive influence in government, education, 
and the family by (1) educating the nation concerning the Godly foundation of our 
country; (2) providing information to federal, state, and local officials as they develop 
public policies which reflect Biblical values; and (3) encouraging Christians to be involved 
in the civic arena. 
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America,353 vigorously claiming that America is a Christian nation founded on 
Christian beliefs.354 As such, a number of well-funded and highly-influential 
preservationist organizations have begun to vigorously advocate for explicitly 
Christian social and legal policies.355 The FMA is one of those policies.356 
 
Id.; Center for Reclaiming America for Christ (CRAC), Our Mission, http://www.reclaimamerica. 
org/pages/aboutus.aspx (“To inform, equip, motivate, and support Christians; enabling them to 
defend and implement the Biblical principles on which our country was founded.”) (last visited Jan. 
8, 2007). CRAC is a ministry arm of CRM, supra note 351. 
 353. E.g., Southern Baptist Convention, On Secularization of our Culture (June 2004), available at 
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution/asp?ID=1135 (“The cultural drift in our nation 
toward secularism obscures moral absolutes under the guise of tolerance . . . .”); Southern Baptist 
Convention, Resolution on Secular Humanism (June 1984), available at http://www.sbc.net/ 
resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=969. 
Secular humanism has penetrated leadership in public life in our own land, especially in 
the political, mass media, and educational arenas, so that religion (except for humanism) is 
more and more regarded as irrelevant to national affairs and as of private significance 
only . . . ; [we] encourage Christians to challenge the growing tendency of humanists to 
dilute biblical principles in public life while they promote humanistic alternatives . . . ; we 
[resolve to] pursue this reversal by Christian example and the penetration of secular 
society, and by seeking appropriate legislative and/or judicial action . . . . 
Id. (alterations added). See also, e.g., BILL O’REILLY, CULTURE WARRIOR 1–2 (2006). 
I have chosen to jump into the fray and become a warrior in the vicious culture war that is 
currently under way in the United States of America. And war is exactly the right term. 
On one side of the battlefield are the armies of the traditionalists like me, people who 
believe the United States was well founded and has done enormous good for the world. 
On the other side are the committed forces of the secular-progressive movement that want 
to change America dramatically: mold it in the image of Western Europe. 
Id. 
 354. E.g., WallBuilders, About Us, supra note 352. 
WallBuilders is an organization dedicated to presenting America’s forgotten history and 
heroes, with an emphasis on the moral, religious, and constitutional foundation on which 
America was built—a foundation which, in recent years, has been seriously attacked and 
undermined. 
. . . . 
. . . [W]e develop materials to educate the public concerning the periods in our country’s 
history when its laws and policies were firmly rooted in Biblical principles. 
Id. (alteration added). See also supra note 16. 
 355. E.g., Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), Purpose, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/ 
purpose/default.aspx (“The Alliance Defense Fund is a legal alliance defending the right to hear and 
speak the Truth through strategy, training, funding, and litigation.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); 
American Center for Law & Justice (ACLJ), About ACLJ, http://www.aclj.org/Content/?f=69 (“The 
ACLJ is specifically dedicated to the ideal that religious freedom and freedom of speech are 
inalienable, God-given rights. The Center’s purpose is to educate, promulgate, conciliate, and where 
necessary, litigate, to ensure that those rights are protected under the law.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); 
Liberty Counsel, Restoring the Culture One Case at a Time by Advancing Religious Freedom, the 
Sanctity of Human Life and the Traditional Family, http://www.lc.org/aboutus.html (“Liberty 
Counsel provides pro bono legal assistance in the areas of religious liberty, the sanctity of human life 
and the traditional family.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). See also The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
About Us, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/82.html (“The Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, interfaith, legal and educational institute dedicated to protecting 
the free expression of all religious traditions.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The Becket Fund is not an 
expressly Christian organization, but it is tirelessly pro-religion. 
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Nevertheless, preservationists may not openly evangelize through facially 
sectarian laws, as this would violate the Establishment Clause outright; as such, 
they have had to make certain compromises of principle in obtaining their 
religious objective. Now, instead of making blatantly religious arguments, 
preservationists carefully couch their justifications in terms that are just secular 
enough that their invidious religious purpose is not revealed. As a result, 
preservationists have found some strange bedfellows in secularism.357 
Moreover, making secularized arguments has required preservationists to 
stake out some intractable scientific and sociological positions against 
homosexuality, same-sex relationships, and same-sex parenting.358 Over the last 
several decades, scientific evidence has mounted that homosexual sexual 
orientation is a benign variation of human sexuality, probably caused by 
genetics, immunology, endocrinology, or a combination of these.359 Moreover, 
 
 356. Rubin, supra note 235, at 41–42 (noting that same-sex civil marriage bans “have no secular 
justification at all; they are simply enactments of [religious belief]. The post hoc secular justifications 
that have been offered for them are unconvincing as a general matter.” (alteration added)). 
 357. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1409. Eskridge writes, 
Like gender-benders and sexual nonconformists, traditionalists have found themselves 
making arguments that not only slight their core religious or natural law beliefs, but also 
move them into analytical territory that is perilous for them. To medicalize or 
constitutionalize their concerns—as lawyers do—risks losing their meaning in the 
translation, and even altering their own self-understanding over time. For example, the 
fundamentalist who truly believes that same-sex marriage is contrary to the law of God 
now finds himself allied with the bigot who says “homosexuals are child molesters,” with 
the lawyer who says “spouses have a right to defend their marriages against homosexual 
assault,” and with the politician who says “normal people have a right not to associate 
with homosexuals and lesbians.” Not only do the latter statements ignore the deep 
spiritual component of the fundamentalist’s belief system, but the devout person’s 
association with those secularized arguments may change his or her belief system. My 
reading of the Gospels suggests that unfactual accusations about gay people and 
dependence on the state to bolster one’s faith are inconsistent with Jesus’s philosophy of 
love—and that the importation of these views into Christianity certainly changes and 
arguably corrupts the philosophy articulated by Jesus. 
Id. Lest we forget, religion lies at the root of the beliefs held by each of the preservationists that 
Eskridge describes in this excerpt. See supra Part III.A. See also supra note 245. 
 358. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997) (claiming that same-sex parenting is likelier than not to result in harm to 
children) [hereinafter Wardle, Potential Impact]. Wardle’s conclusions have been thoroughly 
discussed and rejected in the literature as scientifically suspect and logically unfounded. E.g., Carlos 
A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998). 
 359. See Ryan S. Higgins, “Mr. Chief Justice, Tear Down This Wall”: The Science of Immutability 
Is Eroding the Court’s Barrier to Heightened Scrutiny for Homosexuals 14 (May 8, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
The weight of the scientific evidence compels the conclusion that male sexual orientation 
has a biological antecedent that is beyond conscious, contemporaneous control and is 
fixed in utero or shortly thereafter: Neuroanatomical studies suggest that sexual 
orientation has a biological substrate in the human brain that is not chosen and cannot be 
changed; pheromone studies indicate that sexual orientation is not a conscious, 
contemporaneous choice; and a plethora of studies suggest that genetics, endocrinology, 
and immunology are somehow implicated in the underlying “story” of male 
homosexuality. Indeed, the growing consensus among scientists, psychiatrists, and 
physicians is that while there may be many reasons for a person’s sexual orientation, 
homosexuals do not choose their sexual orientation and it cannot be changed. This is the 
essence of immutability. 
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many scientists have affirmed that, regardless of the origins of homosexuality, 
sexual orientation is fixed by an early age and is not the product of an individual 
choice.360 Attempts to change an individual’s sexual orientation from homo-
sexual to heterosexual are generally viewed as psychologically harmful.361 Same-
sex couples have also been shown to be effective, loving parents capable of 
raising well-adjusted, productive children.362 
Faced with mounting scientific evidence against their anti-gay position, 
preservationists can only prevail if they rely on scientific arguments and 
research about homosexuality that rest on factual conclusions directly contrary 
to those consistently found by mainstream scientists. This research usually 
comes in two flavors: conversion therapy and homosexual parenting. 
First, in the context of “conversion therapy”—a process by which (it is 
claimed) that homosexuals can become heterosexual363—preservationists have 
created an entire lobby of researchers whose outcome-determinative social-
science evidence is manufactured to conclude that (1) homosexuality is a choice, 
(2) homosexuals who refuse to attempt to convert to heterosexuality are doomed 
to a life of misery, and (3) there is no need to give homosexuals any civil rights, 
 
Id. 
 360. E.g., Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and 
Homosexual Men, 253 SCI. 1034 (1991); Ivanka Savic et al., Brain Response to Putative Pheromones in 
Homosexual Men, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7356 (2005); Brian S. Mustanski, A Genomewide Scan of 
Male Sexual Orientation, 116 HUM. GENETICS 272 (2005); Dean H. Hamer, et al., A Linkage Between 
DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCI. 321 (1993); Sven Bocklandt et 
al., Extreme Skewing of X Chromosome Inactivation in Mothers of Homosexual Men, 118 HUM. GENETICS 
691 (2006); 
 361. E.g., American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions About Sexual 
Orientation and Homosexuality, http://www.apa.org/topics/orientation.html (“Some therapists 
who undertake so-called conversion therapy report that they have been able to change their clients’ 
sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. . . . The American Psychological Association is 
concerned about such therapies and their potential harm to patients.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); 
American Psychiatric Association, COPP Position Statement on Therapies Focused on Attempts to 
Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies) (May 2000), http://www.psych. 
org/psych_pract/copptherapyaddendum83100.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
Psychotherapeutic modalities to convert or “repair” homosexuality are based on 
developmental theories whose scientific validity is questionable. Furthermore, anecdotal 
reports of “cures” are counterbalanced by anecdotal claims of psychological harm. In the 
last four decades, “reparative” therapists have not produced any rigorous scientific 
research to substantiate their claims of cure. Until there is such research available, APA 
recommends that ethical practitioners refrain from attempts to change individuals’ sexual 
orientation, keeping in mind the medical dictum to first, do no harm. 
Id. See also American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Psychiatric Treatment and 
Sexual Orientation (Dec. 1998), http://www.psych.org/psych_pract/copptherapyaddendum83100. 
cfm (“The potential risks of reparative therapy are great, including depression, anxiety and self-
destructive behavior, since therapist alignment with societal prejudices against homosexuality may 
reinforce self-hatred already experienced by the patient.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 362. E.g., Pawelski et al., The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership Laws on the 
Health and Well-being of Children, 118 PEDIATRICS 349, 358–60 (July 2006) (summarizing recent 
longitudinal studies of same-sex parents and their children; finding no difference in adjustment and 
psychosocial development outcomes). This article summarizes the findings of a committee 
commissioned by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) to study the effects that continued 
exclusion from legalized family structures has on same-sex couples and their children. Id. at 349. 
 363. See also infra notes 407–12 and accompanying text. 
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because with enough willpower (and religiosity), they can always repair their 
brokenness.364 Scientists have continually debunked these studies, demonstrating 
that they are based on unsound scientific principles and conducted using faulty 
research methods.365 
 
 364. Of these researchers, among the most famous is Joseph Nicolosi, of the National Association 
for the Research & Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), http://www.narth.com. NARTH’s 
primary claim is that “reparative therapy”—a process by which the sexual orientation of a willing 
subject is “repaired” by changing it from homosexual to heterosexual—is a viable treatment option 
for persons who desire to “grow out of homosexuality”; Nicolosi refers to these persons as “non-gay 
homosexuals.” JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A NEW CLINICAL 
APPROACH 3–4 (softcover ed. 1997) (defining “non-gay homosexuals” as those men who experience 
same-sex sexual attractions but who desire to live their lives as heterosexuals); see also NARTH, 
What do clinical studies say?, http://www.narth.com/menus/cstudies.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007). 
One should not conclude that NARTH’s theories are secular merely because the organization is 
not expressly religious: Buried deep within the NARTH website are links to several articles by 
religious medical associations. NARTH, Homosexuality and Hope: Statement Of The Catholic 
Medical Association November, 2000, http://www.narth.com/docs/hope.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007); NARTH, “Michigan State Medical Society Caves in to Gay Activist Agenda,” Charges 
Catholic Medical Association, December 2002, http://www.narth.com/docs/caves.html (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007); NARTH, Medical Association Offers Position Statement on Homosexuality, http:// 
www.narth.com/docs/offersposition.html (reporting on the September 2004 position statement of 
the anti-gay Christian Medical and Dental Association) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
Moreover, Nicolosi himself is a conservative Catholic who believes in religious natural-law theory. 
Sandra G. Boodman, Vowing to Set the World Straight, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2005, at HE1 (quoting 
Nicolosi: “Your true self is heterosexual. Look at your body: It was designed to fit a woman, not a 
man.”). As discussed, much of religious natural-law theory was developed by Catholics, who are 
among its most ardent proponents today. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. See also infra 
Parts V.A.2.f; V.A.3.a. 
Finally, NARTH disclaims all homophobic intent, but it opposes same-sex marriage, subscribing 
to the preservationist position that opposite-sex marriage is the “ideal environment” in which to 
raise children. NARTH, NARTH Position Statements, http://www.narth.com/menus/position 
statements.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 365. Perhaps calling these pieces “studies” gives them more credit than they merit—most of the 
literature claiming that homosexuality is a chosen, mutable condition comes in the form of opinion 
pieces. For example, Exodus International—one of the earliest and most famous of the Christianity-
based conversion-therapy groups—has a series of articles posted on its website that constitute 
nothing more than opinions written by various proponents of the “ex-gay” movement; many of 
these authors have chosen to remain anonymous, and most of the articles are un-cited and have not 
been peer-reviewed. Moreover, the religious content of these “studies” is beyond dispute. See 
Exodus International, Library-Society, http://exodus.to/content/blogcategory/17/56/ (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007). See also infra notes 407–12 and accompanying text. 
To be fair, the preservationists have not commissioned every study that they cite. In 2003, one 
study claimed that a handful of individuals who had undergone “reparative therapy” had 
succeeded in maintaining “good heterosexual function” lasting at least five years. See Robert L. 
Spitzer, Can some gay men and lesbians change their sexual orientation? 200 participants reporting a change 
from homosexual to heterosexual orientation, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 399 (Oct. 2003). 
Preservationists celebrated this study as a validation of their longstanding claims that homosexuality 
is a choice and that homosexuals can rid themselves of same-sex attractions—NARTH has fallen all 
over itself trying to defend Spitzer’s study from criticism. See, e.g., Roy Waller & Linda A. Nicolosi, 
Spitzer Study Published: Evidence Found for Effectiveness of Reorientation Therapy, 
http://www.narth.com/docs/evidencefound.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); A. Dean Byrd, 
Fordham University Dissertation Furthers Spitzer’s Landmark Study on Sexual Re-orientation 
Success, http://www.narth.com/docs/fordham.html (reviewing doctoral dissertation by Jay C. 
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Second, we have briefly noted the scientific evidence in support of 
homosexual parenting;366 nevertheless, preservationists persist in claiming that 
homosexual parenting is dangerous for children.367 I do not wish to delve deeply 
into the arguments for and against homosexual parenting; because the 
documented, positive effects of homosexual parenting do not enjoy the same 
longitudinal credibility as several thousand years of recorded heterosexual 
parenting, it is unlikely that the debate over homosexual parenting could be 
resolved within these pages. For our purposes here, it is enough to show that 
science has not provided us with a conclusive answer either way. 
As such, we seem to be mired in an intractable “war of the studies”: 
Because science may never conclusively establish either the genesis of 
homosexuality or the effectiveness of conversion, or the effects of homosexual 
parenting on children, the preservationists get away with citing social-science 
evidence that is anti-gay, outcome-oriented, and patently non-objective. As a 
result, they have left no room for meaningful argumentation and dialogue based 
on nonpartisan, unbiased scientific research. Instead, advocates on both sides 
can only engage in a fruitless back-and-forth about whose evidence is more 
credible or accurate.368 
Despite the universally-positive support for same-sex civil marriage 
coming from the mainstream scientific and mental-health community,369 
opponents of same-sex marriage persist in manufacturing incredible, specious 
research to justify their anti-gay position. Because neither side appears to have 
gained the upper hand in this battle,370 I will, for the purposes of this analysis, 
 
Wade) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Daniel E. Byrne, Yet Another Attempt to Discredit the Spitzer Study 
Fails, http://www.narth.com/docs/yetanother.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
However, Spitzer himself noted that the only individuals who could reasonably be considered to 
have actually changed their sexual orientation were “extraordinarily religious” and “highly 
motivated” to change—indeed, the only reason for the change was religiosity itself. Boodman, supra, 
at HE1 (reporting that Spitzer claims his study has been misrepresented by the preservationists: “It 
bothers me to be their knight in shining armor because on every social issue I totally disagree with 
the Christian right.”). 
Moreover, Spitzer’s study has been heavily criticized for its research methods. E.g., Theo G.M. 
Sandfort, Studying Sexual Orientation Change, 7 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 15 (2003) (noting 
the methodological deficiencies in Spitzer’s study); Charles Silverstein, The Religious Conversion of 
Homosexuals: Subject Selection is the Voir Dire of Psychological Research, 7 J. GAY & LESBIAN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 31 (2003) (noting that “[e]xtreme bias in subject selection is identified as the 
primary motivation for the subjects to claim that they have religiously converted from homosexual 
to heterosexual” (alteration added)). 
 366. See Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 358–60. 
 367. E.g., Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 358. 
 368. See, e.g., Catá Backer, supra note 225, at 232–34 (listing studies arriving at polar-opposite 
conclusions regarding the impact of same-sex parenting and the influence of non-heterosexuals on 
children generally). 
 369. E.g., Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 361 (representing the position of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics); American Psychological Association, APA Supports Legalization of Same-
Sex Civil Marriages and Opposes Discrimination Against Lesbian and Gay Parents, http://www. 
apa.org/releases/gaymarriage.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); American Psychiatric Association, 
Support of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Marriage, http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/ 
lib_archives/archives/200502.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 370. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. 2006). 
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disregard all social-science evidence about conversion-therapy and homosexual-
parenting as being non-authoritative. This certainly renders it more difficult to 
dispose of the preservationists’ arguments, but it does not render the task 
impossible. To paraphrase Justice Breyer in Van Orden, nothing can adequately 
replace the exercise of sound legal judgment.371 
2. Why We Have Opposite-Sex Marriage: Circularity, Question-Begging, and a  
 Pound of Logic 
Preservationists rehearse several arguments about the nature of marriage to 
justify their position against same-sex civil marriage. As we will see, none of 
these arguments possess either a genuine or a rational secular relationship to 
banning same-sex civil marriage. This is not to say that there are no genuinely 
secular reasons whatsoever for having opposite-sex marriage; indeed, most of 
these arguments are outstanding justifications for having opposite-sex marriage. 
These “pro-marriage” arguments actually constitute a sedimentation of dis-
course: Instead of arguing against same-sex marriage, preservationists are now 
arguing for opposite-sex marriage. 
This is a brilliant tactical move, because it serves as convenient cover for 
their anti-gay purpose: Whenever someone says, “But you’re being 
discriminatory!,” the preservationists can simply respond, “Ah, but no! We just 
love marriage, that’s all!” While this obfuscation may be strategically useful, 
such empty cheerleading serves only to distract—after all, who isn’t for 
“marriage”?372 Isn’t “marriage,” indeed, the very thing that we are fighting 
about? Both sides are for “marriage”—it is disingenuous for one side to attempt 
to claim the moral high ground about the matter. 
As we see, the question before us is not why we should have opposite-sex 
marriage. Rather, the question is why we should have opposite-sex marriage but 
not same-sex marriage. Therefore, the constitutional inquiry is whether there is a 
rational relationship between the proffered secular purpose and the government 
action in question, viz., a ban on same-sex civil marriage. 
Several of the arguments are based on two instrumentalist assumptions 
and a conclusion: (1) opposite-sex marriage serves purpose X; (2) same-sex 
marriage does not serve purpose X (and in fact, might harm it); and therefore (3) 
marriage should not be made available to same-sex couples. While these 
 
[P]laintiffs . . . refer to social science literature reporting studies of same-sex parents and 
their children. Some opponents of same-sex marriage criticize these studies, but we need 
not consider the criticism, for the studies on their face do not establish beyond doubt that 
children fare equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households. What they show, at 
most, is that rather limited observation has detected no marked differences. More 
definitive results should hardly be expected, for until recently few children have been 
raised in same-sex households, and there has not been enough time to study the long-term 
results of such child-rearing. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 371. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[O]ne 
will inevitably find difficult borderline cases. And in such cases, I see no test-related substitute for 
the exercise of legal judgment.” (alteration added)). 
 372. Cf. JAMIE WHYTE, CRIMES AGAINST LOGIC: EXPOSING THE BOGUS ARGUMENTS OF POLITICIANS, 
PRIESTS, JOURNALISTS, AND OTHER SERIAL OFFENDERS 75–77 (2005) (characterizing this style of 
argumentation as the “empty words” fallacy). 
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arguments appeal to many unquestioning lawmakers and voters, it is important 
to explore exactly what is illogical about them. Exposing the irrationality of 
these arguments will inform the rest of the discussion. 
As an initial matter, all advocates for marriage make arguments that favor 
having marriage in the first place. In responding to the question, “what kinds of 
relationships should be included in legal marriage?,” advocates on both sides 
generally proceed on the following syllogism: 
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X. 
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships. 
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is served by Y-type relationships. 
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should include Y-type relationships. 
Note that the term Y-type relationships is broad enough to encompass both 
same-sex and opposite-sex relationships; thus, both narrow and broad 
definitions of marriage373 fit within this syllogism. However, because 
preservationists object to same-sex marriage on substantive grounds, they 
change the syllogism slightly, basing their arguments on a narrower iteration: 
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X. 
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships. 
Third Major Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships. 
Third Minor Premise = Y-type relationships include only opposite-sex couples. 
Third Conclusion = Therefore, attribute A only exists in opposite-sex couples. 
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is only served by opposite-sex couples. 
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples. 
The fallacy with this syllogism is that one of the syllogism’s terms is self-
defining: The Third Minor Premise begs the question of why Y-type relationships 
include only opposite-sex couples. This flaw in reasoning means that none of the 
syllogism’s subsequent conclusions are informed by actual arguments—the 
series of conclusions become mere restatements of the question. 
For example, nothing within the syllogism explains why (1) non-opposite-
sex couples don’t possess attribute A (the Third Major Premise, leading to the 
Third Conclusion), (2) purpose X cannot also be served by relationship attributes 
other than attribute A (the Second Major Premise, leading to the Second 
Conclusion), or (3) purpose X is the only reason to have marriage in the first place 
(the First Major Premise, leading to the First Conclusion). These infirmities 
constitute the very substance of the due-process and equal-protection claims 
described above374—they go to the heart of what marriage is, which, as a legal 
matter, seems reducible to the purposes and attributes in play in the syllogism. 
Same-sex marriage advocates face significant challenges in explaining why, 
under this syllogism, it is irrational to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples 
only. Indeed, under rational-basis review, opponents of same-sex marriage can 
win this argument without expressly concluding that governments should ban 
 
 373. See supra Part I.A. 
 374. See supra Part I.A. 
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same-sex marriage. As revealed in Hernandez v. Robles,375 all a government must 
do is to establish why it makes marriage available to opposite-sex couples; it 
need not advance an affirmative argument against same-sex marriage—under 
rational-basis review, the point is to advance the interest somewhat, even if 
imperfectly.376 Given that opposite-sex marriage usually serves purpose X 
somewhat, a restriction (due process) or classification (equal protection) based 
on purpose X will probably pass muster. 
So far, same-sex marriage advocates have prevailed only when the 
reviewing court determined that legal marriages may serve purposes other than 
purpose X or possess attributes other than attribute A. Said differently, advocates 
have only won when the reviewing court broadened the nature of the right. 
Such broadening truly constitutes the redefinition that preservationists so 
desperately seek to foreclose. 
Lest these arguments distract us: our challenge vis-à-vis the Establishment 
Clause is to discern what secular reason exists for concluding that, because 
same-sex marriage does not possess the attributes of opposite-sex marriage, a 
government should be prohibited from granting such marriages. The syllogism 
in play here is the following: 
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X. 
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A. 
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships. 
Third Major Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships. 
Third Minor Premise = Y-type relationships include only opposite-sex couples. 
Third Conclusion = Therefore, attribute A only exists in opposite-sex couples. 
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is only served by opposite-sex couples. 
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples, and we 
should also ban legal recognition of all other relationships. 
Preservationists have extended the logical conclusion of the syllogism to 
include something—i.e., we should ban same-sex marriage—that the syllogism’s 
propositions do not rationally support. It is insufficient to simply say that 
opposite-sex marriage and same-sex marriage are different. Saying that 
opposite-sex marriage is better than same-sex marriage is a value judgment that 
requires a rational—and, as we will see, permissible—basis. Saying that 
“marriage is marriage” does not answer the question, “What is marriage?”; it 
merely repeats it in the form of a conclusion. 
As mentioned, it is one thing to say that opposite-sex marriage should exist 
and to advance arguments in favor of having opposite-sex marriage. It is quite 
another to say that opposite-sex marriage should exist to the exclusion of same-sex 
marriage. This last shows that the claimed rational relationship between the First 
Major Premise and the First Conclusion has broken down. I call this the 
“Conclusion-Plus” fallacy: Preservationists are relying on something beyond the 
syllogism to justify the second half of the First Conclusion—banning same-sex 
marriage. The proposition that same-sex marriage should be banned merely 
 
 375. 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
 376. See id. at 11. See also id. at 22 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
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because society benefits from having opposite-sex marriage cannot be logically 
derived from anywhere within the syllogism. 
Where, then, does the “Conclusion-Plus” proposition come from? It 
primarily derives from religious beliefs about the immorality and spiritual 
dangers of homosexuality. Logically, the fallacy undermines the necessary 
rational relationship between the asserted government interest and the means 
used to serve that end; constitutionally, the religious beliefs undermine the 
necessary secular purpose. As we will see, then, the preservationists have failed 
to rationally articulate secular justifications for banning same-sex marriage. 
a. A Brief Summary of the Arguments 
This section briefly identifies the primary arguments—state interests, 
really—raised in favor of the FMA and same-sex marriage bans generally. Table 
4 groups the preservationists’ propositions by topic—for comparative purposes, 
I have provided a key logical rebuttal to each argument.377 
Rehearsing these arguments is not just a dry exercise in philosophizing. 
Note that a same-sex marriage ban serves the stated interests extremely poorly, 
if at all. As a result, we face the inescapable implication that the stated interest is 
not the true interest. First, each one of these propositions—with the possible 
exception of Proposition C378—is a rational reason for having opposite-sex 
marriage. Yet, without more information, we cannot establish a rational link 
between the claimed interest and banning same-sex civil marriage. As such, 
none of these interests constitute convincing reasons for adopting the FMA. 
Second, each one of these propositions fills its purpose imperfectly; 
ostensibly, then, the FMA would perfect the interest, or at least to bring us closer 
to perfection—right? Well, no. As we will see, same-sex marriage has nothing to 
do with perfecting the interest. Instead, we would have to change something 
about the laws governing opposite-sex marriage. For example: 
1. If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to encourage opposite-sex 
couples to procreate, then only opposite-sex couples who are willing and 
able to procreate—or, if infertile, willing to adopt—should be allowed to 
marry, and married couples should not be permitted to use contraception. 
2. If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to ensure that as many children 
as possible grow up with a married mother and father, then married 
couples with children should find it harder to obtain a divorce. 
 
 
 377. Our discussion and rebuttal of these arguments will be limited to the Establishment Clause 
context. However, much can be said about these arguments from due-process and equal-protection 
perspectives. See generally Linda C. McClain, “God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the 
Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313 (2006). 
 378.  Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Transcript, The Ties that Divide: A Conversation on Gay 
Marriage with Andrew Sullivan and Gerard Bradley, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide], available at http://pewforum.org/events/print.php?EventID=56 
(“[W]hen you’re coming down to saying that it’s not about procreation, it’s about procreative 
orientation, you’re coming very close to a complete tautology. You’re coming close to saying it’s not 
about being procreative, it’s about being heterosexual, even if that doesn’t mean being 
procreative . . . .” (emphasis and alteration added)) (statement of Andrew Sullivan). 
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TABLE 4. PRESERVATIONIST ARGUMENTS BY TOPIC. 
Proposition Rebuttal 
Civilization and Public Ordering 
1. We want to maintain long-standing social institutions.
379
 
2. We want to encourage the formation of unitary families and 
facilitate intergenerational values-transmission.
380
 
3. We want to encourage gender-complementarity in parenting 
and sex-role modeling.
381
 
4. We want to create the ideal environment for child-rearing, 
which includes a giving each child a mother and father who are 
married.
382
 
Civilization and Public Ordering 
We allow married couples to divorce, despite the fact that it 
works harm against all four interests. 
We allow single-parent childrearing and single-parent 
adoption, which, as mono-gendered parenting environments, 
work harm against interests #1, 2, and 3. 
We allow same-sex-couple adoption and second-parent 
adoption, which, as mono-gendered parenting environments, 
work harm against interests #3 and 4. 
Responsible Procreation 
1. We want to encourage procreation within all marriages; for 
procreation to be “responsible,” couples should wait to have 
children until they are married.
383
 
2. We want to encourage unmarried persons who already have 
children to marry.
384
 
Responsible Procreation 
We allow extramarital and premarital sex, but they could 
result in pregnancy at any time, thus working harm against 
interest #1. 
We allow fertile married couples to use contraception,
385
 but 
contraception results in temporarily- or permanently-delayed 
procreation, and thus works harm against interest #1. 
We allow marriages between infertile and sterile couples, even 
when they will never adopt or foster children, thus working 
harm against interest #1. 
We require certain marriages to be non-procreative;
386
 the 
couple will never have children, thus working harm against 
interest #1. 
We allow singles who will never marry and same-sex couples to 
undergo artificial insemination and in-vitro fertilization, 
resulting in procreation outside of marriage; this works harm 
against interests #1 and 2. 
We allow unmarried couples who will never marry to procreate 
or adopt, thus working harm against interests #1 and 2. 
Procreative Orientation 
We want to encourage the “reproductive meaning” within a 
marriage through its “procreative orientation”—even if the 
couple is infertile or childless by choice.
387
 
Procreative Orientation 
We allow marital partners to engage in non-procreative forms 
of intercourse (e.g., oral sex, anal sex),
388
 but these forms of 
intercourse cannot result in children and thus work harm 
against the interest. 
 
 379. See infra Part V.A.2.b (discussing the definitional argument against same-sex civil marriage). 
 380. See infra Part V.A.2.c (discussing the intergenerational values-transfer argument against 
same-sex civil marriage). 
 381. See infra Part V.A.2.f (discussing the gender-complementarity argument against same-sex 
civil marriage). 
 382. See infra Part V.A.2.e (discussing the ideal-environment argument against same-sex civil 
marriage). 
 383. See infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the responsible-procreation argument against same-sex 
civil marriage). 
 384. See infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the incentivizing-marriage argument against same-sex civil 
marriage). 
 385. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding a statutory ban on 
contraception to be an unconstitutional violation of a married couple’s due process right to privacy 
in procreative decisionmaking). 
 386. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 1996) (allowing first cousins to marry if one of 
them is sixty-five or older); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West 1979) (allowing first cousins to marry if 
the woman is fifty-five or older). See also Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S 
L.J. 337 (2004). 
 387. E.g., See Pew Forum, The Ties That Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Prof. Bradley). 
 388. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a ban on homosexual sodomy). 
Note also that the sodomy ban struck down in Lawrence did not extend to non-procreative 
heterosexual intercourse, which Lawrence also constitutionalized by implication. See generally id. 
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3. If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to encourage “reproductive 
meaning” through penile-vaginal intercourse—thereby maintaining a 
“procreative orientation” within the marriage, then married couples should 
not be permitted to engage in non-vaginal intercourse or vaginal 
intercourse with contraception. 
I will not run through the various permutations ad absurdum. These 
examples are sufficient to show that, aside from banning same-sex marriage, 
there is a rational way to advance all of the interests outlined in Table 4—a 
rational way that no one wants to talk about! 
But according to the strictures of rational-basis review, merely identifying 
these alternative means of advancing the interest is not enough: We must also 
show that, because banning same-sex marriage bears such a highly-attenuated 
link to the interest itself, it is irrational to conclude that banning same-sex 
marriage advances the interest at all. In undertaking this analysis, we will 
discover that the preservationists are citing these interests to cover up an 
invidious religious purpose. It is identifying and dissecting this purpose to 
which we now turn. 
b. Identity Politics and the Definition of “Marriage” 
Preservationists frequently claim that the “one-man, one-woman” model of 
marriage should be “protected” from “redefinition,”389 because the man-woman 
paradigm has always been the only possible definition of marriage per se.390 The 
definitional argument was briefly discussed above,391 but it is worth revisiting 
here in greater detail. The argument is a clever attempt to fix the meaning of 
marriage as an arrangement reserved exclusively for opposite-sex couples 
before any subsequent discussion takes place.392 However useful such an 
argument might be rhetorically, the statement “marriage is marriage” fails 
logically because it is tautological: By claiming that a same-sex marriage, by 
definition, could never exist, preservationists have sidestepped the question (“Is 
marriage only between one man and one woman?”) by repeating it as a 
conclusion (“Marriage is only between one man and one woman.”). No attempt 
is made to explain why “marriage is marriage.” Thus, the definitional argument, 
while tactically useful, is an unsatisfying response to the question, “what is 
marriage?” 
To take on one of the more colorful iterations of the definitional argument, 
Jeffrey Ventrella of the Alliance Defense Fund once wrote that, “without onions, 
[onion rings] cease to be onion rings. In the same way, marriage . . . consists of 
 
 389. This rhetoric is simply code for Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 981 (Mass. 
2003). It bears noting here that the Massachusetts Court was applying state constitutional protections 
to that state’s definition of marriage. So much for federalism! 
 390. E.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7901 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hayworth) 
(“Whether a couple is a man and a woman has everything to do with the meaning of marriage.”). 
 391. See supra Part I.A. 
 392. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Ventrella, Square Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to the Same-Sex “Marriage” 
Debate, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 681, 685 (2005) (“[I]f words lack fixed meaning, then debate itself 
becomes meaningless.” (alteration added)). See also id. at 688 (“Marriage law cannot be decon-
textualized merely to support someone’s trendy preferences.”). 
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two—and only two—persons [in] the union of a male and a female. Absent these 
essential components, the social construct ceases to be a marriage.”393 
The argument, in essence, is that X = X. This is undoubtedly true. But it is 
also mathematically possible that X = Y. It is this second equation that 
represents the root of our definitional crisis. In response to the possibility that X 
= Y, preservationists reply that, if the syllogism 
X = marriage, and 
marriage = one man + one woman, ergo 
X = one man + one woman 
is true, then the syllogism 
X = marriage, and 
marriage = one woman + one woman, ergo 
X = one woman + one woman 
could not also be true. 
At first blush, one man + one woman „ one woman + one woman seems to be 
logically correct. But is it? What, other than a bare dislike of one woman + one 
woman, makes it logically—or, more precisely, legally—impossible for one man + 
one woman = one woman + one woman? Is it really beyond dispute that, given the 
existence of gender dysphoria, intersexuality, and transgenderism, the terms 
“man” and “woman” are impervious to multiple interpretations? It seems quite 
possible that the actors in our math-play are legally fungible: Since it is legal for 
one man to marry, over the course of a lifetime, many women (albeit one at a 
time), it is hard to imagine why, without more, he could not also marry many 
men in the course of that same lifetime. (Remember, the syllogism does not say 
“marriage = only one man + one woman.”) 
If, as a matter of constitutional law, there are precious few areas in which 
women and men can be adjudicated to be inherently unequal,394 then it is unclear 
from the definitional argument exactly why or how one man + one woman is not 
the legal equivalent of one woman + one woman. Arguing from essentialism gets 
us nowhere, because we haven’t yet established that one man + one woman > one 
woman + one woman, or why, even if that is true, such an imbalance justifies 
banning one woman + one woman. I am not arguing that the definitional argument 
is wrong. But to determine that it is right, we need more information than the 
argument is willing to give. 
Returning to the “onion rings” metaphor, we are thus left not with a 
discussion of the necessary ingredients to create an onion ring, but instead with 
the more basic question, “what is an onion?” Certainly, what an onion is cannot 
be without limit.395 However, defining the outer limits of the onion necessarily 
requires an inquiry beyond the onion itself. It seems that Ventrella’s argument is 
unassailable, not because it is correct, but because it is premised on faulty logic: 
 
 393. Id. at 684 (alterations added). 
 394. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend gender-
based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that 
action.”). 
 395. See infra Part V.A.3.c. 
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Major Premise = The onion is what it is. 
Minor Premise = The onion has always been what it is. 
Conclusion = Therefore, what the onion is cannot be questioned. 
A more impenetrable tautology there wasn’t yet. 
Preservationists also find cold comfort in history: Governments have 
continually redefined what constitutes a valid “marriage”;396 this means that 
marriage has never been—and is not now—an institution with a static 
definition. Claiming that one definition of marriage is the only possible definition, 
despite evidence to the contrary, is a factually-unsupportable proposition. 
For historical evidence that marriage in America has included arrangements 
beyond “one-man, one-woman” marriage, one needs to look no farther than 
Mormon polygamy in the late 1800s.397 Concededly, Mormon polygamy always 
occurred within the confines of a man-woman paradigm. Some preservationists 
seize upon this fact to claim that comparisons to polygamy are inapposite—
some preservationists even claim that, because polygamous marriages are bi-
gendered, they would support polygamy over same-sex marriage.398 
Logically, however, polygamous marriage cannot simultaneously support 
and subvert the preservationists’ preferred definition of marriage. According to 
the teleological argument against same-sex marriage, marriage is as necessarily 
bi-nary as it is bi-gendered.399 Moreover, when preservationists invoke the 
“slippery slope,” polygamy is cited as the very thing that they wish to avoid.400 It 
is a logical contradiction to say both “I am against proposition X because it leads 
to bad consequence Y” and “I prefer bad consequence Y to proposition X.” Bad 
consequence Y is either worse than proposition X or it is not. 
It is therefore logically inconsistent for preservationists to claim that 
polygamy’s bi-gendered nature supports their definition of marriage while also 
claiming that polygamy’s multi-nary nature opposes their definition of 
marriage—polygamy either subverts the preservationist definition of marriage 
or it does not. Said in the reverse, preservationists either oppose polygamy or 
they do not. They cannot logically have it both ways. 
Despite its faulty logical foundations, the definitional tautology undergirds 
the preservationists’ frequent appeals to identity politics. Many preservationists 
claim that gay and lesbian individuals have not actually been deprived of their 
right to marry, because they can simply “choose” to marry an individual of the 
opposite sex.401 
 
 396. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (redefining marriage to permit persons of different 
races to marry); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (same). 
 397. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 398. E.g., Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes: Why We Need Marriage, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 14, 2003, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gallagher071403.asp (“Polygamy is not 
worse than gay marriage, it is better. At least polygamy, for all its ugly defects, is an attempt to 
secure stable mother-father families for children.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 399. E.g., Ventrella, supra note 392, at 684 (opining that “marriage . . . consists of two—and only 
two—persons [in] the union of a male and a female” (emphasis added)). 
 400. See infra Part V.A.3.c. 
 401. E.g., Card, supra note 65. 
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This argument concedes that something has to change before the definitional 
crisis can be resolved—the question is what or whom. It assumes that 
homosexuals are merely being obstinate about who they wish to marry, and so 
the definition of marriage need not be changed to accommodate their “trendy 
preferences.”402 Identity-politicking serves two useful purposes for 
preservationists: (1) refuting claims of sex discrimination and (2) questioning the 
notion that homosexuality is a sufficiently immutable characteristic as to merit 
heightened constitutional protection. 
First, there is a meaningful argument that same-sex marriage bans 
constitute unconstitutional discrimination based on sex. Grossly stated, the 
argument is this: (1) marriage is, after Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, an institution 
that affirms individual autonomy and decisionmaking vis-à-vis choice of 
partner; (2) bans on same-sex marriage are a restriction on individual autonomy, 
because they do not permit individuals to marry their choice of partner; (3) the 
restriction on individual autonomy is based on the sex of the individual who 
seeks to enter marriage (this renders irrelevant questions of class-based harms—
i.e., harms to men or women as discrete groups); (4) because same-sex marriage 
bans draw lines based on gender, they thus require an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification”;403 and (5) same-sex marriage bans do not survive this heightened 
scrutiny.404 This claim renders the claimant’s sexual orientation to be irrelevant, 
because having a particular sexual orientation is not a prerequisite to marriage. 
The claim succeeds or fails on whether the restriction is conceived of as 
working an individually- or group-based harm. If the restriction is conceived of 
as against the individual, the claim succeeds, because the individual’s autonomy 
is diminished based on her sex. If the restriction is conceived of as against an 
entire gender, the claim fails, because the legal handicap is the same for both 
genders, and it is generally-applicable to everyone—the restriction diminishes 
the autonomy of 100% of the population, so the persuasive force of any one 
individual’s claim is undermined. 
Preservationists, predictably, take the position that homosexuals remain 
subject to the same gender-based line drawing that applies to heterosexuals, so 
no sex-discrimination claim can be stated. Identity-politicking helps in this 
regard, because it paints with a broad brush, delineating homosexuals as part of 
the larger class of males and females, not as individuals who, although similarly 
situated, are not permitted to marry the person of their choice solely on account 
of their individual genders. 
Second, and more invidiously, the assertion that homosexuals can always 
choose to marry someone of the opposite sex is subtly intended to imply that 
sexual orientation is not a “choice”—at least not in the classic sense405—and 
therefore it is not deserving of heightened protection or scrutiny. While not 
directly related to the “definition” of marriage, this invocation of identity 
politics is deliberate and definitional—it intentionally questions whether a 
homosexual orientation results from nature or from choice. 
 
 402. See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 688. 
 403. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 404. For a fuller explanation of the sex-discrimination claim, see generally Clark, supra note 67. 
 405. See supra notes 359–61 and accompanying text. 
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It is important to remember that religions—preservationists included—are 
not of one accord regarding the origins or moral consequences of homosexuality 
or homosexual behavior.406 For preservationists, there are two general schools of 
thought in this regard. One school believes that homosexuals (but curiously, not 
heterosexuals) have affirmatively chosen their sexual orientation, and that they 
have chosen incorrectly.407 This is the “reparative” school, and it is largely 
Evangelical. This school believes that a homosexual orientation can—and 
should—be changed to a heterosexual one through therapy and religious 
indoctrination.408 This belief is derived largely from the Bible passages that 
condemn homosexual behavior,409 and it drives the belief that homosexuals 
suffer from a sinful, unrepentant failure to choose the proper sexual orientation: 
heterosexuality. 
The other school holds that the genesis of homosexuality is irrelevant—this 
is the “behavioral” school, which believes that, although homosexual behavior is 
sinful, homosexual desires are not. Accordingly, the story goes, even if an 
individual does not choose a homosexual orientation, and even if that 
orientation is immutable, individuals can choose whether to act on their 
homosexuality.410 The Roman Catholic Church is the largest proponent of the 
“behavioral” school; unlike the Evangelical ministries, it does not aim to 
“change” an individual’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual—
the goal instead is to encourage homosexuals to live a life of chastity and 
spiritual purity.411 
Regardless of which school one follows, it is the underlying religious belief 
about the immorality of homosexuality that preservationists seek to insinuate 
 
 406. See supra Part I.B & Table 1. 
 407. As a logical matter, for this rationale to hold, it would mean that 100% of people choose 
their sexual orientation, and that 100% of the population is therefore susceptible of conversion to a 
different sexual orientation. 
 408. Representative religious organizations include: Homosexuals Anonymous, http://www.ha-
fs.org/The_14_Steps (fashioned after the twelve-step program of Alcoholics Anonymous, but not 
affiliated with AA or any other recovery groups fashioned upon the AA model) (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007); Love in Action, www.loveinaction.org (claiming to “restor[e] those trapped in sexual and 
relational sin through the power of Jesus Christ”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Exodus International, 
www.exodus-international.org (“promoting freedom from homosexuality through the power of 
Jesus Christ”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Pure Life Ministries, www.purelifeministries.org (“for men 
with sexual addictions or homosexuality”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). See also Traditional Values 
Coalition, Ministry and Counseling Resources For Those Struggling With Same-Sex Attractions And 
Other Gender Identity Disorders, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/resources/index.php (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 409. See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text. 
 410. Catholic Answers, Homosexuality, http://www.catholic.com/library/Homosexuality.asp 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
Homosexual desires, however, are not in themselves sinful. People are subject to a wide 
variety of sinful desires over which they have little direct control, but these do not become 
sinful until a person acts upon them, either by acting out the desire or by encouraging the 
desire and deliberately engaging in fantasies about acting it out. People tempted by 
homosexual desires, like people tempted by improper heterosexual desires, are not 
sinning until they act upon those desires in some manner. 
Id. (emphases in original). 
 411. Courage, Our Five Goals, http://couragerc.net/TheFiveGoals.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007). 
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into the law through same-sex marriage bans. One theory is that banning same-
sex marriage can actually incentivize heterosexuality: Because a ban on same-sex 
marriage will perpetuate heterosexual privilege in both law and culture, it might 
have the derivative effect of turning some homosexuals into heterosexuals, or at 
least of encouraging them to remain sexually chaste.412 
It is tempting to dismiss this claim as hogwash, but there is something to it: 
If a government can rationally determine that opposite-sex marriage is, on 
balance, better than same-sex marriage,413 then there is little to stop it from 
rationally determining that heterosexuality is, on balance, better than 
homosexuality—right? 
Well, not exactly. While rational-basis review may theoretically permit a 
government to incentivize heterosexuality, there still must be a legitimate basis 
for doing so at all.414 In the Establishment Clause context, one would have to 
identify the government’s interest in incentivizing heterosexuality and then 
determine whether that purpose is sufficiently secular. As shown here, the 
reasons for wanting to incentivize heterosexuality derive from religious belief. 
We might also question whether a government ever has a legitimate reason to 
incentivize or encourage a change in something so fundamental as an 
individual’s sexual orientation.415 
At root, then, identity politics and the definitional argument both prove to 
be unsatisfying as secular justifications for bans on same-sex marriage. Identity 
politics is the cynical notion that homosexuality is so aberrant that the only 
reasonable response to it is to change homosexuals into heterosexuals, and 
failing that, to punish them for their aberrance by withholding civil rights. 
Because identity politics derives entirely from religious belief, it is an 
insufficiently-secular justification for banning same-sex marriage. The 
definitional argument fails because it does not make an argument; it merely 
 
 412. The idea that same-sex marriage bans would encourage chastity among homosexuals is 
somewhat absurd: Regardless of whether same-sex couples can legally marry, homosexuals will 
continue to form pair-bonds and to engage in sexual relationships. The question is whether they 
should be permitted to do so within the confines of a legal construct. The incentivizing-hetero-
sexuality argument obfuscates, failing to address this question head-on. 
 413. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E. 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The Legislature could rationally believe 
that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father.”). 
 414. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to 
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not 
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group). 
 415. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1032 n.5 (2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in 
dissent). 
Rather than being merely an unchanging characteristic, “immutability” may describe 
those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for 
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that 
change might be physically. Courts and legislators therefore should not conclude that 
homosexuality is mutable because reasonable minds disagree about the causes of 
homosexuality or because some religious tenets forbid gays and lesbians from “acting on” 
homosexual behavior. Instead, courts should ask whether the characteristic is one 
governments have any business requiring a person to change.” 
Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
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states a definition. Asserting that religious marriage is the only possible 
definition of marriage defies both fact and reason—moreover, the proffered 
definition is insufficiently secular “because the tradition in question is a 
religious one.”416 
c. Marriage as an Intergenerational Values-Transmission Device 
Preservationists often make an instrumentalist claim that opposite-sex 
marriage resulting in a household run by a mother and a father is the primary—
and as some claim, the only—way that values and beliefs are transmitted across 
generations.417 I will leave alone the incredible insult that such a claim hurls 
toward single-parent and same-sex parent families, focusing instead on the 
claimed secular relationship between marriage-as-a-values-transmitting-device 
and a ban on same-sex civil marriage. At the outset, it is worth asking why then, 
if marriage is so good at serving this noble purpose, same-sex couples should be 
barred from taking advantage of it? Why should same-sex couples not be 
allowed to pass on their values in such an effective way? 
Values-transmission is a really good reason to have marriage at all; for 
civilizations to survive, they must necessarily have institutions that facilitate the 
intergenerational transfer of accumulated cultural knowledge, values, and 
beliefs. However, what the preservationists have failed to explain is why 
marriage’s ability to serve this valuable function inherently justifies limiting 
access to marriage to only opposite-sex couples. 
So what else might be going on with this claim? What secular justification 
is there to prevent same-sex couples from taking advantage of values-
transmission in the same way as opposite-sex couples? Under Prof. Siegel’s 
theory of transformation, the word “values” is pretextual code for “religious 
beliefs.”418 Rhetorically, it is no accident that “values-transmission” and “family 
values” share the word “values.” It takes little digging to discover that what the 
preservationists mean by “values” is meant to signal religious opposition to 
homosexuality and same-sex relationships.419 
As a definitional matter, “values” encompasses both secular and sectarian 
morality. Exploiting this definitional ambiguity, preservationists attempt to lend 
an air of legitimacy to their arguments—and render them less susceptible to 
 
 416. Rubin, supra note 235, at 42; see infra Part V.B; see also supra note 37. 
 417. E.g., Senate, Less Faith, supra note 184 (statement of Prof. Wardle) (“Marriage is the great 
prize. It is the primary mediating structure through which values are transmitted to society in 
general and to the rising generation, in particular. . . . [T]he institution of marriage is . . . crucial to 
the organization of society and the transmission of social values.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. 
REC. S5415 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“We know the values 
transmission that occurs in a marriage, what the parents say to their children and what they live in 
front of their children. We know the values transmission that takes place from grandparents, if they 
are surviving, to children, passing on those traditions and thoughts.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily 
ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“My parents have been married for over 50 years. 
You look at them and say: That is the way it should be, where two become one. Out of that union 
comes more people, more children, raised with a solid set of foundational values that you hope can 
be good citizens.”). 
 418. See Siegel, supra note 248, at 111. 
 419. See also supra Table 1. 
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Establishment Clause challenges—by conflating secular and sectarian morality 
and carefully couching their claims in secular-sounding terms.420 
Nevertheless, it is not enough to merely identify the code words. To show 
that a irrational sectarian relationship between values-transmission and bans on 
same-sex marriage, we must engage the claim directly. Preservationists want to 
encourage opposite-sex marriage because it serves a valuable public purpose, 
viz., intergenerational values-transmission. Returning briefly to our syllogism 
from above, let us make “values-transmission” equal purpose X. The attributes 
and relationships that the preservationists prefer include “a mother-father 
household” (attribute A) and “opposite-sex relationships” (Y-type relationships). 
All we have left to do now is to make the substitutions: 
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve values-
transmission. 
First Minor Premise = Values-transmission is served by a mother-father household. 
Second Major Premise = Values-transmission is served by a mother-father household. 
Second Minor Premise = A mother-father household exists in opposite-sex relationships. 
Third Major Premise = A mother-father household exists in opposite-sex 
relationships. 
Third Minor Premise = Opposite-sex relationships only include opposite-sex 
couples. 
Third Conclusion = Therefore, a mother-father household only exists in opposite-
sex couples. 
Second Conclusion = Therefore, values-transmission is only served by opposite-sex 
couples. 
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples, and we 
should also ban legal recognition of all other kinds of relationships. 
Again, we find a basic circularity in the Third Minor Premise, which says 
that opposite-sex relationships include only opposite-sex couples. It is beyond 
dispute that opposite-sex relationships would be comprised of opposite-sex 
couples—indeed the very nature of the thing makes the syllogism true.421 As 
Goodridge noted, such argumentation “singles out the one unbridgeable 
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that 
difference into the essence of legal marriage.”422 
This argument is therefore unhelpful in answering the question why same-
sex couples should be excluded from marriage. The claim cannot logically rest 
on the mere truism that same-sex couples are different from opposite-sex 
couples because they are, well, same-sex couples and not opposite-sex couples. 
Without more, all we can look to for justification is the underlying religious belief 
that homosexuals and same-sex couples suffer from an incurable moral and 
 
 420. E.g., H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15–16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House 
Committee on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”) (DOMA “advances the 
government’s interest in defending traditional notions of morality” (emphasis added)). 
Note how carefully this language walks the line between religious belief and secularism. It is 
crafted to signal religious belief to the “insiders” who know how to decode it, but the statement is 
just vague enough about its underlying religious precepts to render it safe from the challenge that it 
is overtly and impermissibly religious. 
 421. Cf. WHYTE, supra note 372, at 107–16 (2005) (discussing the logical fallacy of question-
begging). 
 422. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003). 
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spiritual bankruptcy, and that, in light of this degraded state, the only 
reasonable thing to do is to deny them access to civil marriage. 
Note what I am not saying: I am not claiming that intergenerational values-
transfer is an ignoble purpose for marriage, or that opposite-sex marriages are 
incapable of fulfilling that purpose. Indeed, I am not even claiming that same-
sex marriages are capable of fulfilling that purpose. Instead, I am concluding—
based purely on logical reasoning and the argument’s face value—that there is 
no rational secular relationship between the claimed purpose and the proposed 
government action. 
d. Encouraging Responsible Procreation: Marriage as a Civilizing Force in  
 Society 
A recent iteration of the “Conclusion-Plus” fallacy is that the state should 
ban same-sex marriage because it serves the state’s interest in encouraging 
“responsible procreation.”423 Concomitant with this claim is that marriage is a 
civilizing force in society, and that being married is good for everyone—married 
people are described has happier, healthier, better-off financially, and better-
regarded in their communities.424 As noted above, these arguments present 
compelling reasons to have opposite-sex marriage, but they fail to answer the 
question, “Why ban same-sex marriage?” 
Responsible procreation means that the state has an interest in 
incentivizing procreation within marriage; the assumption is that children being 
raised within a marriage are more likely than not better off than children being 
raised by single or unmarried parents. Fair enough: Encouraging propagation of 
the species is a noble state interest, and creating stable environments for child-
rearing is a logical aim. Nevertheless, the responsible procreation argument is 
fallacious in its own right, for two reasons. First, the claimed interest is both 
over- and under-inclusive. Responsible procreation proves too much about the 
nature of opposite-sex marriage and opposite-sex couples’ interests in child-
rearing: first, opposite-sex couples are not universally capable or desirous of 
having children; second, opposite-sex couples are not universally desirous of 
being married; and third, opposite-sex couples are not universally desirous of 
having children within a marriage. Additionally, responsible procreation does 
not reach children being raised in single-parent families, whether by death, 
divorce, or design. As such, the interest itself is significantly over- and under-
inclusive, even without considering same-sex marriage as part of the equation. 
Even so, we may assume that the state’s interest is rational. This leads us to 
the second fallacy in the argument: Banning same-sex marriage does not 
 
 423. The term “responsible procreation” comes from Lynn Wardle’s “Multiply and Replenish”: 
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 771 (2001). In essence, it is a reiteration of the procreation arguments made more obliquely in 
the “ideal-environment” and “gender-complementarity” contexts, see infra Parts V.A.2.e, f. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bring it up here in a separate analysis to show that reducing 
marriage to only procreation results in logical breakdown of the argument. 
 424. See infra note 531 and accompanying text (discussing the public-health argument against 
same-sex marriage). 
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incentivize opposite-sex marriage.425 One might respond by saying that 
legislatures may rationally decide that opposite-sex couples need marriage more 
than same-sex couples do—indeed, this is the very argument made in 
Hernandez.426 Nevertheless, it does not really answer the question before us. 
Hernandez was concerned with answering the question why the New York 
Legislature has heretofore failed to offer marriage to same-sex couples; 
Hernandez explicitly held that the New York Legislature has the discretion to 
“extend marriage or some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples.”427 Our 
question is a different one. Why should the New York Legislature—or any 
legislature, for that matter—be foreclosed from exercising its discretion in this 
regard? The responsible procreation argument offers nothing to explain why 
this should be so. 
Moreover, marriage undoubtedly provides tangible and intangible benefits 
to the spouses. However, an inevitable question arises: Why should same-sex 
couples be precluded from taking advantage of these benefits? Said differently, 
why do same-sex couples not deserve these benefits? The preservationists have 
offered no rational or secular response to this question. It seems then, that their 
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality are supplying the 
necessary link between the claimed interest and the means used to serve that 
interest. Such a justification is decidedly sectarian. 
e. Child-Rearing and the “Ideal Environment” 
Preservationists claim that the man-woman marriage paradigm is the 
“ideal environment” in which to procreate and raise children.428 This “child-
centered” view is a relatively new development in family-values rhetoric.429 To 
 
 425. The only claim that same-sex marriage bans incentivize opposite-sex marriage is based 
entirely in private religious bias. See infra Part V.A.3.b. 
 426. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The Legislature could find that unstable 
relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born 
into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting 
stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more.”). 
 427. Id. 
 428. E.g., Senate, supra note 177 (testimony of Pastor Daniel de Leon, Sr.) (“Marriage between a 
man and a woman is the standard. A child is like a twig that is planted in the soil of our society that 
requires two poles to have the best chance of growing strong and healthy. Those two poles, if you 
will, are the parents, Dad and Mom.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of 
Rep. Gingrey) (“The ideal for children is the love of both a mom and a dad. No same-sex couple can 
provide that. The ideal for marriage is about bringing together moms and dads so children have a 
mother and a father to learn from.”); id. at H5302 (statement of Rep. Pitts) (“[T]he statistics still show 
that the best home for kids is still with a mom and dad who are married and love each other. That is 
the ideal we are talking about here: the best home for kids. By protecting marriage, this amendment 
promotes such an environment for our kids.” (alteration added)); id. at H5302 (statement of Rep. 
Graves) (“[T]he House needs to stand up and send a positive message to the American people about 
what is the best married environment to raise our children, and that is an environment that is a 
marriage between a man and a woman.” (alteration added)). 
 429. Thirty-five years ago, when Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972), first brought the idea of same-sex marriage onto the national stage, society’s anti-
gay rhetoric was frequently grounded in then-widely-held beliefs that homosexuals were 
“disturbed” or “perverted” individuals who suffered from mental illness. Indeed, it was not until 
1973 that the American Psychiatric Association removed “homosexuality” from its list of 
pathologies. See American Psychiatric Association, Homosexuality and Civil Rights: Position Statement 
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support the claim, they frequently invoke social science evidence purporting to 
show that children who are products of “healthy” opposite-sex marriages are 
fundamentally better-off than children who are not.430 
Without delving into the specific merits of the social science claim, it is easy 
to dispose of the “ideal-environment” interest as logically unsound. The stated 
interest is to ensure that as many children as possible are born into and raised in 
man-woman marriage paradigms. This is certainly a valid interest—
governments frequently espouse such “aspirational” paradigms, and the “ideal 
environment” claim appears to fall neatly in that category: The operating 
assumption is that marriage acts as a stabilizing, civilizing force in adult 
relationships, in turn creating a more nurturing environment for children. 
Said differently, the claim is that opposite-sex marriage is simply better for 
children than same-sex marriage. Well, so what? If the state’s interest is in 
providing a mother-father home for every child, there is a panoply of other steps 
that it could take to serve that interest directly, viz., (1) enacting strict limitations 
on premarital and extramarital intercourse (minimizing the potential that an 
out-of-wedlock birth would result), (2) offering more financial incentives to 
unmarried opposite-sex couples if they marry, particularly if they already have 
or plan to have children (such incentives currently include, inter alia, certain tax 
breaks, pension rights, and Social Security benefits), or (3) more strictly 
regulating divorce (lessening the possibility that children would be exposed to 
parenting environments that are somehow less-than-”ideal”). 
This is not to advocate for these measures in lieu of (or even more 
frighteningly, in addition to) bans on same-sex marriage. The point is this: the 
means used to serve the interest is a ban on same-sex marriage. There are many 
other reasonable steps that the government could be taking to incentivize 
opposite-sex marriage and encourage the formation of the “ideal 
environment,”431 but the supporters of the FMA are choosing instead to ban 
same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage bans are not of a kind with the 
regulations and incentives suggested above. Same-sex marriage bans are 
designed to prevent the formation of legal family units, as opposed to the 
changes suggested above, which are intended to encourage the formation of legal 
family units. 
Moreover, as a matter of common sense, it seems irrational to conclude that 
the banning of one form of marriage would lead to the flourishing of another. 
Indeed, in Lewis, the State of New Jersey gave away this argument, noting that 
marriage’s sole purpose could not be to incentivize opposite-sex couples to 
procreate.432 The absence of a rational relationship here belies the invidious truth 
 
(Dec. 1973), http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/197310.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007). 
 430. See Catá Backer, supra note 225, at 232–34. 
 431. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), Pub. L. 104-193, § 401(a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000)) (“The 
purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to . . . end 
the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage . . . .”). 
 432. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006). 
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underlying this claim: Advancing the “ideal environment” cannot be the preser-
vationists’ true interest in banning same-sex marriage.433 
That said, courts have thought otherwise. One of Hernandez’s key logical 
foundations was that “an important function of marriage is to create more 
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be born.”434 
This rationale implies sub silentio that, in advancing the interest of creating the 
“ideal environment,” the New York Legislature could rationally single out the 
children of same-sex couples for disparate treatment—children who, but for their 
parents’ sexual orientation, fall squarely within the larger class of children 
intended to be protected by marriage.435 
It is facetious to conclude that the government rationally advances its 
interest in providing all children with the security that marriage provides by 
denying an identifiable class of children that very security. It is perverse to 
punish children for the sexual orientation of their parents. If the preservationists 
care so much about children, why would they relegate a portion of them to a 
permanent underclass? 
Some might say that rational-basis review allows us to count heads—or to 
not count heads—when making social policy.436 Under this reasoning, the 
children of same-sex couples don’t matter because there aren’t as many of them 
as there are children of opposite-sex couples.437 However we conceive of rational 
 
The State does not argue that limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman is 
needed to encourage procreation or to create the optimal living environment for children. 
Other than sustaining the traditional definition of marriage, which is not implicated in this 
discussion, the State has not articulated any legitimate public need for depriving same-sex 
couples of the [rights of marriage]. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 433. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking 
down on Free Exercise grounds a generally-applicable, facially-neutral ordinance that was enacted 
with the facial purpose of protecting public morals and safety, but which was actually intended to 
burden the religious practice of only Santerian practitioners). A key aspect of this rule is that the law 
must be intended to discriminate; merely burdening one religious group over others is insufficient. 
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 434. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
 435. Cf. 152 CONG. REC. S5527 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Akaka). 
Given the Marriage Protection Amendment’s broad and ambiguous language, it would 
have a potentially devastating effect on existing same-sex families. In particular, I am 
concerned how this amendment would impact the children currently being raised by 
same-sex parents. Not only would it curtail the States from granting equal marriage rights 
to same-sex couples, it could also, through their parents, deprive children of access to 
health insurance, life insurance benefits and inheritance rights. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 436. Cf. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e do not count heads before 
enforcing the First Amendment.”). 
 437. Nevertheless, many same-sex couples are raising many children throughout the nation. 150 
CONG. REC. H7901 (2004) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (“There are over 1 million children being 
raised in gay and lesbian families in the United States.”). Barring nationwide laws against 
homosexual parenting, it is foreseeable that they will continue to do so in ever-increasing numbers, 
particularly given the continuing development and wider availability of alternative reproductive 
methods. See Rubin, supra note 235, at 42–43. Therefore, if the ability or willingness to have and raise 
children is a predicate to receiving civil marriage benefits, same-sex couples have already fulfilled 
this requirement in spades. 
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basis, it is nevertheless unreasonable to conclude that a government rationally 
advances its interest through an action that affirmatively harms its interest. 
Additionally, if the point of marriage is to encourage procreation, it is 
unclear how allowing infertile and sterile opposite-sex couples to marry—but 
not wholly-fertile same-sex couples—advances the stated interest. The argument 
is that same-sex couples need marriage less than opposite-sex couples do, 
because same-sex couples are less likely to have children.438 How does this logic 
not also apply to opposite-sex couples who are childless by chance or by choice? 
If the legal objection is childlessness, then the logical response would be to deny 
marriage to all couples who are highly likely to remain childless. 
In response to this criticism, one might argue that the potential for these 
opposite-sex couples to adopt children is a sufficient justification for allowing 
them to marry, while still excluding fertile same-sex couples. Although this 
conclusion appears facially reasonable, it is mere obfuscation: How will 
preventing same-sex couples from marrying encourage infertile and sterile 
opposite-sex couples to adopt children? Assuming the existence of a causal link 
between the two is irrational. 
At root, then, the words “ideal environment” suggest that other 
relationships—e.g., single parenting, same-sex parenting—are bad for children. 
The merits of this empirical claim lie beyond the scope of our inquiry. Instead, 
our focus is on rationality: If, arguendo, gays are bad for children, what is the 
logical remedy—banning same-sex marriage or banning homosexual parenting? 
Since banning homosexual parenting does not seem to carry as much currency 
as banning same-sex marriage,439 preservationists have chosen to fight the battle 
they can win. The “ideal environment” argument helps them in this regard: It 
signals the religious belief that, because homosexuals are immoral and 
 
Rubin also raises the concern that the world may already by overpopulated as it is, rendering the 
necessity of reproduction a dead letter. See id. at 42. This appears to be a valid concern: In October 
2006, the United States’ population exceeded 300 million, giving American environmentalists 
significant pause. See U.S. population now 300 million and growing, CNN.COM, Oct. 17, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/17/300.million.over/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 438. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“[T]he Legislature could rationally decide that, for the 
welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex 
than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth 
of children; homosexual intercourse does not.”). 
 439. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2004), cited in Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-
1152-C, 2006 WL 1445354 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006) (holding Oklahoma’s ban on recognition of out-
of-state adoptions by homosexuals to be unconstitutional under the federal Full Faith and Credit, 
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses); WEST’S F.S.A. § 63.042(3) (1977), cited in Lofton v. Sec’y 
of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida’s ban on 
homosexual adoption against federal due-process and equal-protection challenges), reh’g en banc 
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). See also Human Rights 
Campaign, State Legislation/Ballot Initiatives Affecting GLBT People: Parenting Record, 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Parenting&Template=/CustomSource/Law/LawLegis
lationSearch.cfm (continually updating a catalogue of state-level measures that impact homosexual 
parenting and adoption rights) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Most recently, legislatures in Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Utah have addressed suggested bans or restrictions on homosexual parenting. Id. 
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depraved, they are incapable of being good parents.440 The religious purpose 
underlying this preservationist claim—and same-sex marriage bans generally, is 
to discourage same-sex couples from becoming parents by punishing their 
children. This is decidedly sectarian. 
f. “Gender Complementarity,” the Modeling of Sex Roles, and the  
 “Procreative Orientation” of Marriage 
On a related point, preservationists claim that “gender complementarity” is 
the only type of relationship model that the state should endorse as an 
appropriate example for children.441 Preservationists frequently claim that 
children can only learn “proper” social and gender roles within a man-woman 
parenting paradigm.442 Despite the overwhelming amount of scientific evidence 
that rebuts this claim,443 the merits of this empirical claim lie beyond these pages. 
The war-of-the-studies that inevitably results cleverly distracts us from the more 
invidious aspects of the “gender complementarity” theory. 
One subtext of the theory is that, because same-sex relationships are, by 
their very nature, not bi-gendered, they are inferior to opposite-sex relationships 
as role models for children and are therefore undeserving of legal recognition. 
Moreover, the theory goes, giving legal recognition to same-sex relationships 
would “promote” homosexuality to children as “an acceptable lifestyle 
choice”—this would further harm the interest because children would be taught 
that it is acceptable not to conform to gender norms. 
 
 440. An even more invidious interpretation of “ideal environment” is that “we need children to 
be raised in heterosexual families because we have to keep them away from sexually predatory gays 
who, as everyone knows, are child molesters.” 
This may seem like an extreme reading of “ideal environment,” but a number of preservationist 
interest groups take this stance as an official party line. E.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Exposed: 
Homosexual Child Molesters, http://traditionalvalues.org/urban/one.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); 
Traditional Values Coalition, The Homosexual Movement and Pedophilia, http://www.traditional 
values.org/homosexual_movement_and_pedophilia/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Timothy J. Dailey, 
Family Research Council, Homosexuality and Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.frc.org/get. 
cfm?i=IS02E3 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Tres Kerns, Concerned Women for America, ABC News 
Special on Catholic Pedophile Crisis Misses Mark, http://www.cultureandfamily.org/article 
display.asp?id=590&department=CFI&categoryid=cfreport (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 441. E.g., Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (testimony of Christopher Wolfe) (“[G]ender 
complementarity is essential or integral to the meaning of the institution of marriage. Marriage is a 
union of two people whose physical union makes them, literally, a single unit, in the sense that this 
union of two complementary, engendered bodies is the ordinary way of bringing children into 
existence.” (alteration added)). 
 442. E.g., 150 Cong. Rec. E1859 (2004) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (“While not everyone who enters 
into marriage desires children or is able to have children, the context of their marriage is an example 
of how a man and a woman should live together in a way where children could be raised and cared 
for.”). See also Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children and Society of “Lesbigay” Parenting, 
23 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 541 (2004). 
We know that children of parents who smoke are more likely to smoke than children 
whose parents do not smoke; children of parents who are violent tend to be violent; 
children of Republicans tend to vote Republican. Is it not reasonable to expect that 
children raised by lesbigay parents will tend toward the same kinds of sexual behaviors 
and gender identity issues as their parents? 
Id. 
 443. E.g., Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 358–60. 
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Citing these interests, the preservationists seek to prevent the “promotion” 
of homosexuality, claiming concern for the well-being of children generally. 
Nevertheless, as we will see, their impetus for making this argument is their 
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality. This concern for other 
people’s children overreaches: If the end sought is to limit the exposure of their 
own children to homosexuality, preservationists already possess the autonomy 
to do that effectively,444 so no substantive legal changes appear to be necessary—
preservationists may, according to the dictates of their consciences, teach their 
children whatever they wish about homosexuality, homosexuals, and same-sex 
relationships. If the end sought is more invidious—to dictate what information 
is available to every child or to limit other parents’ ability to educate their children 
as they see fit (or both)—then the interest cannot withstand scrutiny for two 
reasons: (1) such a restriction unconstitutionally infringes on others’ right to 
bring up their children as they see fit; and (2) the preservationists’ negative 
views of homosexuality are dictated solely by religious belief, which is a 
constitutionally-impermissible basis for creating public policy. As a result, this 
iteration of the “no promo homo” argument fails both because it overreaches 
and because it is not secular. 
Moreover, the ends-means problem encountered in the previous section 
arises here as well. The stated interest of the “gender complementarity” claim is 
that marriage exists to encourage the formation of opposite-sex relationship 
models, premised on the assumption that these relationships are the ideal 
method for teaching children about healthy adult relationships. The means to 
that end is a ban on same-sex marriage. Again, the means fail to rationally serve 
the ends: It is irrational to conclude that the formation of opposite-sex 
relationships is the natural—or even logical—result of a ban on same-sex 
marriage. 
As a result, it would seem that the “gender complementarity” theory must 
stand for something else—and so it does. Preservationists, and particularly 
Catholics, believe that penile-vaginal intercourse is the only appropriate form of 
intercourse, in part because of the “divinity” of the copulative sexual act,445 and 
in part because they believe that male and female genitalia are physiologically 
“complementary.”446 Therefore, “complementarity,” an otherwise innocuous 
word, is used equivocally to telegraph a belief in the “proper” copulative form 
of sexual intercourse—also referred to as the “procreative orientation” of 
 
 444. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the due process right to 
“liberty” includes the right to “bring up children . . . according to the dictates of [one’s] own 
conscience” (alteration added)); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (U.S. 1925) (holding that the due process right to “liberty” includes “the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
 445. E.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/ 
catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm#2335 (“Each of the two sexes is an image of the power and tenderness of 
God, with equal dignity though in a different way. The union of man and woman in marriage is a way 
of imitating in the flesh the Creator’s generosity and fecundity . . . .”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 446. E.g., Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (testimony of Christopher Wolfe) (“Marriage is a 
union of two people whose physical union makes them, literally, a single unit, in the sense that this 
union of two complementary, engendered bodies is the ordinary way of bringing children into 
existence.”). 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
 PRESERVATIONISM 643 
marriage.447 Preservationists believe that oral and anal sex—the primary 
methods by which many homosexuals engage in intercourse—are deviant and 
sinful forms of sex.448 The basis for this belief is found in several Biblical passages 
that explicitly condemn non-vaginal forms of intercourse as disfavored by God 
and punishable by death.449 
This religious belief was originally manifested in criminal sodomy laws, 
which have been used for centuries to punish non-procreative intercourse, 
particularly between men.450 Historical sodomy laws represented a 
commandeering of civil social policy by the church, and American sodomy laws 
perpetuated this conflation of sectarian and secular interests for hundreds of 
years. Many preservationists continue to believe that homosexuals should 
continue to be punished for engaging in these “deviant” forms of sex.451 
However, as a constitutional matter, the government may no longer punish 
individuals who eschew penile-vaginal intercourse for other forms of sex. If 
Lawrence means anything—and some argue it does not452—it certainly means 
that governments cannot punish individuals for consensually engaging in non-
vaginal sexual intercourse.453 
Therefore, if preservationists were to continue to punish homosexuals for 
their sinful forms of sexual intercourse, they had to find alternative forms of 
punishment. They discovered a gold mine in same-sex marriage bans, which 
have become a modern-day proxy for sodomy laws: Sodomy laws are designed 
to punish homosexual conduct, and same-sex marriage bans are designed to 
punish homosexual relationships. Because preservationists may no longer punish 
homosexual sex directly, they now seek to punish the relationships in which 
 
 447. E.g., Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Prof. Bradley). 
 448. E.g., New Advent, Catholic Encyclopedia: Lust, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/ 
09438a.htm (characterizing sodomy as “a consummated external sin”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); 
Southern Baptist Convention, On Same-Sex Marriage, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/ 
amResolution.asp?ID=1128 (claiming that “the Bible calls [homosexuality] sinful and dangerous 
both to the individuals involved and to society at large”; citing Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1:26–27, 
both of which condemn homosexual sexual intercourse (alteration added)) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 449. E.g., Leviticus 20:13 (New Oxford ann., New Rev. Standard Version) (“If a man lies with a 
male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, 
their blood is upon them.”). 
 450. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1351. See also An Acte for the punysshement 
of the vice of Buggerie, 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1534) (Eng.) (“the detestable and abhomynable vice of 
buggery . . . [is] adjudged felnye” (alteration added)). 
 451. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), sixteen amicus briefs were filed in support of the 
State of Texas. Of these, only two were not filed by a fundamentalist Judeo-Christian religious 
group; even so, both of these non-religious briefs relied heavily on the preservationist arguments 
evaluated here. See Brief for the States of Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL 
470172; Brief for Texas Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL 470181. 
 452. See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 706–07. 
 453. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers[ v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986),] was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual 
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about 
the right to have sexual intercourse.”). 
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homosexual sex is likely to occur.454 Flouting Lawrence’s mandate, talk of 
“complementarity” telegraphs this invidious religious purpose. 
3. Of Slippery Slopes and Social Destruction: Consequentialism, Perversity, and  
 Chicken Little 
One of the most popular tropes in favor of the FMA is that allowing same-
sex marriage would cause American society to slide down a slippery slope 
toward total destruction—the theory is that same-sex marriage would set off a 
chain reaction of negative effects that will ultimately lead to the end of 
civilization as we know it.455 The legal conclusion, then, is to ban same-sex 
marriage before any court, legislature, or popular vote has the opportunity to 
begin such dangerous experimentation with the fabric of our society.456 
The slippery slope comes in two primary flavors—consequentialism and 
perversity. The consequentialist argument is that same-sex civil marriage and 
marriage-like arrangements will devalue marriage and traditional family 
structures, resulting in a marriage-less society that is only steps from total social 
breakdown. The perversity argument is that legalizing same-sex marriage will 
lead to the legalization of other perverse relationship models that are even more 
depraved than same-sex couplings: If same-sex relationships were legalized, the 
argument goes, then proponents of these other relationships would be able to 
argue that their relationships, too, should be legally recognized.457 
Of all the arguments made in favor of the FMA, the slippery slope is the 
only one that is made against same-sex marriage directly. All other arguments 
 
 454. This seems like an irrational course of action in and of itself, if only because homosexuals 
will continue to pair-bond and have sexual relationships even while marriage remains foreclosed to 
them. This conclusion hardly requires evidence: Pair-bonding has occurred among homosexuals for 
the duration of human history, yet marriage has also been foreclosed to them for almost the entirety 
of that history. The question before us, which the “gender complementarity” argument does not 
answer, is why marriage should continue to be foreclosed to homosexuals and same-sex couples. 
 455. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5441–42 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) 
(“[W]ith the weakening of the institution of marriage over the past 30 to 40 years, with this 
redefining of marriage, which would define marriage out of existence, which is what we have seen 
in other countries, you are going to harm your next generations and succeeding generations that you 
raise.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. REC. H5304 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Akin) 
(“[A]nybody who knows something about the history of the human race knows that there is no 
civilization which has condoned homosexual marriage widely and openly that has long survived.” 
(alteration added)). 
 456. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5457 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[O]ur 
marriage laws permeate our entire culture and we need to be wary about letting the judiciary foist 
some untested and frankly, unwanted social experiment on an entire Nation.” (alteration added)); 
152 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Foxx) (“The [Goodridge] decision 
represents that beginning of what could be a dangerous erosion of this sacred tradition [marriage] 
that we must protect.” (alterations added)). 
 457. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5522 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe). 
[A]ll of those who are concerned about the very strong lobby, the homosexual marriage 
lobby, as well as the polygamous lobby, that they share the same goal of essentially 
breaking down all State-regulated marriage requirements to just one, and that one is 
consent. In doing so, they are paving the way for legal protection of such practices as 
homosexual marriage and unrestricted sexual conduct between adults and children, group 
marriage, incest, and, you know: If it feels good, do it. 
Id. (alteration added). 
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are either arguments in favor of opposite-sex marriage or are arguments against 
same-sex parenting, or both. As such, the analytical method for these claims is 
somewhat different than before. First, these slippery slopes are secular, even 
though the fears driving their invocation are decidedly religious. This secularity 
does not end the inquiry, for the government’s interest in avoiding the slide 
must still be rationally related to banning same-sex marriage. For each slippery 
slope, we therefore must establish two propositions: (1) that allowing same-sex 
civil marriage does not harm the state’s interest and (2) that banning same-sex 
civil marriage does not advance the state’s interest. As we will see, this 
analytical framework plays out slightly differently in each context. 
a. Consequentialism: Stanley Kurtz and the Scandinavian Dilemma 
In February 2004, conservative commentator and social theorist Stanley 
Kurtz published an article purporting to link the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships in Scandinavia to both falling rates of opposite-sex marriage and 
rising out-of-wedlock birth rates.458 Specifically, Kurtz claimed that legalizing 
same-sex civil marriage or marriage-like relationships had more or less caused 
opposite-sex couples to stop marrying. I say “more or less” because Kurtz 
himself conceded that same-sex marriage had not actually undermined opposite-
sex marriage, but instead had “further undermined the institution [of opposite-
sex marriage]. The separation of marriage from parenthood was increasing; gay 
marriage has widened the separation. Out-of-wedlock birthrates were rising; 
gay marriage has added to the factors pushing those rates higher.”459 
Preservationists rejoiced at this news, greeting Kurtz as their new anti-gay 
messiah. Kurtz’s work supposedly confirmed their worst fears about the 
destructive path America will travel if same-sex relationships are ever legalized 
here. However, the preservationists apparently did not read Kurtz’s work very 
carefully—had they done so, they might not have begun to repeat his 
conclusions ad nauseam in congressional debates and hearings.460 They would 
have discovered that Kurtz’s work rests on some very shaky logical foundations, 
and that his conclusions have been roundly criticized from both ends of the 
political spectrum as unscientific and statistically suspect.461 Nevertheless, 
 
 458. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The “conservative case” for same-sex marriage 
collapses, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26 [hereinafter Kurtz, The End of Marriage]. 
 459. Id. (alteration added). 
 460. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5419–20, 5423–24 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Brownback) (citing Kurtz’s research); 152 CONG. REC. S5442–43 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Brownback) (same); id. at S5450 (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (same); 152 CONG. REC. S5523 (daily 
ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (same); 152 CONG. REC. H5315–16 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Musgrave) (same); 150 CONG. REC. H7919 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (same); 
150 CONG. REC. S7908 (2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (same); id. at S7827–28 (statement of Sen. 
Brownback) (same); id. at S7954 (statement of Sen. Allard) (same); id. at S7967 (statement of Sen. 
Inhofe) (same); id. at S7980–81 (statement of Sen. Santorum) (same); id. at S7997–98 (statement of Sen. 
Brownback) (same); id. at S8003–07 (statement of Sen. Allard) (same); id. at S8088 (statement of Sen. 
McConnell) (same); House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 16 (statement of Judge Bork) 
(same); id. at 56–60, 84–102, 124–97 (reprinting several articles by Kurtz and related materials). 
Nevertheless, merely repeating a falsehood over and over again does not make it true. 
 461. See 150 CONG. REC. H7913–15 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (written statement of Rep. Frank); 
M.V. Lee Badgett, Prenuptial Jitters: Did gay marriage destroy marriage in Scandinavia?, SLATE, May 20, 
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heartened by the preservationists’ uncritical response, Kurtz has continued to 
write on the topic, amassing an extensive body of articles on the state of 
marriage in Northern Europe.462 
According the Kurtz, the harm to state’s interest boils down to this: “Gay 
marriage is one part of a new stage of marital decline that contains three basic 
elements: parental cohabitation, legal equalization of marriage and cohabitation, 
and gay marriage. My claim is that these three factors are mutually 
reinforcing.”463 Kurtz’s conclusions were drawn from his own meta-analysis of 
several studies that had traced marriage trends in Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden, over the last several decades.464 All of these nations legalized same-sex 
relationships in some way during the late 1980s through the 1990s.465 Kurtz cited 
decreases in opposite-sex marriages and increases in out-of-wedlock births 
between 1990 and 2000 as evidence that legalizing same-sex relationships 
significantly contributed to the decline of marriage in Scandinavia.466 
In regard to this last, Kurtz’s own argument undermines the conclusion 
that he draws from the changes to marriage that occurred in the 1990s: 
“Scandinavia’s out-of-wedlock birthrates may have risen more rapidly in the 
seventies, when marriage began its slide.”467 This seems to be a tacit admission 
that the decline of marriage in Scandinavia began long before same-sex 
relationships were legalized there.468 
It appears then that Kurtz’s statistical conclusions suffer from the classic 
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: The fallacy occurs when we assume that, if two 
events occur sequentially and in close proximity to one another (in either space 
or time), then the later-in-time event was caused by the first-in-time event. 
However, without more, it is logically irrational to conclude that, since opposite-
sex marriage in Scandinavia declined after same-sex relationships were 
 
2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100884/; Nathaniel Frank, Quack gay marriage science, NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 3, 2004, at 20; Andrew Sullivan, Kurtz Again, DAILY DISH, Jan. 27, 2004, http://time-
blog.com/daily_dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_01_01_dish_archive.html&PHPSESSID=8
93a9fbfa49b42caea86fa0d0f640ae1 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). But see Stanley Kurtz, Unhealthy Half 
Truths: Scandinavia marriage is dying, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, May 25, 2004, available at http://www. 
nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200405250927.asp [hereinafter Kurtz, Unhealthy Half Truths] 
(responding to Badgett’s criticisms); Stanley Kurtz, Slipping Toward Scandinavia: Contra Andrew 
Sullivan, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2004 (responding to Sullivan’s criticisms), available at http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200402020917.asp. 
 462. See National Review Online, Stanley Kurtz, http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz-
archive.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Not all of Kurtz’s work in this area is catalogued in this archive, 
but this listing is sufficient to show that he has published extensively on this topic. 
 463. Kurtz, Unhealthy Half Truths, supra note 461. 
 464. The author of one of Kurtz’s primary sources has publicly denounced Kurtz’s conclusions as 
willfully misinterpreting his research. Darren R. Spedale, Nordic Bliss, http://www.freedomto 
marry.org/document.asp?doc_id=1443 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 465. Kurtz, The End of Marriage, supra note 458. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. And indeed, this was the case. See William N. Eskridge, Darren R. Spedale & Hans 
Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2004 
ISSUES L. SCHOLARSHIP No. 4, at 43–49 (2004) (tracing the change in marriage and out-of-wedlock 
birth rates in Denmark and Sweden; establishing that ongoing trends began early in the Twentieth 
Century), available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pdf/ScandinaviaBEPressArticle.pdf. 
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legalized, therefore opposite-sex marriage necessarily declined because of the 
legalization of same-sex relationships. This error in reasoning constitutes the 
very definition of the post hoc fallacy. 
But as a matter of theory, is Kurtz right or wrong about what same-sex 
marriage might do to opposite-sex marriage? If he is, it might be considered 
rational to believe him, regardless of the methodological flaws in his work. 
Therefore, we must identify exactly what it is that Kurtz is claiming will happen. 
His syllogism is something like this: 
Major Premise = Legalizing same-sex relationships delinks marriage from procreation 
and parenthood. 
Minor Premise = Delinking marriage from procreation and parenthood leads to the end of 
marriage. 
Conclusion = Therefore, legal recognition of same-sex relationships leads to the end of 
marriage.469 
Kurtz’s syllogism suffers from question-begging in both the Major and 
Minor Premises. First, nothing in Kurtz’s work explains why legalizing same-sex 
relationships delinks marriage from procreation and parenthood—or more 
precisely, why legalizing same-sex relationships delinks marriage from 
procreation and parenthood more than current laws already have. Currently, 
procreation and parenthood may occur outside of marriage, and likewise, 
marriage may occur without procreation and parenthood.470 Second, nothing in 
Kurtz’s work explains how delinking marriage from procreation and 
parenthood leads to the end of marriage. It seems that low exit-costs and a 
declining heterosexual interest in marriage have started America down that 
slippery slope already471—and to a large extent, same-sex relationships aren’t 
even legal in America, so they certainly couldn’t be the cause. 
Nevertheless, under rational-basis review, we must show that it is 
irrational to believe either that allowing same-sex marriage would harm the 
government’s interest or that banning same-sex marriage would advance it. The 
first part—showing no harm to the interest if same-sex marriage is allowed—is 
difficult to do here, if only because Kurtz’s argument has so unsuccessfully 
delineated the government’s interest. If we assume, arguendo, that the 
government’s interest is to incentivize marriage for procreation and parenting 
purposes, then we immediately find ourselves in familiar territory: As before, 
we find many alternative rational ways for the government to advance this 
interest aside from banning same-sex marriage, and we find a dearth of 
explanations for why same-sex marriage harms the interest.472 
Still, we should take the substance of Kurtz’s claim seriously, if only to 
show that it is irrational to conclude that fewer opposite-sex marriages will 
occur if same-sex marriage is permitted. If Massachusetts is any example, 
opposite-sex couples have continued to do quite well for themselves despite the 
existence of same-sex civil marriage: Although, in declining, its overall marriage 
 
 469. This articulation of Kurtz’s syllogism is derivative of the one used in Eskridge, Spedale & 
Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 12–13. 
 470. Cf. id. at 16. 
 471. See id. at 19. 
 472. See supra part V.A.2.a. 
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rate has followed a nationwide trend that began in the 1950s,473 Massachusetts 
continues to enjoy the lowest divorce rate in the nation and it has for some 
time.474 Moreover, if we understand out-of-wedlock birth rates to stand as a 
proxy for the success of opposite-sex marriage, Massachusetts—like the rest of 
the nation—has enjoyed an out-of-wedlock birth rate has remained “essentially 
stable” over the last sixty years.475 Since same-sex marriage was legalized there 
in 2004, we have not seen a precipitous drop-off in marriage rates or a 
concomitant increase in out-of-wedlock birth or divorce rates.476 As a factual 
matter, it is clear then that opposite-sex couples are having little trouble forming 
and sustaining healthy adult relationships in Massachusetts. The sky has not 
fallen. 
The second part—showing no advancement of the interest if same-sex 
marriage is banned—is also a familiar question. As mentioned, it is hard to 
understand exactly how banning same-sex marriage will induce more opposite-
sex couples to enter marriage and procreate—and to stay in marriage for many 
years. The chain of causation between the two is so attenuated that it is simply 
irrational to conclude that the banning of one leads to the flourishing of the 
other. 
Finally, it is important to note one key difference between the United States 
and Scandinavia—and it is a difference that Kurtz himself calls out as highly 
relevant: The European nations with the lowest rates of family-dissolution and 
out-of-wedlock births are those which are “strongly dominated by the Catholic 
confession.”477 Scandinavia is a highly-secularized region of the world,478 but the 
United States is still a very religious nation.479 And indeed, the very reason same-
sex relationships have caused such a furor in America is because of religious 
beliefs.480 The fact that so many religious believers feel so strongly about 
marriage itself militates against the rationality of concluding that legalized 
same-sex relationships would lead to lower rates of opposite-sex marriage. 
 
 473. See National Center for Health Statistics, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the 
United States, 23 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 2, 4, 11–12 (July 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf [hereinafter NCHS, Cohabitation]; see also National Vital 
Statistics System, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004, 53 NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP. 6 (June 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_21.pdf 
[hereinafter NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths]; National Center for Health Statistics, 
Marriage and divorce rates by State: 1990, 1995, and 1999–2002, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/ 
mar&div.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 474. See NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, supra note 473, at 6. 
 475. See National Vital Statistics System, Births: Final Data for 2002, 52 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 8 
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf [hereinafter 
NVSS, Births: Final Data]; NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, supra note 473, at 6. 
 476. See NVSS, Births: Final Data, supra note 475, at 8; NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and 
Deaths, supra note 475, at 6. 
 477. Kurtz, The End of Marriage, supra note 458 (quotation omitted). 
 478. See id. 
 479. PEW CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, supra note 9, at 26 (reporting that, as of October 2003, sixty-
two percent of Americans rated religion as “very important” in their lives, with an additional 
twenty-four percent rating religion as “fairly important”). 
 480. Id. at 1–3. 
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All of this is not to say that a slide down the slope is impossible—we have 
already begun that slide to some degree, but this slide cannot be rationally 
attributed to same-sex couples, who are largely denied access to marriage and 
will be for the foreseeable future.481 No, it is only to say that a slide is not 
inevitable, and that, for the reasons discussed, it is illogical to conclude from 
Kurtz’s work that the consequentialist slippery slope constitutes a rational 
justification for banning same-sex marriage. 
b. Private Bias and the Cheapening of Marriage 
Before moving on to the slippery slope of perversity, it is worth pausing to 
consider what many claim to be the potential psychological impact of same-sex 
marriage on opposite-sex couples. Echoing the consequentialist argument 
dismissed above, many preservationists claim that allowing same-sex couples to 
civilly wed will result in fewer marriages overall, because opposite-sex couples 
would no longer perceive marriage as a special institution worthy of a life-long 
commitment. Some, like Jeffrey Ventrella, claim that evidence showing the 
deleterious effects of same-sex marriage on opposite-sex marriage could not 
reasonably be produced before those negative effects have already occurred.482 
Ventrella is correct about our inability to precisely measure speculative 
harms ex ante: It is impossible to predict with any certainty what the long-term 
effects of any policy change will be—indeed, if this were the limiting principle 
on government action, nothing would ever change because of this very 
uncertainty. In light of this logical flaw, Ventrella’s argument fails logical 
scrutiny: By assuming its conclusion—that a decline in opposite-sex marriage 
will directly result from same-sex marriage—the argument renders itself a 
solution in search of a problem. 
To be fair, this version of the consequentialist argument says, “These 
potential harms are so bad that we don’t even want to chance it.” In a different 
context, this argument may have persuasive legal force. However, this line of 
reasoning was used to oppose interracial marriage with little success; it has 
merely been recycled here.483 
Interestingly, as a result of bans on same-sex civil marriage, harm to 
opposite-sex marriage has already begun: Some opposite-sex couples are now 
refusing to wed until civil marriage is made available to same-sex couples.484 
Moreover, some members of the clergy are refusing to issue marriage licenses or 
solemnize marriages until same-sex couples have full access to civil marriage,485 
 
 481. Cf. Eskridge, Spedale & Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 20. 
 482. See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 717–21. 
 483. See Eskridge, Spedale & Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 20–21. 
 484. Kayleen Schaefer, The Sit-In at the Altar: No “I Do” Till Gays Can Do It, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2006, at 91 (reporting on the larger trend; noting that celebrity couples Charlize Theron and Stuart 
Townsend, and Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt, have vowed not to wed until same-sex couples are 
allowed to marry); see also Erik Baard, Standing on Ceremony: A Rites Issue: Straight Couples Who Refuse 
to Marry Because Gays Can’t, VILLAGE VOICE (online ed.), Dec. 10, 2003, available at http:// 
www.villagevoice.com/news/0350,baard2,49322,1.html. 
 485. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, A New Marriage Decision (for Heterosexuals), LESSIG BLOG, June 6, 2005, 
http://lessig.org/blog/archives/002943.shtml (chronicling several Connecticut and Massachusetts 
ministers who are refusing to solemnize any marriages until same-sex couples have nationwide 
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and at least for a time, Benton County, Oregon, stopped issuing civil marriage 
licenses to anyone.486 These examples show that, even if the preservationists’ 
stated interests were rational, quantifiable harm to those interests is occurring as 
a direct result of continued marriage inequality. There is no reason to think that 
this harm would abate if marriage were constitutionally foreclosed to same-sex 
couples. 
Nevertheless, this is not the key problem with this interest. It is that the 
interest is based entirely on assumptions about the subjective opinions, feelings, 
and perceptions of millions of individuals nationwide. Preservationists cannot 
adequately represent the opinions of all Americans within a claim for “freedom 
from” same-sex civil marriage—as we have seen, such a claim is factually 
inaccurate, for many Americans support same-sex civil marriage.487 Therefore, 
the preservationists must be understood only to represent their own interests, 
which by definition includes the religious belief that same-sex marriages would 
corrode the “holy state of matrimony.”488 
This claim lies in the “constitutional” layer of sedimentation, within which 
preservationists assert a right to be free from exposure to homosexuality.489 This 
claimed right apparently includes a concomitant right to be free from the very 
knowledge that legal same-sex civil marriages might exist somewhere else. 
Unfortunately, the preservationists have fundamentally misconceived the role of 
the Constitution in this regard: The First Amendment is not designed to abate 
“the offense that religious people feel about being compelled to witness the 
behavior of people who disagree with their beliefs.”490 “[B]ruised feelings are a cost 
of living in an open, free society, but it is an inevitable cost that we accept.”491 
Thus, the easiest way to understand the marriage-will-be-cheapened 
argument is through the lens of private bias. Without this perspective, it would 
be impossible to understand why an opposite-sex couple in Arizona would 
 
access to civil marriage) (last visited May 8, 2006); Unitarian-Universalist Association, Freedom to 
Marry: Ministers’ Coverage in the Media and Written Comments, http://www.uua.org/news/2003/ 
freedomtomarry/ministercoverage.html (providing the names, locations, and comments of 
Unitarian-Universalist ministers who have refused to solemnize any marriage until same-sex 
couples have access to civil marriage) (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 486. See Oregon county bans all marriages, B.B.C. NEWS AM., Mar. 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/3564893.stm (last visited May 8, 2006). On November 2, 2004, Oregon voters adopted 
a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (adopted 
2004). Even with the amendment in place, it is not entirely clear that Benton County has resumed 
issuing marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples. See Benton County, Oregon, Marriage FAQ, 
http://www.co.benton.or.us/MarriageFAQ.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); cf. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 
(Or. 2005) (holding that the marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples by Multnomah County, 
Oregon, in February and March 2004 were void under OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; recognizing that § 5a 
(referred to as “Measure 36”) rendered same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the Oregon 
Constitution). 
 487. See supra notes 6–10. 
 488. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House Committee 
on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”). 
 489. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1362–63. 
 490. Id. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that an individual’s freedom to 
engage in offensive speech generally overrides others’ right to be free from the offense caused by 
such speech). 
 491. Rubin, supra note 235, at 43 (emphasis and alteration added). 
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refuse to marry on account of a same-sex couple being permitted to marry in 
Massachusetts. For preservationists, this private bias arises exclusively from 
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality—while this bias 
motivates them to adopt secular-sounding arguments, their religious beliefs will 
always be the essential factor motivating their opposition to same-sex marriage. 
Same-sex marriage bans effectively relegate homosexuals to a second-class legal 
status and prevent public recognition of their relationships. By preventing 
homosexuals from gaining recognition—and ultimately acceptance—within the 
public sector, preservationists serve their invidious religious purpose of 
punishing homosexuals for their depravity.492 However, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly stated that the idiosyncratic beliefs giving rise to these private biases 
have no place in the American legal canon.493 
c. The Long Way Down: Perversity 
Preservationists love to trot out a parade of horribles that goes something 
like this: Unless the government draws the line before legal recognition of same-
sex relationships, as a matter of logic, if it extended legal recognition to same-sex 
relationships, it would also have to give legal recognition to other relationship 
models that, to put it lightly, flout convention.494 Preservationists frequently cite 
bestiality, child marriage, polygamy/polyamory, and incest as exemplary of 
these “perverse” relationship models.495 The preservationists’ battle cry derives 
directly from religious beliefs about what makes these relationship models 
perverse.496 Putting aside this religious belief, all we must do is determine 
whether the government has a rationally secular purpose in wanting to prevent 
legalization of these other horribles—we need not mount an affirmative attack 
upon them. 
 
 492. Cf. discussion supra Part V.A.2.f. 
 493. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”); Cohen, 430 U.S. at 21 (“The ability 
of government . . . to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon 
a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. 
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents 
simply as a matter of personal predilections.”). 
 494. E.g., House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 39–40 (colloquy between Rep. King 
and Rep. Frank) (argument regarding where, why, and how to draw the line between two-party 
unions and three-plus-party unions). 
 495. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J, dissenting). 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . . called into question by today’s 
decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from 
its holding. 
Id. 
 496. E.g., Jill Martin Rische, The Pain of Polygamy, 18 WATCHMAN EXPOSITOR No. 1, 2001, http:// 
www.watchman.org/lds/painpolygamy.htm (making the Christian case against Mormon 
polygamy) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The Watchman Fellowship is a Christian anti-cult group that 
considers Mormonism to be a cult. See Watchman Fellowship, About Us, http://www.watchman. 
org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.about_us (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Nevertheless, the group’s views 
on polygamous practices are generally representative of those held within the larger Christian 
community. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
652 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
As noted, the government’s interest in avoiding a slide down this slope is 
secular. Our task is to show why it is irrational to believe that banning same-sex 
marriage is necessary to prevent the slide from occurring. Here, we must 
establish three things for each horrible: (1) the government has a genuinely 
secular justification for outlawing it; (2) same-sex marriage does nothing to 
undermine that justification; and (3) same-sex marriage poses no comparable 
concerns of its own. 
Despite their other differences, advocates on both sides agree that marriage 
requires valid legal consent of the parties.497 Within this consent-based marriage 
model, same-sex civil marriage appears entirely permissible. Comparisons to 
bestiality and child marriage are easy kills: While animals498 and minors499 are 
incapable of giving legal consent (and will remain so for the foreseeable future), 
two adults of the same sex can give legal consent, particularly if—as many 
preservationists insist—they are capable of consenting to enter into a 
heterosexual marriage.500 
Comparisons to polygamy also fail. At the outset, it is important to 
distinguish historical polygamy (used here to identify polygamy derived from 
historical—mostly Mormon—religious beliefs) from modern polygamy (used 
here to identify polygamy derived from both religious beliefs501 and secular 
relationship arrangements). 
Historical polygamy, which is entirely religious in nature,502 has a 
checkered history in America, long having been associated with coercion, adult-
child marriage, and child sexual abuse. Historical polygamy has persisted into 
the modern era, particularly among splinter groups such as the Fundamentalist 
Church of Latter-Day Saints.503 In refusing to legally recognize historical 
polygamy, the government has long stated a genuine secular interest in 
avoiding the coercive costs that historical polygamy poses,504 and modern courts 
continue to apply this coerciveness analysis to individuals seeking legal 
recognition of historical polygamous relationships, particularly when minors are 
 
 497. Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (holding that the government could not punish non-procreative 
intercourse between individuals capable of giving meaningful legal consent). 
 498. See, e.g., Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (holding that “the word ‘animal,’ in the 
language of the law, is used in contra-distinction to a human being, and signifies an inferior living 
creature”). 
 499. See Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that minors are “legally 
incapable of consent”). 
 500. Cf. Card, supra note 65 and accompanying text (claiming that marriage is not foreclosed to 
homosexuals at all, because they remain free to marry members of the opposite sex). 
 501. Modern-day religious belief in polygamy is not limited to insular Mormon sects. A new 
polygamous movement has recently arisen among Evangelical Christians. See Christian Polygamy 
INFO, Christian Polygamy, http://www.christianpolygamy.info/christian-polygamy/ (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007). 
 502. E.g., The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, Polygamy: Latter-Day Saints and 
the Practice of Plural Marriage, http://lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1—36-2-539, 
00.html (discussing the history of Mormon polygamy in America; describing the Church’s position 
today) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 503. See supra note 42. 
 504. E.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (holding that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and 
which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism”). 
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involved.505 Same-sex marriage does nothing to undermine this secular interest, 
and it raises no similar concerns of coerciveness.506 
Insofar as they involve three or more consenting adults, neither modern 
polygamy nor polyamory507 raise the same issues of consent and coercion. 
Indeed, within a consent-based marriage model, the only real problem is that 
there are three or more members of the relationship unit. So what stops these 
individuals from claiming legal rights for their multiple-party relationships? 
The government has historically been afforded the right to maintain “good 
order,”508 and this interest in orderly administration is genuinely secular. 
Moreover, the deference that federal courts afford states in regulating the family 
unit confirms that orderly administration of marriage is a significant area of 
state concern.509 
Nationwide, family law (and particularly marriage) is founded on a two-
party model. Legally recognizing modern polygamy and polyamory would 
require a dramatic overhaul in our current system of public ordering, reaching 
dozens of areas of law, including divorce, child custody, adoption, pension and 
ERISA benefits, property ownership and tenancies, derivative tort claims (e.g., 
loss of consortium or wrongful death), taxation, intestacy and survivorship, and 
probate administration. As such, the government’s secular interest in 
perpetuating a two-party model of legal relationships is not insubstantial. 
It thus seems rational to conclude that, as a matter of public policy, three-
plus-party relationships work harm against the existing two-party model of 
public ordering used throughout America. Moreover, until polygamy or 
polyamory is identified as a suspect characteristic deserving of some kind of 
heightened scrutiny—be it “rational-basis with bite” or otherwise—the 
 
 505. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006) (“[Y]oung people should be protected 
from sexual exploitation by older, more experienced persons until they reach the legal age of consent 
and can more maturely comprehend and appreciate the consequences of their sexual acts.” (citation 
and quotation omitted)). 
 506. For a detailed refutation of the claim that allowing same-sex civil marriage would require 
legalization of polygamy, see Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, 
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1579–94 (1997) (outlining the fundamental 
objections to polygamy based on legal theories of equality, liberty, and personhood). 
 507. Polyamory is an amorphous term, frequently used to encompass relationship arrangements 
resembling simple polygamy to more complex arrangements, such as those in which three or more 
individuals participate as equal partners in a single relationship. See The Polyamory Society, 
Introduction to Polyamory: What Is Polyamory?, http://www.polyamorysociety.org/page6.html 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Here, “polyamory” is used to describe all adult, consensual, three-plus-
party relationships that are arrangements other than simple polygamy. 
 508. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163 (affirming Congress’s definition of civil marriage on public policy 
grounds, noting that Congress has the right to regulate “good order,” particularly as it relates to 
public health, welfare, and a right to prescribe the conditions under which territories may join the 
union). 
 509. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding that “domestic relations [is] an area that has 
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States 
upon the subject of divorce . . . .”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has 
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens 
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”) (alteration added)). 
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government’s secular interest in maintaining the two-party system is likely to 
remain undisturbed. 
Conversely, legally recognizing same-sex marriage poses no similar 
administrative hardship, because the same-sex marriage model is by definition a 
two-party institution. As a matter of law, resolving whatever de minimis 
administrative difficulties same-sex marriage might impose is a very simple 
task: A government must only pass a statute of general applicability to amend 
all mentions of “husband and wife,” “man and woman,” or “spouses” within its 
legal canon to include the parties to a same-sex civil marriage. This one-line 
statute would single-handedly operate to overcome objections that same-sex 
marriage would constitute an administrative inconvenience. As such, same-sex 
marriage works no evil against the government’s interest in the orderly 
administration of family law. 
Moreover, teleologically, same-sex marriage does nothing out of the 
ordinary, save for the biological sex of the individuals involved. Presumably, 
heterosexuals will continue to want to marry heterosexuals, so allowing men to 
marry men or women to marry women would not appear to work a decisive 
harm against ensuring that a sufficient number of marriageable individuals 
remain “in the market,” so to speak. It seems that same-sex marriage is costless 
in this regard.510 
A polygamist, on the other hand, is really asking for “marriage-plus,” 
because under a two-party consent model, she will always be able to marry one 
individual of her choosing; the only thing she will not be able to do is to legally 
marry another individual while she remains married to her first spouse. 
Concededly, this seems unsatisfying as an emotional explanation, given the 
potential that the legal spouse may begin to view the polygamist’s relationship 
with the cohabiting “spouse” as inherently inferior, which possibly leads to 
tension within the arrangement. Nevertheless, the government’s interest here 
appears to be both rational and secular; for these reasons, polygamists have a 
long road ahead of them before a three-plus-party marriage may be legally 
possible. 
As for comparisons to consensual adult incest, a causal link between 
allowing same-sex marriage and a subsequent repeal of laws prohibiting incest 
cannot logically exist. While conflating incest and same-sex marriage is an 
 
 510. Some preservationists claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry would be 
prohibitively expensive for the government. However, the government is presently structured so 
that, at least in theory, it could afford to provide marriage benefits to every last eligible adult, 
regardless of any one individual’s sexual orientation. Therefore, if every last eligible adult woke up 
legally married tomorrow morning, then every last eligible adult would have a cognizable claim to 
receive the legal benefits of marriage. In theory, then, it seems that the gender of the individual to 
whom one is married is irrelevant to the cost to the government, which must plan as though 100% of 
the eligible population might legally marry at any time. 
Therefore, the claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry would be prohibitively expensive is 
a canard: If every homosexual adult married a person of the opposite sex tomorrow, the preser-
vationists would raise no claim that the state’s assets were being dissipated by these new marriages. 
Because—at least in this context—the preservationists’ objection is therefore being lodged against 
same-sex couples as same-sex couples (and not as homosexuals), the argument that allowing same-sex 
marriage would cost society money is undermined by clear animus against same-sex couples as a 
class. 
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effective rhetorical device, it fails to acknowledge that (1) consanguinity laws 
already vary widely511 and (2) challenges to those laws began decades before 
widespread efforts to obtain same-sex marriage.512 Therefore, the idea that incest 
is a possible slippery-slope outcome is largely a red herring based on the post hoc 
fallacy of causation. 
Still, we would do well to take the claim seriously: To be charitable, then, 
the preservationist position is probably closer to the claim that allowing same-
sex marriage would undermine the legal justifications underpinning the few 
incest taboos that remain. This is a largely inaccurate perception of the law: The 
remaining taboos universally prohibit incest between nuclear family members, 
and many states still ban incest between first cousins.513 
Moreover, governments have consistently identified a genuinely secular 
interest in denying legal recognition to incestuous adult relationships. Under a 
consent-based model of marriage, the government wants to ensure that the 
parties to a marriage have the capacity to give meaningful legal consent to enter 
into marriage. The possibility of intra-family coercion casts a cloud over 
incestuous relationships—said differently, the government could legitimately 
question whether incest is ever truly consensual.514 Moreover, the government 
wants to support relationship models that foster harmony within pre-existing 
intimate family relationships—as a society, we want family members to remain 
on good terms with one another for the sake of intra-family stability.515 Like all 
relationships, incestuous relationships can end quite badly, and the government 
has a cognizable, secular interest in preventing legal arrangements that result in 
estrangement between close relatives.516 
Same-sex marriage does no harm to either of these interests: Generally, 
adults are presumed to have the legal capacity to consent to enter into marriage, 
 
 511. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 361 (cataloguing incest provisions by state). 
 512. The historical taboo on incest is a complex social phenomenon, and this Article does not 
seek to respond to it in its entirety. For a detailed analysis, see Courtney M. Cahill, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary 
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1562–65 (2005). See also, e.g., Israel v. 
Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Colo. 1978) (challenge to incest law resulted in recognition of an equal 
protection claim on state constitutional grounds). 
 513. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 361. 
 514. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 354 (noting that “consent becomes harder to determine or 
even define given the authority relationships within the family”). 
 515. McDonnell is concerned that this breakdown may occur in part because the intra-family 
relationship becomes overly sexualized. Id. at 353. 
 516. Some might argue that recognizing same-sex marriages would nevertheless result in 
estrangement between close relatives. This is undoubtedly true, as many homosexuals and same-sex 
couples suffer from rejection by their parents, siblings, and close relatives. 
For our purposes, it is important to identify who is being estranged from one another. In the incest 
context, the two parties to the relationship—who are both members of the same pre-existing, 
intimate family—are being estranged from one another. In the same-sex marriage context, one party 
to the relationship is being estranged from a family member who is not a party to the marriage. 
Paternalistically attempting to preventing estrangement because of such private, third-party biases 
against homosexuality or same-sex relationships may be a noble aim, but it cannot constitute the 
basis of an informed government policy. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them 
effect.”). 
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and, as in opposite-sex marriage, allowing two unrelated individuals to form a 
legally-recognized family relationship does not usually disrupt any pre-existing 
intimate family bonds. Moreover, we may assume that, if same-sex marriage 
were ever allowed, the same consanguinity restrictions currently applicable to 
opposite-sex couples would be applicable to same-sex couples. 
Other slippery-slope concerns undoubtedly exist. However, our 
examination of these horribles has shown that same-sex marriage is not of a 
kind with them. Bans on bestiality, child marriage, polygamy/polyamory, and 
incest all implicate longstanding, rational secular government interests. Same-
sex marriage does nothing to undermine these interests and raises no similar 
concerns of its own. 
Preservationists’ invocation of this parade of horribles must be disregarded 
as rhetorical scare tactics. Preservationists are attempting to tie the perceived 
valuelessness of these relationship models with a presumed valuelessness of 
same-sex relationships. As I have demonstrated, same-sex relationships inflict 
none of the negative costs that these other relationship models can impose. 
Thus, because its logical underpinnings crumble in the face of rational scrutiny, 
the slippery slope of perversity fails to gain legally-persuasive force. 
4. A New Slippery Slope: Religious Freedom and Sincerely-Held Beliefs 
Preservationists have recently begun to sound shrill alarms about the 
intolerably-high tariff that same-sex civil marriage will unconstitutionally exact 
from the preservationists’ free exercise of religion.517 Doctrinally, this may be a 
simple argument to rebut, but it is among the most emotionally-charged ones 
we will face. Simply stated, the operative syllogism is this: 
Major Premise = The Free Exercise Clause forbids restrictions on religious practice. 
Minor Premise = Religious practice is restricted by same-sex marriage. 
Conclusion = Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause forbids same-sex marriage. 
While we know that the Free Exercise Clause does not actually forbid same-sex 
marriage, it is not possible to respond to this substantive argument within our 
pre-existing framework. The very objection derives from religion—and no less 
but from that aspect of religion that is constitutionally-protected from state 
interference: free exercise. By striking meaningful compromises, however, we 
can identify ways in which same-sex civil marriage and freedom of religion can 
peacefully co-exist, such that allowing same-sex civil marriage would not 
burden religious practice. 
 
 517. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5422 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback). 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that same-sex marriage poses a significant threat to 
religious liberties. Scholars on both the left and the right agree that same-sex marriage has 
raised the specter of the massive and protracted battle over religious freedom. Where 
courts impose the same-sex marriage regime as a constitutionally guaranteed right, a 
multitude of new religious liberty conflicts will inevitably arise at every point where the 
law touches marriage and is applied to individuals, businesses, nonprofits, and even 
churches and synagogues. 
Id. 
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A live case will help to clarify the values at stake. Maggie Gallagher—
President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy (iMAPP),518 a 
conservative Catholic, and author of a substantial body of preservationist 
literature519—has made much hay over Catholic Charities of Boston’s (CCB) 
March 10, 2006 decision to stop providing adoption-placement services.520 The 
reason? CCB found itself between a rock and a hard place: One the one hand, it 
wanted to follow the Vatican’s teachings that homosexuals are unfit to be 
parents and thus withhold adoption-placement services from them wholesale; 
on the other hand, to receive a license to operate adoption services within 
Massachusetts, it had to pledge to follow state anti-discrimination laws—which 
prohibit, inter alia, discrimination against homosexuals in the provision of state-
licensed social services. 
What did CCB do? Initially, it sought a religious exemption from the anti-
discrimination laws. When that failed, it took what it believed to be the most 
sensible course of action: Instead of compromising its doctrinal position in order 
to comply with the law, it chose to cease all adoption placements whatsoever 
and refused to seek licensure. 
The preservationists are falling over themselves trying to claim that this 
“tragedy” was a direct result of Goodridge.521 It seems somewhat disingenuous to 
claim that CCB was unexpectedly burdened with having to provide state-
licensed services to same-sex couples seeking to adopt. For seven years before 
Goodridge was decided, same-sex couples in Massachusetts enjoyed anti-
discrimination protections in all aspects of state life, save marriage. After 
Goodridge, same-sex couples now enjoy anti-discrimination protections in all 
aspects of state life, including marriage. As such, it would seem that CCB was 
subject to the same legal duty toward same-sex couples before Goodridge as it is 
now; the fact that some of CCB’s same-sex couple clients are now legally 
married doesn’t have any bearing on whether it is presently subject to the state 
anti-discrimination laws—it always has been. Moreover, whatever CCB found to 
be doctrinally intolerable about homosexual parenting on the day before 
Goodridge was decided is the same as what they find to be intolerable about 
homosexual parenting today. All that changed was the legal relationship 
between those homosexuals who were seeking to parent. 
To be certain, Gallagher correctly observed that this conflict was inevitable. 
However, she incorrectly characterized its cause as deriving primarily from the 
 
 518. http://www.marriagedebate.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 519. See The Marriage Law Project at The Catholic University of America, Marriage Document 
Database, http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/resources/Marriage%20Database/Complete/cfm (attribu-
ting twenty-six articles to Gallagher) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 520. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246, at 20. See also 152 CONG. REC. S5473 (daily ed. 
Jun 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“If you do not define marriage as the union of a man and 
a woman, but define it to require that you have to recognize same-sex unions, that is the basis—one 
of the bases on which Catholic Charities was driven out of the adoption business in Boston. They 
were required by law to do something against the tenets of their faith.”); id. at S5479 (statement of 
Sen. Brownback) (“There is an argument that churches that do not perform same-sex unions will not 
be allowed to perform any marriages.”). 
 521. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“Massachusetts law prohibited ‘orientation 
discrimination’ over a decade ago. Then in November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ordered gay marriage.”). 
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Goodridge decision itself. Rather, the conflict was inevitable regardless of how 
the case might have come down; Goodridge may have accelerated the timing of 
the conflict, but a storm was brewing long before same-sex couples were given 
the right to marry in Massachusetts. 
The next steps in this debate are tricky indeed. It would beg the question to 
simply shrug and tell CCB that it needs to learn to tolerate homosexual 
parenting.522 Indeed, the very (in)tolerability of homosexual parenting is the 
heart of the dispute. So what is the proper solution? At one end of the spectrum, 
we can totally privatize religion, requiring those religions that choose to venture 
out of their cages to operate in a world of enforced pluralism. At the other end 
of the spectrum, we can give religion a carte blanche exemption from complying 
with whichever social policies it dislikes, permitting religiously-motivated 
discrimination to go unchecked in the public square. As a constitutional matter, 
neither option is desirable or satisfying. As such, the proper answer is more 
nuanced than either of these positions, and it lies somewhere in between them. 
One of the battle cries of preservationists is that legalizing same-sex 
relationships will, if not actually force churches to perform same-sex marriages,523 
then at least coerce them into remaining silent about their objections to same-sex 
marriage, for fear that speaking out would threaten their tax-exempt status or 
eligibility for faith-based funding.524 The obfuscating rhetoric that usually 
 
 522. Cf. WHYTE, supra note 372, at 109–10 (“Everyone favors tolerance—but only, of course, of 
what should be tolerated. This qualification is the tricky bit; it is where disagreements tend to arise. 
And when they do, extolling the virtues of tolerance is of no help, because it can’t tell us what 
should be tolerated and what not.”). 
 523. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“The problem is not that clergy will be 
forced to perform gay marriages or prevented from preaching their beliefs.”); see also Letter from 
Clergy for Fairness to Reps. Hastert and Pelosi (July 7, 2006), reprinted in 152 CONG. REC. H5309–10 
(daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
Thoughtful people of faith can and do disagree on the issue of marriage. America’s many 
religious traditions reflect this diversity of opinion, as do we who sign this letter. 
But we respect the right of each religious group to decide, based on its own religious 
teaching, whether or not to sanction marriage of same-sex couples. It is surely not the 
federal government’s role to prefer one religious definition of marriage over another, 
much less to codify such a preference in the Constitution. To the contrary: the great 
contribution of our Constitution is to ensure religious liberty for all. 
Some argue that a constitutional amendment is necessary to ensure that clergy and faith 
groups will never be forced to recognize marriages of same-sex couples against their will. 
This argument is unfounded. Such coercion is already expressly forbidden by the First 
Amendment’s “establishment” clause, its guarantee of the right to “free exercise” of 
religion, and the Supreme Court’s doctrine of religious autonomy that is rooted in both 
religion clauses. These, and only these, are all the protection of religious autonomy—and 
of religious marriage—our nation needs. 
Id. Clergy for Fairness is comprised of hundreds of clergy from dozens of religious denominations 
throughout the nation; the group has taken no unified stance for or against same-sex civil marriage, 
but it has taken a strong stance against the FMA. See Clergy for Fairness, About Clergy for Fairness, 
http://clergyforfairness.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 524. Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“Even a slight risk of anything so damaging as 
the loss of tax-exempt status will persuade many [religious] groups to at least mute their marriage 
theology in the interest of preserving the rest of their activities.” (alteration added)). 
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accompanies this claim is that those churches who oppose same-sex marriage 
will be pilloried in the public square as if they were racist.525 
And yet, it is actually within this battle cry that we begin to see our way 
through to resolving the underlying dispute. If there is one thing that everyone 
agrees about, it is that the government is unquestionably forbidden to dictate to 
its citizens (or to a group of its citizens) what their religious beliefs should be—
such an action would clearly violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses, for unduly burdening religious practice and imposing religion, 
respectively. Therefore, the question turns on what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation for religious belief, such that churches are neither forced nor 
coerced into compromising their doctrinal beliefs and practices. 
One suggestion is to include, with every statute, judicial opinion, or ballot 
referendum that legalizes same-sex relationships, an exception that expressly 
exempts religious organizations from being compelled to participate in same-sex 
nuptials. Moreover, as argued here, there should be an express separation of the 
civil and religious aspects of marriage, so that churches can make a specific 
choice regarding whether to solemnize same-sex marriages or not. A bright-line 
separation would add certainty and stability to the law: (1) same-sex couples 
would know which churches welcome their religious celebrations; (2) churches 
would remain free to exercise according to the dictates of their beliefs; and (3) 
would-be spouses of all stripes would remain free to avoid the religious aspects 
of marriage altogether and simply obtain marriage licenses directly from the 
state. All told, this seems to be a straightforward resolution to the first 
substantive objection. 
The second objection—coercion—is a thornier thicket. It is best dealt with 
in two parts: ministry and social service. The churches themselves are seeking to 
preserve their tax-exempt status while simultaneously reserving the right to 
speak out on doctrinally-compelling issues. Separating out the ministry function 
of churches helps us to see that, if same-sex civil marriage is allowed, nothing 
will change regarding what churches may say about it—even under a public-
accommodations law outlawing discrimination based on sexual-orientation, it is 
extremely unlikely that a church would have to squelch core religious speech 
within its own four walls. The current framing of the freedoms of speech, 
association, and free exercise operates to protect these messages, whatever their 
content. 
At last, then, we come to it: Because many churches operate social-service 
branches—e.g., the Catholic Charities—they often provide services on behalf of 
the state. Under the states’ police powers, private organizations need not be 
classified as state actors to be subject to generally-applicable anti-discrimination 
rules. The question here is whether a limited religious exemption should be 
made available, if only for the issue of same-sex marriage. 
On the one hand, it is tempting to take a hard line against the churches, 
saying, “If you want the money (or license, or access to public buildings, etc.), 
then just comply with the laws!” However, this begs the question before us 
 
 525. Id. (“Twenty years ago it would have been inconceivable that a Christian or Jewish 
organization that opposed gay marriage might be treated as racist in the public square. Today? It’s 
just not clear.”). 
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while disrespecting faith-based organizations on two levels: one, it shows 
indifference to their call to provide mission services at all; and two, it 
communicates to them that their deeply-held beliefs don’t matter. 
On the other hand, we have anti-discrimination laws for a reason—we 
think that, all other things being equal, certain groups of people should live 
secure in knowing that their minority characteristics will not render them 
vulnerable to either overt or invidious discrimination. We make these non-
discrimination laws generally-applicable so that service-providers of all types 
aren’t able to work harm against the interest based solely on idiosyncratically-
held prejudices. 
So how do we resolve this tension? One way is to create targeted, narrow 
exemptions one-at-a-time, or on an as-needed basis. Gallagher thought that a bill 
exempting religious adoption agencies from the strictures of Massachusetts’ 
anti-discrimination laws might have done the trick, had it not died in the state 
Legislature.526 She was probably right. 
Nevertheless, it seems rational to reserve the question. Legislatures and 
courts may take it up and resolve it with directness, nuance, or both, at any time. 
Foreclosing debate on the subject seems irrational—if the lines we draw today 
prove dissatisfying, then we can draw them differently in the future. With the 
FMA, those lines are drawn once, and we will see, once they are set, they are 
extremely difficult to move.527 
As to this last it seems worth mentioning that the free-exercise claim may 
be best characterized as a hybrid slippery-slope and invidious-purpose 
argument. What would motivate someone to ossify the nuanced lines that courts 
are constantly drawing in around free-exercise claims? Logically, if that person 
had a religious belief that the line should be in one place forever, then it would 
make sense to attempt to fix the line early-on to minimize the possibility that it 
might be drawn differently in the future. Indeed, it seems that the 
preservationists’ desire to harden ever-flexible constitutional boundaries has 
bled over from their public policy arguments into the free-exercise claim. 
Therefore, the religious purpose underlying the FMA seems to be twofold: (1) 
impose/endorse religion, and (2) exploit the free-exercise doctrine to heavily 
favor religion, while simultaneously making it as difficult as possible to change 
the law once it is passed. 
5. Warhorses: Public Health and Morals 
Preservationists have long cited public health, safety, welfare, and morals 
as reasons for banning same-sex civil marriage.528 Here, we divide the claim into 
two parts: public health and morals. First, the public-health interest is ostensibly 
that of slowing the spread of sexually-transmitted infections (STIs). This 
argument is premised on two obvious assumptions and an invidious one. First, 
 
 526. See id. 
 527. See infra note 641 and accompanying text. 
 528. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 374 (2003) (noting that several key reasons for marriage “include (1) safe sexual 
relations . . . , (4) healthy human development . . . , [and] (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and 
social order” (alteration added)). 
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the obvious assumptions: (1) limiting the spread of STIs furthers the public 
health; and (2) homosexuals as a class are disproportionately more likely to 
contract, carry, and transmit STIs than are other groups. Advocates both for and 
against same-sex marriage can easily agree that the first assumption is a worthy 
goal; it need not be discussed further. 
The second assumption is, to be charitable, a debatable one, but we will 
nevertheless assume for the sake of argument that the preservationists are 
correct. We need not explore disease statistics before we can determine that the 
argument is irrational and not secular. Saying “the public health” is a non 
sequitur response to the posit, “Why ban same-sex civil marriage?” Here is the 
syllogism: 
Major Premise = The public health is served by reducing the number of STIs. 
Minor Premise = The number of STIs is reduced within opposite-sex marriage. 
Conclusion = Therefore, the public health is served by opposite-sex marriage, and we 
should ban same-sex marriage. 
Again, we find ourselves confronted with the “Conclusion-Plus” fallacy. 
First, as usual, the Minor Premise begs its conclusion why the number of STIs is 
reduced only within opposite-sex marriage. Moreover, the syllogism offers no 
justification whatsoever to explain how banning same-sex marriage serves the 
public health. 
An individual’s capacity to marry is not premised on being free from 
STIs.529 Indeed, women are permitted to pass diseases on to their newborn 
children with impunity: A baby could be born with syphilis, gonorrhea, and 
HIV, and her mother’s legal capacity to marry will remain intact.530 As such, it 
would seem arbitrary and irrational to punish one class of persons—
homosexuals—for the mere potential that they may harm the public health in 
manner X, while permitting another class of persons—heterosexuals—to harm 
the public health in manner X with impunity, with the only justification being 
that they are heterosexuals. 
The third, more invidious premise underlying this argument is that 
homosexuals are disproportionately more likely to (1) engage in extra-
relationship intercourse and (2) expose themselves to STIs in the process—
ostensibly through unsafe sex. Again, this is a non sequitur. In terms of legal 
capacity to marry, it matters not at all—and it has never mattered—whether the 
would-be spouses are monogamous or whether they will, once married, 
routinely engage in unsafe sex with extramarital partners. The state just doesn’t 
get involved with asking people such questions before allowing them to marry. 
As such, refraining from extramarital sexual activities is not a predicate to 
getting married, and remaining free from STIs throughout a marriage is not a 
predicate to staying married. 
 
 529. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 74 (noting that, while several states require blood tests 
before a marriage license will be issued, that no state actually conditions the right to marry on the 
outcome of that test; reporting also that Louisiana and Illinois briefly flirted with mandatory HIV-
testing, and that Utah once attempted to void all marriages where either party was infected with 
HIV). 
 530. Her constitutional right to procreate will also remain intact, despite the harm that the inter-
generational spread of disease works against the state’s public-health interest. 
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Granted, some states require the parties to a marriage to submit to 
premarital blood-tests; however, regardless of what ancillary public-health 
benefits might obtain, the tests are not primarily done for the state’s benefit. No 
one’s capacity to marry is contingent on the results of a premarital blood-test. 
Instead, the state is at most interested in ensuring full disclosure between the 
parties regarding the presence of any diseases that each might transmit either 
genetically or through intercourse. Stated differently, the interest is to 
discourage disease-free individuals from marrying diseased individuals. This is 
a worthy public-health goal. Even so, it is not a rational justification for banning 
same-sex marriage. 
Preservationists claim that, in regard to public health, the state’s interest in 
encouraging marriage is that, because marriage is “the building block of 
society,” it counsels stability, monogamy, and commitment between spouses.531 
This rationally leads to a reduction in STIs, because married couples are 
presumed to have fewer sexual partners throughout the course of their 
marriages, thus minimizing the risk that either spouse will contract an STI and 
transmit it to the other. Fair enough. 
Assuming this is true, it is irrational to exclude same-sex couples from 
marriage on the ground of public health, as allowing same-sex marriages would 
seem to directly serve the interest at stake: Marriage would, presumably, do all 
the things for same-sex spouses that it does for opposite-sex spouses, viz., 
counsel stability, monogamy, and commitment within the marriage. As a result, 
same-sex spouses would have fewer sexual partners during the marriage, thus 
minimizing the risk that either spouse will contract an STI and transmit it to the 
other. 
Moreover, if homosexuals are as diseased as some preservationists would 
like to think, then it is irrational to think that preventing same-sex couples from 
marrying would slow the spread of STIs. Indeed, if the claimed public-health 
purpose—minimizing the spread of STIs—were the true interest, then it would 
seem that same-sex couples need marriage more than opposite-sex couples do. 
According to the argument’s premise, same-sex couples are more prone to 
contracting and transmitting STIs; as such, marriage would civilize them for the 
betterment of all society: their relationships would stabilize, they would be less 
likely to engage in extra-relationship sexual activities, and they would benefit 
from increased commitment to one another. 
 
 531. Marriage also contributes to the overall health and well-being of the spouses themselves. See 
NCHS, Cohabitation, supra note 473, at 3 (“Compared with unmarried people, married men and 
women tend to have lower mortality, less risky behavior, more monitoring of health, more 
compliance with medical regimens, higher sexual frequency, more satisfaction with their sexual 
lives, more savings, and higher wages.” (citation omitted)); see also 152 CONG. REC. S5479 (daily ed. 
June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (“[A]lmost every category of individual character and 
wellness was better if you were married. That is the just the way it was. You had a longer lifespan, 
you ended up with more wealth, you had better health, you were happier, and there was less drug 
use, less criminality, and less suicide.” (alteration added)). 
If being married leads to such positive outcomes for the spouses, why then would preservationists 
want to prevent same-sex couples from becoming married? If we want these outcomes because they 
are good, then shouldn’t we want them for everyone? 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
 PRESERVATIONISM 663 
If the government’s public-health interest is in slowing the spread of STIs, it 
is irrational to prevent same-sex couples from marrying. Without marriage, 
same-sex couples will presumably continue to engage in both safe and unsafe 
sexual intercourse. Without marriage, it is reasonable to assume that STI rates 
among homosexuals will remain the same or increase. Without marriage, it is 
reasonable to assume that partners will continue to infect one another at about 
the same rates, and that those individuals and couples who are predisposed to 
engage in extra-relationship intercourse—both safe and unsafe—will continue to 
do so at about the same rates. 
Enter marriage. Assuming that marriage has the stabilizing, civilizing 
effects that opponents of same-sex marriage claim it does, it is rational to 
conclude that allowing same-sex marriage will actually cause infection rates to 
fall. While partners may continue to infect one another with STIs contracted 
prior to marriage, the overall rate of extra-relationship intercourse will 
presumably drop, due to marriage’s wise counsel regarding monogamy and 
commitment. Moreover, because marriage is as special as the preservationists 
say it is (if it weren’t, then why all the fuss?), homosexuals would suddenly have 
an incentive to wait until marriage to engage in sexual intercourse (which they 
do not have now), thus reducing the likelihood of either partner bringing an STI 
into the marriage. 
This third aspect of the public-health claim—i.e., marriage is civilizing, but 
we don’t want same-sex couples to have it—belies what is really going with this 
argument. The preservationists are constructing a tidy double-bind for same-sex 
couples. First, they condemn homosexuals for living lives of promiscuity and 
vice, but they also refuse to make the civilizing arrangement of marriage 
available to homosexuals. And then, when homosexuals say, “Okay, we want 
some respect now,” the preservationists reply, “Well, no. Because you’re 
promiscuous and live lives of vice, we don’t think you deserve it because you’re 
not morally worthy. Sorry.” 
So which is it? Do same-sex couples get to live lives of stability, monogamy, 
and commitment, or are they to be continually shunted into the second-best 
category, where the very relationship attributes they seek are the ones they are 
faulted for not already possessing? 
In one study, homosexuals were castigated for failing to live up to the 
expectations of opposite-sexed, married society; this failure of outcomes was 
held up as the primary reason for keeping same-sex couples from marrying. For 
ease of use, Table 5 lists each argument opposite a key response. 
This entire study deserves a resounding “Well, quite!”532 Looking solely at 
the fact that same-sex couples are not allowed to marry, none of these outcomes 
is surprising—indeed, in responding to them, as we have seen, one need resort 
only to logic to show that they are inapposite and unfairly-characterized 
criticisms designed merely to perpetuate bias. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to raise this study for two additional reasons. 
First, it is a sociological fact that any study dividing social groups along cultural 
lines will find significant variables between similarly-situated parties from 
 
 532. See WHYTE, supra note 372, at 111. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
664 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
within each group. For example if the study had compared outcomes between 
Black and Hispanic couples (or rich and poor couples, or highly-educated and 
 
Table 5. Comparative Study of Homosexual-Cohabiting and 
Heterosexual-Married Couples. 
Claim Response 
Same-sex couples have relationships of shorter duration than 
married couples. 
Marriage has higher exit costs than cohabitation; therefore, it 
would make sense for a population restricted entirely to 
cohabitation to have shorter relationships on average than 
marriage couples. 
Homosexuals have a greater number of lifetime sexual 
partners than heterosexuals. 
Marriage is available to heterosexuals for the entirety of their 
adult lives; given the likelihood that seventy-six percent of 
women will marry at least once by age thirty,
533
 thereby logically 
reducing the number of the average heterosexual’s lifetime 
sexual partners, it makes sense that homosexuals would have 
more sexual partners over the course of a lifetime—there is no 
concomitant life-long, stabilizing institution for homosexuals to 
enter. As such, the comparison seems inapposite. 
Same-sex couples have lower levels of sexual fidelity within a 
relationship than married couples. 
Without the disincentivizing social costs that infidelity imposes 
on an intact marriage, same-sex couples have been given no 
institutional incentive to remain monogamous for the duration of 
their relationships. Again, the comparison seems inapposite. 
Same-sex couples raise fewer children per capita than 
married couples. 
As preservationists love to point out when making their other 
arguments,
534
 same-sex couples cannot procreate without outside 
assistance; therefore, it seems completely reasonable that the 
barrier to entry for becoming a parent—the necessity of 
involving a third party—operates to disincentivize parenthood. 
Same-sex couples and homosexuals generally have greater 
“health risks” (the study only reviewed HIV and suicide 
risks). 
It is not surprising that the preservationists behind this study 
chose to emphasize the two health risks that have historically 
troubled the LGBT community. If the preservationists were anti-
Black, they might have chosen to emphasize sickle-cell anemia; if 
they were anti-Semitic, they might have chosen to emphasize 
Tay-Sachs disease; if they were anti-poor, they might have 
chosen to emphasize Type-II Diabetes (adult-onset) or obesity. 
Once more, the comparison seems inapposite.
535
 
Same-sex couples have higher levels of intra-relationship 
domestic violence.536 
This last is the only relationship characterization that presents us 
with even a modicum of difficulty. However, because of a 
deliberate statistical fallacy, the study’s conclusions are not 
trustworthy. Let us assume that marriage counsels stability 
between the partners. It is reasonable, then, to assume that 
married couples would have less intra-relationship domestic 
violence. As such, the relevant comparison would only seem to 
be between same-sex couples and cohabiting (unmarried) 
opposite-sex couples. This analysis would render the finding 
more trustworthy, because it compares outcomes between 
similarly-situated groups—i.e., those who have not yet benefited 
from marriage’s stabilizing counsel.
537
  Nevertheless, the study 
groups married and unmarried opposite-sex couples into a single 
statistical group, which skews the relevant comparison, making 
it far less meaningful.  As such, it is irrational to conclude that 
this statistic provides any insight into our comparison of 
outcomes. 
 
 533. NCHS, Cohabitation, supra note 473, at 11. 
 534. See supra Part V.A.2.c. 
 535. One cannot make a logical argument by first identifying undesirable traits that are more 
likely to exist in the disfavored community than in the favored one, and then faulting the disfavored 
community for possessing those traits while congratulating the favored community for lacking 
them. 
 536. Timothy J. Dailey, Family Research Council, Comparing the Lifestyles of Homosexual 
Couples to Married Couples, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS04C02&v=PRINT (last visited Jan. 8, 
2007). 
 537. On this point, the study is infirm for two additional reasons: first, it elides the meaning of 
the word “violence” to include everything from verbal shouting to physical assault, rape, and 
stalking; and second, it capitalizes on this equivocation by refusing to control for confounding 
factors in data-collection, such as a particular group’s overall willingness or hesitancy to report. For 
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undereducated couples, etc.), significant differences would have been 
observed—perhaps not the same differences as those observed between same-
sex couples and married opposite-sex couples—but significant differences 
nevertheless. As Goodridge noted, such argumentation therefore “singles out the 
one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and 
transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage.”538 
Second, if the institution of marriage has all of the stabilizing and civilizing 
effects that the preservationists claim, then it is irrational to fault same-sex 
couples for failing to match the outcomes of opposite-sex married couples, when 
same-sex couples have never been offered the opportunity to benefit from 
marriage’s stabilizing, civilizing forces. And why have same-sex couples never 
been offered the opportunity to benefit from marriage? Because of their failure 
to match the outcomes of those who have.539 This is truly impenetrable logic. 
Encountering this circular double-bind feels about as rational as walking 
up to someone who’s obviously angry with you, asking them why they’re upset, 
and hearing them reply, “If you don’t know, then I’m certainly not going to tell 
you.” The preservationists have cleverly pieced together a closed-circuit 
feedback loop: No matter what homosexuals do to live the lives that the 
preservationists claim they should be living—i.e., lives of stability, monogamy, 
and commitment—it’s never going to be good enough. Why? Because 
preservationists believe that homosexuals are immoral, depraved, and 
redeemable only when they admit of self-hatred and unworthiness, and convert 
to heterosexuality.540 
 
example, heterosexual men in a cohabiting or marital relationship are widely considered to 
constitute up to forty percent of domestic violence victims. There are two key confounding factor in 
obtaining actual rates: first, a cultural unwillingness to report, and thereby, to appear weak or 
vulnerable; and second, cultural notions of what constitutes “violence” varies significantly between 
men and women. See Domestic Violence Against Men (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.oregon 
counseling.org/Handouts/DomesticViolenceMen.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 538. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003). 
 539. From this line of reasoning, one could easily conclude that, if we found that same-sex 
couples did match the outcomes of opposite-sex couples, then the preservationists would simply say, 
“Oh, then you don’t need marriage like the opposite-sex couples need it—let’s make sure they have it 
first.” Cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
 540. See Pew Forum, The Ties That Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Andrew Sullivan). 
[W]hat I would like to ask Mr. Bradley is, if you don’t agree with our right as citizens to 
enjoy the very fundamental right that others do, what would you have us do? How would 
you like gay people to live their lives? Are we supposed to not have relationships? Are we 
supposed to have no social support for those relationships? The religious right, on the one 
hand, wants to condemn gay people from [sic] being, “promiscuous;” but, on the other 
hand, they want to condemn us for getting married. What are we supposed to do? Where 
would you like us to go? The answer is, We’d like you to disappear off the face of the 
earth. 
. . . . 
You speak as if gay human beings don’t really exist or that you don’t need to have a 
proposal for them when you are simultaneously proposing to strip them of any basic civil 
rights for their relationships. That seems to me to speak volumes about where this 
argument is coming from, whether it’s coming from a desire for the common good or the 
common good only of people of whom you approve. 
Id. (alterations added). See also supra notes 358–65, 401–15 and accompanying text (discussing the 
preservationist theories of “reparative therapy” and sexual-orientation conversion). 
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This last observation leads us to the final point in this section. A 
preservationist might encounter our argumentation here, concede all of it, and 
still throw up her hands, saying, “Well, so what? I just don’t like gay people. I 
think they’re immoral. Isn’t that rational enough? Isn’t that secular enough?” 
Indeed, this is a powerful claim. Norms of morality have guided American 
social-policymaking for the entirety of our history, and they will—and should—
continue to inform our cultural discussion. The moral obligations we assume as 
a society are complex—too complex, indeed, for these pages. 
Instead of considering the deontological range of rights and duties that we 
carry, let us instead briefly consider Mill’s On Liberty.541 Prof. Mark Strasser boils 
down Mill’s “harm principle” to the following “taxonomy of conduct”: 
a) Those actions that are self-regarding are not appropriately subject to sanctions from 
either the state or society; 
b) Those actions which are hurtful to others without violating any of their legal rights 
may be subject to public condemnation, but are not thereby subject to legal 
sanction; and 
c) Those actions which violate the legal rights of others are subject not only to public 
condemnation, but also to legal sanction.542 
Strasser believes that this taxonomy of conduct was a significant linchpin 
undergirding Lawrence’s reasoning—particularly the portion of Lawrence that 
suggested the existence of “a certain sphere which should be free from 
government interference.”543 However, Strasser does not stop his analysis there. 
He concludes that Lawrence may have actually exceeded Millian values when it 
“suggest[ed] that the relations are protected because they may be part of a more 
enduring relationship, [thus] ascribing some degree of positive constitutional 
value to same-sex relationships.”544 
What does this have to do with preservationism? Well, it would be an 
overstatement of Lawrence to say that it applies some prospectively-helpful legal 
standard to our question—after all, Lawrence did expressly reserve the question 
of legally recognizing same-sex relationships.545 However, the Millian tax-
onomy, combined with Lawrence’s broader respect for same-sex relationships, 
goes a long way toward lessening the legal force of the “I just don’t like gay 
people” argument. 
First, it is both rational and secular to conclude that same-sex couples are 
self-regarding—that is, one can conclude that they work no harm against public 
or private interests. Thus, in this first taxonomic world, it is rational and secular 
to conclude that same-sex relationships are costless to the larger society, and 
 
 541. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1978) 
(1859), cited in Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and the 
Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285 (2006) [hereinafter Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex 
Relationships]. 
 542. Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships, supra note 542, at 287–88. 
 543. Id. at 292. 
 544. Id. at 294 (alterations added). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (noting that 
the sexual conduct at issue was “but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”). 
 545. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that the case “does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”). 
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that any resulting harm is entirely internalized by the parties. It is from this 
vantage point that one might begin an argument in favor of same-sex marriage. 
Second, it is also rational and secular to conclude that same-sex couples 
“are hurtful to others” but do not “violat[e] any of their legal rights.” If same-sex 
marriage were allowed, same-sex couples would probably have to settle for 
living in this second taxonomic world for the foreseeable future. The second 
world acknowledges that there are a lot of people in the world who simply don’t 
like gay people, but it also provides same-sex couples with enough protection to 
ensure that their interests as a minority are not “insecure.”546 One could also 
begin to make an argument for same-sex civil marriage from this vantage point, 
making sure to highlight that same-sex civil marriage is no more harmful to 
public and private interests than are the other so-called victimless behaviors that 
we currently permit. 
Third, it is an irrational and sectarian world that the preservationists are 
trying to construct for us. It is in this third taxonomic world that same-sex 
couples would find their interests to be the least secure yet—the claim would be 
that same-sex couples pose an irreparable harm to public and private interests, 
such that they should be punished, or—barring punishment—at least not given 
any civil rights. After all this argumentation and dissection, we see that it is this 
third world from which all preservationist arguments are being made. 
At root, all that we have left is a bald dislike for homosexuals and same-sex 
couples. It seems that both Romer and Lawrence thus answer the question before 
us: Preservationism, stripped of its idiosyncrasies, is nothing but bare animus—
an illegitimate and irrational basis for public policy.547 
6. Federalism, the Conflict of Laws, and Institutional Legitimacy 
Before leaving the secular purpose inquiry, there is one more question to 
answer: Why a federal constitutional amendment? Much of the impetus behind 
the FMA is due to the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, and 
the FMA’s proponents do not mask their desire to overrule the Goodridge 
decision by any means possible.548 By calling into question the institutional 
legitimacy of judicial review, the preservationists may indeed have a broader 
purpose in mind.549 In the context of same-sex marriage, preservationists are 
 
 546. “If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
 547. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to 
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not 
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group). 
 548. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[T]he most 
widely covered success in the effort to destroy traditional marriage[] came more recently in the state 
of Massachusetts where four judges ruled in the Goodridge case that marriage itself must be 
redefined to include same-sex couples . . . .” (alteration added)). 
 549. See Traditional Values Coalition, Our Battle Plan to Take Back Our Courts: The Plan to Win 
over Judicial Tyranny, http://www.ourbattleplan.com/plan.php (outlining a strategy for placing 
“constitutionalists”—code for religious conservatives—into a majority of positions on the federal 
bench) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
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only attacking the institutional legitimacy of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court because it ruled in favor of same-sex marriage. 
This is not to say that preservationists have no other reasons to attack the 
institutional legitimacy of the courts.550 It is merely to say that, in the context of 
the FMA, the attack comes only when courts decide in favor of same-sex 
relationships. Preservationists do not object to litigating same-sex civil marriage 
rights551—they only object to losing. This belies the truth that the preserva-
tionists’ problem is not with the courts, but with same-sex relationships. 
Why the flip-flopping? As a matter of constitutional structure and inherent 
powers, courts are either competent to decide same-sex civil marriage claims or 
they are not. Therefore, one can only assume it is because of a substantive 
objection to same-sex marriage—if the Massachusetts Court had ruled against 
the plaintiffs in Goodridge, it is clear that preservationists would be praising them 
for it.552 In terms of the FMA, then, the substantive attack seems to be more upon 
same-sex marriage than upon the institutional legitimacy of courts to order it. 
Procedurally speaking, then, proponents of the FMA claim that they merely 
want to “protect” marriage from “redefinition” by “activist” courts.553 Ancillary 
to this claim is the assertion that the definition of marriage should be left up to 
the people,554 and that a court order in favor of same-sex civil marriage in one 
 
 550. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion as a fundamental due-process 
right under the federal Constitution). 
 551. E.g., Josh Richman, Same-sex marriage handed a setback, OAKLAND TRIB. (Cal.) (online ed.), Oct. 
6, 2006 (reporting that Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel, who argued on behalf of the Campaign for 
California Families in the California marriage cases, was “eager to make his case to the Supreme 
Court”). 
 552. When the California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of that state’s marriage ban, 
preservationists celebrated a “victory.” See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, California Court Upholds State’s Ban 
on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A16 (reporting that Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel 
had characterized the decision as “a crushing defeat to the same-sex marriage agenda”); Maura 
Dolan & Lee Romney, Ban on Gays’ Ability to Wed Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 1 (reporting that 
“[c]onservative Christians involved in the litigation reacted with glee” (alteration added)); Lisa Leff, 
Appeals court upholds California’s ban on same-sex marriage, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 6, 2006, at A7 
(reporting that Monte Stewart of the Marriage Law Foundation claimed that the decision is “a 
victory for society’s most consequential social institution, and that is marriage”). 
 553. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“While recent 
court decisions handed down by activist judges may not respect the traditional definition of 
marriage, these decisions also highlight a lack of respect for the democratic process. . . . Any 
redefinition of marriage has been driven entirely by the body of government that remains 
unaccountable and unelected—the courts.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Musgrave). 
[M]ost legal experts expect DOMA to fall once a challenge finally reaches the high Court, 
which is why it would be the very height of foolishness to rely on the Supreme Court to 
protect marriage. Sadly, that august tribunal is part of the problem. Justice Scalia has 
already warned us that the Court’s 2003 Lawrence decision was only the beginning of a 
road at the end of which is a radical redefinition of marriage at the hands of the Court. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 554. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5440 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“Democracy 
and representative government are at the core of this debate. . . . The will of the people should 
prevail.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Musgrave) (“The 
American people want to settle this issue now. They don’t want us to wait to see how much havoc 
the courts will wreak on the definition of marriage before we act to protect it.”). 
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jurisdiction would eventually result in a nationwide imposition of same-sex civil 
marriage in all jurisdictions.555 
In response to the FMA, both opponents and advocates of same-sex civil 
marriage are crying “federalism.”556 On the one hand, opponents presume that 
the FMA will protect federalism for three reasons: (1) it forecloses the possibility 
that the Supreme Court would mandate a nationwide definition of marriage by 
court order, (2) it sends the question of defining marriage to the legislatures of 
all fifty states, and (3) it ensures that no conflict of laws questions arise between 
the states, as no state will be permitted to perform same-sex marriages that are 
legally enforceable. 
On the other hand, advocates claim that the FMA undermines federalism 
for three reasons: (1) it forecloses the possibility that states might act as 
laboratories for change—it prevents a state legislature or popular referendum 
from, at some point in the future, legalizing same-sex marriage, (2) it federalizes 
an area of law—family law—that has historically been regulated by the states, 
thereby intruding on the scope of their Tenth Amendment authority by 
expanding federal power, and (3) it intrudes on individual autonomy and 
decisionmaking about where to live—the states will not be able to efficiently 
respond to demands for same-sex marriage coming from a desirable market 
constituency. 
These arguments are based primarily on the constitutional structure and 
economic theory, but this should not distract from the point: Preservationists 
want to federalize marriage policy because it would overrule the Goodridge 
decision and prevent future courts from rendering Goodridge-like decisions in 
the future. Why is this? As discussed, it is because preservationists have a 
substantive, religiously-derived objection to same-sex civil marriage, and they 
are trying to honor that objection by imposing an ossified definition of religious 
marriage upon the entire nation. 
Yet despite this religious intent, preservationists instead claim that the 
FMA merely prevents America from sliding down one of the slippery slopes. 
However, this claim is disingenuous and intellectually dishonest. Even if same-
sex marriage advocates could prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that none of 
these slides would occur—i.e., that allowing same-sex civil marriage would 
have either a neutral or net-positive effect on social stability and culture—the 
preservationists’ substantive objections to same-sex marriage would not 
 
 555. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[S]ame-sex 
advocates have, through the courts, systematically and successfully trampled on laws democratically 
enacted through the States. If marriage is redefined for anybody, it is redefined for everybody. . . . If 
we fail to define marriage, the courts will not hesitate to do it for us.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. 
REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Musgrave) (“While the Goodridge case 
remains on the books, court dockets all over the country will continue to be ensnarled with same-sex 
marriage litigation as opponents of traditional marriage continue to fight to expand their agenda to 
the rest of the country.”). 
 556. Compare generally Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection, supra note 19, at 464–68 (arguing 
that the FMA advances federalism), with Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: 
Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic, 570 POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst.) 1 (2006) (arguing 
that the FMA damages federalism). 
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evaporate; their religiously-derived objections to homosexuality and same-sex 
relationships would remain unaffected. 
As a result, it is difficult to believe that supporters of the FMA have 
absolutely no homophobic or discriminatory purpose in mind whatsoever—the 
very substance of their objection appears to be that same-sex couples might 
someday receive the rights and benefits of marriage, in addition to whatever 
social approval the state’s legal imprimatur might confer. 
For their part, opposite-sex couples derive no direct benefit from—and 
suffer no hardships under—the FMA. However, the FMA directly impacts those 
same-sex couples who are seeking legal recognition for their relationships. By 
design, if not by language, the FMA singles out same-sex couples and imposes a 
unique legal handicap upon them: Under it, for same-sex couples to receive the 
legal recognition they seek, they must either (1) settle for “separate-but-equal” 
arrangements that mimic marriage (but which may only be enacted 
legislatively557) or (2) bring about such a substantial shift of opinion among 
Congresspersons and state legislatures as to repeal the FMA.558 
Prof. Gerard Bradley, a drafter of the FMA,559 once suggested a third way 
for same-sex couples to obtain legal protections for their relationships: Under 
the FMA, same-sex couples would have to convince a legislature to declare that 
a particular right is no longer an “incident of marriage.”560 Thus, the right would 
 
 557. 152 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“The amendment 
does not seek to prohibit, in any way, the lawful, democratic creation of civil unions or domestic 
partnerships. It does not prohibit private employers from offering benefits to same-sex couples. It 
denies no existing rights.”); id. at S5455 (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[W]e are limited the powers of 
the courts. We have not done anything to restrict the power of the legislature, except on the 
definition of marriage which is between a man and a woman.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. REC. 
S5519 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[U]nder my amendment, States remain free 
to address the issue of civil unions and domestic partnerships. Citizens acting through their state 
legislatures can bestow whatever benefits to same-sex couples they choose.”). But see id. at 5521 
(statement of Sen. Levin) (“[T]he very language of this constitutional amendment would make it 
unconstitutional for the States to create civil unions or domestic partnerships in their constitutions 
with any of the same legal benefits currently afforded to marriage.” (alteration added)). 
 558. At the time of this writing, there are 440 Representatives listed on the House’s website. See 
http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). There are 100 
Senators in the Senate. See http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). There are 50 states eligible to vote on federal constitutional amendments. 
Constitutional amendments must pass both houses of Congress with a two-thirds majority vote, or 
294 Representatives and 67 Senators, and they must be ratified by three-quarters of the states, or 38 
states. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
Assuming, then, that the FMA passed with the absolute minimum required number of votes, 
same-sex marriage advocates would have to convince at least one-third of each chamber of 
Congress, or 147 Representatives and 33 Senators, and at least one-half of the states, or 26 states 
(because of how the numbers work out), to reverse their votes on the FMA. This would require an 
incredibly costly political campaign that could easily take decades to complete. 
 559. Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide, supra note 378 (“I indeed was one of the radical natural-law 
‘jurisprudes’ who drafted the Federal Marriage Amendment . . . .” (statement of Prof. Bradley)) (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2006). 
 560. Id. (“The legislature has to decide if something which hitherto has been an incident of 
marriage isn’t any longer, because we’re extending to any large number of people.”; “[I]nsofar as the 
legislature takes something which had been an incident of marriage and extends it to people who are 
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not fall within the purview of the FMA, and same-sex couples (and, according to 
Bradley, anyone561) could take advantage of the right. 
This is an odd argument—Bradley wants to have his cake and eat it, too. 
First, Bradley supports a federal constitutional amendment to say—rather 
emphatically—that same-sex couples may not “redefine marriage.” Yet, Bradley 
also claims that same-sex couples can receive legal protections because they 
can—and should?—petition legislatures to “redefine marriage” by determining 
that certain rights are no longer “incidents of marriage.” So, which is it? Do 
same-sex couples have the right to “redefine marriage,” or don’t they? 
Moreover, Bradley fails to acknowledge the incredible political burden that 
successfully defining away the “incidents of marriage” would impose upon 
same-sex couples and their supporters. 
The problem with all of these procedural arguments is not that religious 
believers are civilly engaged in the marriage debate; I think most would agree 
that civic engagement is a good thing. Rather, the problem is that religious 
believers are trying to insinuate their religious beliefs into the law and impose 
those beliefs on the larger society, without providing a genuinely secular justification 
for doing so. While the procedural justification for the FMA is inherently secular, 
as we have seen, the entire reason for enacting it is not. 
B. Applying the Lemon-Endorsement Test 
“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion.’” 
–Justice David H. Souter, in McCreary County v. ACLU562 
We have determined that the proffered purposes for the FMA—and for 
same-sex marriage bans generally—are neither rational nor secular. 
Nevertheless, the preservationists may soon divine an excuse for same-sex 
marriage bans that passes the threshold question of secular purpose. As such, it 
is important to briefly conduct a Lemon-endorsement analysis to determine 
whether, despite the existence of a yet-undiscovered secular purpose, same-sex 
marriage bans endorse or establish religion.563 
At the outset, it is important to note that only the secular-purpose question 
can be characterized as a rational-basis inquiry with any confidence. The rest of 
the Lemon-endorsement test probably constitutes some form of heightened 
scrutiny, but it is unclear just how deferential this test is. For our purposes, the 
test’s heightened aspects will permit some additional poking and prodding, but 
 
not married, well, then, yes, by definition it’s no longer an incident of marriage, at least in that 
jurisdiction.” (statements of Prof. Bradley) (alteration added)). 
 561. Id. 
 562. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
 563. It is important to remember that the FMA has been used throughout this Article as 
exemplary of all same-sex marriage bans. The arguments used to support the FMA are the same as 
those used to support other bans. Certainly, it may seem cognitively silly to test the constitutionality 
of a constitutional amendment, but the analysis presented here retains its legal force against all non-
FMA bans, and as a method of argumentation generally. See also infra Part V.B.4. 
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the level of deference will remain remarkably close to the rational-basis scrutiny 
used earlier. 
Now recall our three-part question from above: Does the FMA have the (1) 
purpose or (2) effect of either endorsing or establishing religion, and (3) does it 
divide society according to individual religious beliefs? Analytically, it is 
simplest for us to divide the “purpose” and “effect” inquiries into two separate 
parts for ease of application: It is one thing to have an express purpose of 
endorsing or establishing religion, while it is another to have a primary effect of 
doing so. The third and final part of the inquiry will focus on whether the 
government’s action segments society into insiders and outsiders based upon 
their religious beliefs. 
1. What Does the Reasonable Observer Know About the Context and History of  
 Same-Sex Marriage Bans and the FMA? 
As a threshold matter, it is important to determine what the reasonable 
observer would know about the FMA, same-sex couples, preservationism, and 
the history of marriage. First, she is “presumed to be familiar with the history of 
the government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to show.”564 
Therefore, she knows the general history of the FMA and its various iterations. 
She is also familiar with the justifications given for the FMA in congressional 
debates and hearings, and she is well-versed in the preservationist arguments 
against same-sex marriage. She is also aware of the dispute among scholars 
regarding the exact meaning of the FMA—and particularly the dispute about its 
“legal incidents thereof” clause; she knows that there is not one overriding 
interpretation upon which a majority of commentators can agree. She is also 
aware of the explicitly-religious credentials of the FMA’s main proponents. 
Second, she is “familiar with implementation of government action.”565 
Therefore, she is aware of the history of federal same-sex marriage bans, 
including the legislative history and passage of the federal DOMA. She is aware 
of the religiously-based anti-gay justifications given in support of DOMA, and 
she is aware that such arguments have largely been discarded during the FMA 
debates and hearings in favor of more secular-sounding ones. 
Third, she inquires as to “‘the historical context of the statute . . . and the 
specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage.’”566 Therefore, she knows 
that the FMA is intended to constitutionalize marriage for two reasons: (1) to 
shore up any infirmities in the federal DOMA; and (2) to overrule the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Goodridge decision. She knows that the 
FMA has come up for a vote twice in each chamber, that it has failed each time, 
and that the text of the amendment has not changed significantly since it was 
first introduced. She also knows that, despite nominal changes in language, each 
iteration of the FMA is intended to accomplish the same purpose as the very 
first: Ban same-sex marriage and impose a single, religiously-derived definition 
of marriage on the entire nation. She is also aware of any obfuscation used to 
 
 564. Id. at 2737 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). 
 565. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted)). 
 566. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)) (alteration added). 
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cover up the religious definition of marriage that the FMA contains—she 
understands intuitively what the preservationists are trying to do. 
Fourth, she is “‘deemed aware of the history and context of the community 
and forum in which the religious display appears.’”567 Therefore, she is acutely 
aware of the impact that the FMA has a federal constitutional amendment: As 
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it would 
dictate marriage policy to all fifty states, the federal government, and all 
extraterritorial jurisdictions that are subject to United States federal law. She 
understands that the “forum” of the FMA is the federal Constitution—the only 
document to which all legal systems in the Union must swear allegiance. She 
understands the process of both ratifying and repealing amendments to the 
Constitution; she understands how difficult it would be to repeal the FMA if it 
were ratified. She understands the political and social implications of using the 
Constitution as a rights-restricting instead of a rights-expanding document for 
the first time in the nation’s history. 
As for the community, she understands that, as a federal constitutional 
amendment, the community of the FMA encompasses the entire nation. 
Therefore, she knows the history of same-sex marriage throughout America, 
including the case law, the state-level DOMAs and constitutional amendments, 
and the general religious sentiment against same-sex couples and 
homosexuality in general. She knows of the long history of commingling 
religious and civil marriage in America, and she is aware of the current diversity 
of opinion among religious groups regarding the morality of homosexuality and 
same-sex relationships. She is acutely aware of the ongoing sectarian debate 
within a number of major religions, and she knows that several major Christian 
and Jewish churches have made same-sex religious marriage available to gay 
and lesbian couples. 
2. Does the FMA Have the Purpose of Endorsing or Establishing Religion? 
Armed with this knowledge, she must now ask whether the proponents of 
the FMA have the purpose of endorsing or establishing religion. This is a tough 
question. Facially, the FMA is completely neutral regarding religion, religious 
belief, and homosexuality. Moreover, if asked, the proponents would probably 
say, “Of course, there are secular purposes for having the FMA!” As discussed 
above, the secular purposes underlying the FMA are tenuous at best—indeed, 
we have to assume the existence of one here just to permit the inquiry. 
Nevertheless, these facts give rise to the strong inference that the FMA does not 
have the facial purpose of endorsing or establishing religion. 
Moreover, the reasonable observer knows how adamantly the FMA’s 
supporters have disclaimed a discriminatory purpose. Even so, she will discover 
that several of the FMA’s key supporters have announced that they endorse the 
FMA because it codifies a definition of marriage derived from a specific set of 
Judeo-Christian beliefs.568 This sends up red flags. 
 
 567. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 568. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S7968 (2004) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (citing Matthew 19:4–6 as a 
justification for adopting the FMA’s definition of marriage); id. at S7980 (statement of Sen. Santorum) 
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As a result, she may be able to rationally determine that the law was 
developed with a specific religious objective in mind: To insinuate an 
identifiably-religious definition of “marriage” into the federal Constitution—
and by extension, to impose a sectarian religious belief on the entire nation. 
However, to make this rational determination now might prove too much, 
because the law is not facially sectarian. Therefore, she is going to reserve 
judgment. 
3. Does the FMA Have the Effect of Endorsing or Establishing Religion? 
The reasonable observer must now discern whether the effect of the FMA is 
to endorse or reject a religion or religious belief. The effect inquiry requires her 
to know how various American religions conceive of marriage. She must then 
determine whether the FMA has cherry-picked from among these religious 
beliefs—the root of her inquiry to determine whether the FMA shows favoritism 
to particular beliefs or, said differently, whether the FMA conveys disapproval 
to others. If it does either of these, the government’s definition of marriage has 
effectively endorsed one religion’s definition of marriage over another’s. 
Religions are not of one accord regarding the definition of marriage and the 
sanctity of same-sex marriages. From the brief survey of the major American 
religions that we conducted above,569 it is clear that no single definition of 
marriage prevails among religious believers.570 Two of these definitions are 
relevant here: (1) marriage can only be between one man and one woman, and 
(2) marriage is between two adults, regardless of gender. The beliefs that 
underpin these two definitions are theologically at odds with one another and 
are not easily reconcilable. It is unlikely that this theological crisis will be 
resolved anytime soon. 
Linking this dispute to the Establishment Clause is simple: When the 
government takes sides in a serious theological dispute, it has effectively 
endorsed the religion with which it sides.571 Moreover, when the government 
 
(stating that the “definition of traditional marriage” is “truth that has been established in Biblical 
times”); 150 CONG. REC. H7912 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (stating that marriage “was ordained 
by God”); id. at H7917 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (stating that marriage is a “covenant between one 
man and one woman”); 152 CONG. REC. S5458 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Thune) 
(noting that states “define marriage as a sacred union between a man and a woman”). 
 569. See supra Part I.B. 
 570. Some preservationists argue that, if this diversity of belief is the ground upon which we 
allow same-sex marriage, then the government must logically accommodate all religious conceptions 
of marriage: If a religious group believes that five adults and six children should marry eight horses, 
then why should the government stand in their way? 
This argument merely rehearses the slippery slope of perversity. See supra Part V.A.3.c. To briefly 
reiterate that discussion here: The government has a rationally secular interest in retaining a 
consensual, adult, two-party model of marriage. Adult-child-horse group marriage harms this 
interest because it involves (1) parties to a marriage who are incapable of giving legal consent and (2) 
a numerosity of parties to the relationship that harms the state’s rational interest in maintaining 
“good order.” Same-sex marriage does neither of these. Therefore, the secular interests that justify 
prohibiting adult-child-horse group marriage do not justify prohibiting same-sex civil marriage. 
 571. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2880 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that, 
in light of the competing translations of the Ten Commandments, the use of one version of the 
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attempts to conclusively resolve the dispute, it broaches on free-exercise 
territory as well, because it is effectively telling the minority group what it 
thinks the answer should be. 
As discussed, a sectarian dispute is raging about the definition of 
“marriage.” Same-sex marriage bans place the government in the middle of this 
dispute. By choosing to ban same-sex marriage, the government is undertaking 
a decidedly sectarian action—one that simultaneously discriminates against 
same-sex couples and the religions that support them. These religions are 
finding themselves told that their beliefs are less valuable to society because 
they are more inclusive of same-sex couples.572 
Because the FMA enacts a religiously-derived model of opposite-sex 
marriage, the reasonable observer has an even stronger case to rationally 
conclude that it has the effect of endorsing those religions that believe in only 
opposite-sex civil marriage, while simultaneously rejecting those religions that 
believe in a broader definition of marriage. Indeed, she is getting very close at 
this point. 
4. Does the FMA Segment Society into Political Insiders and Outsiders 
 Based Upon Their Religious Beliefs? 
“Government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without 
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or  
less than full members of the political community.” 
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter573 
We have briefly mentioned that there may be two separate Establishment 
Clause concerns with the FMA. The first claim is that the FMA is intended to 
impose a religiously-derived definition of marriage upon the entire nation; this 
 
Decalogue impermissibly placed the Texas government “at the center of a serious sectarian 
dispute”). 
 572. To be fair, we should ask whether allowing same-sex civil marriage would implicate the 
Establishment Clause analysis undertaken here. For starters, the test would be the same—as such, 
the government would have to articulate a rationally-secular justification for allowing same-sex civil 
marriage. It is likely that the government would have very little trouble doing so: (1) we have 
identified a number of secular reasons for having civil marriage generally; (2) allowing same-sex 
civil marriage broadens the right to marry; and (3) allowing same-sex civil marriage does not dictate 
to any religion what it must believe or how it must practice that belief. Remember, even though civil 
marriage permits divorce and remarriage, because the Catholic Church does not believe in divorce, 
it is not required to perform re-marriage ceremonies. 
Therefore, courts would probably perceive that, in allowing same-sex civil marriage, the 
government has a generally-applicable, non-invidious purpose in mind: Of the two available 
definitions, the preservationist definition fits within the advocate’s definition. As such, neither 
preservationists nor advocates would be excluded from the definition of marriage if the advocates’ 
definition were chosen. Conversely, under the preservationists’ definition, advocates are expressly 
excluded from the definition of marriage. It is this exclusionary effect that matters here: Because the 
advocates’ definition is not inherently exclusionary—even though the preservationists might find it 
offensive—it does not appear to be susceptible of the same concerns raised here. 
 573. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627–28 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal cross-references omitted). 
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claim is the by far the more important of the two. However, the second possible 
claim arises here, in the neutrality context. 
The second claim is that the FMA is intended to choose one form of 
religious marriage from all available definitions, and to then establish the 
preferred definition. We have also shown that, to at least some extent, this is the 
effect of the FMA. Choosing this religiously-derived definition of marriage runs 
afoul of the neutrality requirement: Because the FMA would be enacted within 
the context of an ongoing sectarian dispute, the reasonable observer cannot 
conclude that the government is treating religions neutrally when it expressly 
adopts the beliefs of some while rejecting the beliefs of others. 
So what?, one might ask. The government needs some definition of 
marriage, does it not? Indeed, that is true. However, the definition of marriage 
that it adopts it must choose for rational, secular reasons. As discussed, the 
definition that the FMA has chosen is neither rational nor secular as related to 
the justifications given for the law. This is not to say that one-man, one-woman 
marriage is never rational or secular; it is only to say that, insofar as the FMA’s 
proponents have explained themselves, they have not given a convincing 
account of why their definition is rationally secular. 
Nevertheless, the reasonable observer’s inquiry is not complete: She must 
finally determine whether the FMA creates a class of political outsiders. 
Specifically, she must determine whether adherence to religious belief generally 
is “relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the community.”574 She will have little 
trouble concluding that the FMA has the effect of creating a sizeable class of 
political outsiders—those who, whether for religious or irreligious reasons, do 
not ascribe to the religiously-derived “one-man, one-woman” marriage model. 
This includes same-sex couples, who by their very existence do not ascribe to the 
religiously-derived definition of marriage; it also includes several major Judeo-
Christian groups. Finally, we cannot forget that it rejects the beliefs of the entire 
family of Secularist groups, all of whom support same-sex marriage. 
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis sought to mitigate the “numerous 
more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or 
convey a message of disapproval to others.”575 Civil marriage is a bundle of 
rights, benefits, and responsibilities that only the government can bestow. Its 
very existence evidences a belief that the government prefers certain 
relationship models over others. This is not inherently wrong: The government 
can offer up a number of secular justifications for holding this preference. The 
argument made here is that the FMA has failed to provide a rationally secular 
justification for having this particular preference. 
Adopting the FMA’s exclusionary definition of marriage constitutes the 
very favoritism that O’Connor sought to avoid. At best, the FMA conveys an 
undeniable message of disapproval religious believers who embrace the 
theological validity of same-sex unions. At worst, the FMA is designed to 
punish those religious believers for their beliefs by making them political 
outcasts. 
 
 574. See id. at 625. 
 575. Id. at 627–28 (O’Connor, concurring). 
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As discussed, the FMA was used in this paper as exemplary of all same-sex 
marriage bans, whether those codified in judicial decisions, state Defense of 
Marriage Acts, or state constitutional amendments. The preservationist 
arguments discussed here are rehearsed ad nauseam on a microcosmic scale 
within the states. Each ban has this same imposing purpose, makes this same 
sectarian choice, and has this same alienating effect. As discussed, no rational 
secular justification has been put forward to justify favoring the beliefs of one 
religion over another. We can only conclude, then, that same-sex marriage bans 
violate the Establishment Clause for their lack of neutrality toward religions and 
religious beliefs. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RESOLVING OUR DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM 
“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect.” 
–Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in Palmore v. Sidoti576 
We return now to the definitional question that opened this paper: What is 
“marriage”? As we have seen, “marriage” is what we make of it. The law is 
clear—if we are going to base our definition of marriage on a traditionally 
religious institution, we have to have a legitimate secular purpose for doing so. 
The alternate course of action suggested here is to deliberately extricate 
civil marriage from religious marriage. In doing so, our task will be to identify 
normative reasons why a certain number and gender of individuals should be 
allowed access to civil marriage. As part of this process, the government should 
continue its course of re-conceiving of civil marriage as a legal system designed 
both to secure legal benefits for families and to transfer property, wealth, and 
inter-generational responsibilities. This secular, marriage-autonomy model 
tracks nicely with the free market that already exists for opposite-sex couples.577 
Re-privatizing religious marriage should not sound scary: America’s free-
exercise, free-speech, and freedom of association jurisprudence is strong. No 
matter what civil definition of marriage we ultimately adopt, religious marriage 
will always be free to continue in its own way, unfettered, because it will always 
be based on the subjective beliefs of the particular adherents—Catholics can 
continue to refuse to recognize divorce, Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints can 
continue to believe in polygamy, and Unitarian-Universalists can continue to 
believe in same-sex religious marriage. 
Several of the preservationist arguments raised and dismissed above, while 
being in and of themselves legitimate, are not rationally advanced by same-sex 
marriage bans. As discussed, this Article is concerned primarily with the case 
against same-sex marriage, not the case for it—as such, affirmative arguments in 
favor of same-sex marriage are distinctly lacking, and for good reason: They 
serve to distract from the laser-sharp perceptiveness that we must wield in 
identifying and exposing the religious foundations of same-sex civil marriage 
bans. Whether the cure for this constitutional infirmity comes in the form of civil 
 
 576. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
 577. See supra note 54. 
19_WILSON.DOC 2/8/2007 2:11 PM 
678 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:561 2007 
marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, or an as-yet-unknown legal 
relationship—that is a question for another day. 
Sedimentation theory shows that the preservationists have begun to dig 
deep to find adequately secular justifications for imposing a sectarian definition 
of marriage on the entire nation. Because these justifications come up short 
every time, the invidious religious purpose underlying same-sex marriage bans 
is usually revealed upon even a cursory logical inquiry. According to McCreary 
County, this religious objective cannot be adequately extinguished by simply 
varnishing the truth—we must politely request that it retire itself to the private 
sector of religious belief. Brave same-sex couples around the nation have made 
incredible sacrifices in the process of starting this conversation about re-
privatizing religious marriage. 
One might question why it’s such a problem to base our nation’s definition 
of marriage on an historically religious one that reflects the religious beliefs of a 
majority of Americans. For those who believe that majorities should always 
have their way simply because they are majorities, there is no ready answer to 
this dilemma. So far, all of the supposedly secular reasons advanced to support 
an opposite-sex-couples-only definition of marriage appear to be mere pretexts 
for religiously-based anti-gay bigotry. Moreover, the arguments against same-
sex marriage are becoming more and more attenuated; mere creativity or 
reinvention seems unable to eradicate the religious objective that originally 
underpinned these bans. 
Invoking the Establishment Clause to strike down same-sex marriage bans, 
therefore, deports these religious beliefs back to the pews where they belong. As 
mentioned, this leaves religious beliefs unmolested, and religious adherents will 
remain free to believe whatever they choose about homosexuals and to practice 
those beliefs unfettered by government interference. 
Additionally, denying same-sex couples access to a genuinely secular 
definition of civil marriage perpetuates bigotry and homophobia at a tangible 
cost to these couples and their families. As the Andrew Sullivan-Gerard Bradley 
debate demonstrates, opponents of same-sex marriage have offered up no 
response to explain why this hardship should continue. Whether their purpose 
is as invidious as Sullivan perceives it to be is not the point—when 
preservationists are asked what help they would give to strengthen same-sex 
families, they simply remain silent. Just as rational-basis review does not justify 
abdicating the judicial role, neither does utter silence justify perpetuating harm 
to children. If the children of heterosexual parents really do deserve better 
treatment and more security than the children of homosexual parents, it is 
important for preservationists to explain why. 
Until they do, we will be left to wonder: Preservationists claim that 
marriage is about protecting children. If marriage is really about protecting 
children, then it would be about protecting all children, not just those of 
heterosexual parents—right? Preservationists claim that marriage is about 
encouraging the creation of families. If marriage is really about encouraging the 
creation of families, then it would be about encouraging the creation of all 
families, not just those falling within a vaguely-stated hetero-normative 
“ideal”—right? Preservationists claim that marriage is about social stability and 
values-transmission. If marriage is really about engineering social stability, then 
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we should be undertaking to prohibit divorce, adultery, and pre- or extra-
marital sex—right? 
It is not believable that the preservationists spouting off about “ideal 
environments,” “gender complementarity,” and “values transmission” in 
congressional testimony have genuinely secular objectives in mind. No 
Secularist has been put forward to lend credible support to the “family values” 
talk that preservationists are constantly regurgitating to Congress and state 
legislatures. Much like drawing a fish in the sand,578 this rhetoric is—and always 
will be—a coded message of bigotry passed between religious believers, 
conveniently cloaked in the secular-sounding rhetoric of pseudo-scientific 
claims about children and social stability. 
It is likely that enforcing the Establishment Clause against same-sex 
marriage bans will remain politically unpalatable to judges for some time—
particularly to those state-court judges who answer to their electorates. Should a 
court strike down a ban on Establishment Clause grounds, the initial backlash 
will not be easily withstood. 
Preservationists may accuse me of being hostile toward religion. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. I believe in returning religion to its rightful 
sphere in which individuals practice autonomously-chosen beliefs in private, 
without being permitted to impose those beliefs on government, society, or the 
nation. I believe in the Framers’ ideal of keeping divine authority separate from 
secular authority. Adhering to this ideal is hardly hostile to religion—indeed, it 
is democracy-saving: Democracy suffers when any religion hijacks our secular 
government, even if that religion claims to represent the beliefs of the majority 
of Americans. Returning religion to the pews and returning secularity to the 
government is good for both. Giving legal force to religious ideology perverts 
both the law and religion, and religious tyranny in any form subverts the 
promises of our Constitution. 
We must extricate civil marriage from religious marriage. If we are going to 
deny same-sex couples the right to marry, we must have a genuinely—and 
rationally—secular reason for doing so. As discussed, that ship has likely sailed, 
for the stain of a religious objective will not easily be bleached away: 
Preservationists would commandeer the government to impose their religious 
beliefs on the nation. Moreover, the government would choose between 
competing religious beliefs about the definition of “marriage” and then reward 
adherence to the chosen belief with “insider” status. This violates basic 
neutrality principles, endorses one religion over others, and creates a 
significantly-sized class of outsiders. The Establishment Clause cannot abide 
such an abuse of power: It is exactly the kind of religious tyranny the 
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent. 
 
 578. In the days of the early church, back when Christians were genuinely persecuted for their 
beliefs, they drew fishes in the sand to identify one another. One person would draw the top arc of 
the fish with his foot, and the second person would use his foot to draw the bottom arc of the fish. If 
the second person did not complete the drawing, the first person pretended that his own arc was just 
a doodle in the sand. Religious Tolerance.org, Christian Symbols: Fish (Ichthus), Cross & Crucifix, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_symb.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
